Earnings Quality in U.K. Private Firms

Earnings quality in U.K. private firmsΙ

Ray Ball a,* and Lakshmanan Shivakumar b

a Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60637, USA

b London Business School, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom

Abstract

UK private and public companies face substantially equivalent regulation on auditing, accounting standards and taxes. We hypothesize that private-company financial reporting nevertheless is lower quality due to different market demand, regulation notwithstanding. A large UK sample supports this hypothesis. Quality is operationalized using Basu’s (1997) time-series measure of timely loss recognition and a new accruals-based method. The result is not affected by controls for size, leverage, industry membership and auditor size, or by allowing endogenous listing choice. The result enhances understanding of private companies, which are predominant in the economy. It also provides insight into the economics of accounting standards.

JEL Classification: M41; K22; N24

Keywords: Earnings quality; conservatism; loss recognition; private firms; economics of accounting standards; earnings time series; accruals.

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ΙWe are grateful for helpful comments from Sudipta Basu, Martin Casey, Greg Clinch, Gilad Livne, Jim Seida, Michelle Yetman, Jim Wahlen, Gregory Waymire (the referee), Jerold Zimmerman (the editor), and participants at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Accounting Asso ciation, University of Chicago, Indiana University, London Business School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Notre Dame and University of Toronto. Ball gratefully acknowledges financial support from the University of Chicago, Graduate S chool of Business.

*Corresponding author. Present address: Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, IL 60637-1561; Phone: +1-773-834-5941; fax: +1-773-834-4585.

E-mail address: ray.ball@https://www.wendangku.net/doc/0013447872.html, (R. Ball)

Earnings Quality in U.K. Private Firms

1. Introduction

We examine timely loss recognition – an important attribute of financial reporting quality – in a large sample of U.K. private and public firms. Private company reporting is interesting in its own right, due to the predominance of private companies in the economy.1 The U.K. setting is parti cularly interesting, because U.K. private company reporting is subject to substantially equivalent regulatory provisions as public company reporting, whereas the markets for private and public financial reporting are substantially different. The U.K. therefore provides a rare opportunity to study the interaction between market and regulatory effects (Ball, Robin and Wu 2000, 2002; Ball 2001). We argue that the market demands lower quality financial reporting for private companies than for public companies, regulation notwithstanding, and report evidence consistent with that view. The result enhances our understanding of the economic role of accounting standards, an issue that is surprisingly neglected in the literature.

Three principal features of the U.K. financial reporting regulations are substantially equivalent for private and public companies. First, the U.K. Companies Act requires all private and public companies to file annual financial statements that comply with the same accounting standards. Second, financial statements filed by U.K. private companies must be audited (there is an exemption for very small companies, but no firms in our sample qualify). Third, private and public companies are subject to the same tax laws. These are the major regulatory institutions for U.K. financial reporting, and they are substantially equivalent for public and private companies.

1 Over 90% of registered U.K. companies are private (Companies House, U.K.). They constitute 99.9% of all private non-agricultural entities in 1993 Europe (Mulhern 1995). The Forbes list of the top 500 U.S. private companies (https://www.wendangku.net/doc/0013447872.html,/private500/) includes 245 with revenues exceeding $1 billion in 2000. The U.S. Small Business Admin istration (https://www.wendangku.net/doc/0013447872.html,/advo/stats/facts99.pdf) reports that in 1998 businesses with fewer than 500 employees accounted for 51% of US GDP, 47% of sales, and 53% of private nonfarm employment. The role of small firms in job creation, growth and innovation is widely debated; see Schumpeter (1934) and Acs (1996).

Nevertheless, the market for financial reporting differs substantially between private and public companies. Private companies are more likely to resolve information asymmetry by an “insider access” model. They are less likely to use public financial statements in contracting with lenders, managers and other parties, and in primary and secondary equity transactions. Their financial reporting is correspondingly more likely to be influenced by taxation, dividend and other policies. These differences imply a demand for lower quality financial reporting.

We interpret reporting quality in abstract terms as the usefulness of financial statements to investors, creditors, managers and all other parties contracting with the firm. Following Basu (1997), we measure a single but nevertheless important attribute of reporting quality: timeliness in financial-statement recognition of economic losses. Timely loss recognition increases financial statement usefulness generally, particularly in corporate governance and debt agreements. Governance is affected because timely loss recognition makes managers less likely to make investments they expect ex ante to be negative-NPV, and less likely to continue operating investments with ex post negative cash flows. Debt is affected because timely loss recognition provides more accurate ex ante information for loan pricing and more quickly triggers debt agreement rights (su ch as repricing, and restrictions on leverage, investment and dividends) from violating covenants based on ex post accounting ratios. We therefore argue that timely recognition of economic losses is an important attribute of financial reporting quality.2 Our principal result is that timely loss recognition is substantially less prevalent in private companies than in public companies, despite the groups facing equivalent regulatory rules. The result is apparent in both a test for transitory time-series components in income and a new test based on the relation between accruals and cash flow from operations. It is robust with respect to controls for size, leverage, industry and fiscal year-end (which influence the likelihood of

2 The literature on timely loss recognition, conservatism and value relevance are discussed further in Section 2.3.

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experiencing an economic loss) and for auditor firm size. It also is robust with respect to alternative definitions of both income (inclusion or exclusion of exceptional and/or extra-ordinary items) and operating cash flow (estimated from successive balance sheets or directly from cash flow statements), alternative estimation methods (Fama-MacBeth t-statistics, extent of data Winsorizing) and alternative model specifications (a selection model addressing endogeneity of the public/private choice). This result cannot be attributed to ris k or tax differences between private and listed firms. The lower timeliness of loss recognition observed in private companies relative to public companies, despite the substantive equivalence of their reporting rules, supports the view that market demand substantially determines important financial reporting properties.

As financial reporting criteria, quality and usefulness differ from economic efficiency because they do not address optimality. Lower quality does not imply sub-optimality because it can arise from either lower demand for or higher cost of supplying quality. Our findings thus should not be interpreted as supporting stricter regulation of financial reporting by private firms. Quite the contrary: our hypothesis is that lower earnings quality in private firms is an optimal outcome in the market for financial reporting, not a failure in supply.

The following section describes the economic role of timely loss recognition (the attribute of earnings quality we measure), and its relation to conservatism and “value relevance.” The section also outlines our two principal tests of loss recognition timeliness: Basu’s (1997) method of identifying transitory loss components in income; and a test we develop that is based on the relation between accruals and cash flow from operations. Section three describes the relevant UK institutional features and develops the hypothesis that loss recognition timeliness is substantially affected by the different economic roles of financial reporting in private and public companies. Section four describes the data, section five presents the principal results, and section six describes a variety of specification tests to ensure the robustness of the results. The final two sections consider alternative explanations and summarize our conclusions.

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2. Timely loss recognition: hypotheses and tests

This section outlines the economic role of timely loss recognition in accounting, and its relation to conservatism and to value relevance. It then describes the two measures of loss recognition timeliness we utilize: Basu’s (1997) test for transitory time-series components in income and a new test based on the relation between accruals and cash flow from operations. 2.1 Timeliness of accounting income

Accounting income is a barometer for evaluating financial reporting in general, because changes in balance sheet quantities flow through the income statement (assuming “clean surplus” accounting and ignoring offsetting changes such as reclassifications). Timely income-statement recognition therefore implies timely revision of all financial statement variables and all financial ratios based on them.

Economic income incorporates both current-period cash flow and any revision in the present value of expected future cash flows.3 Accounting recognit ion of economic income can be thought of as occurring under two broad models: deferred and timely recognition. Deferred recognition largely ignores revisions in expectations and awaits the realization of the revised cash flows themselves. For a multi-period investment, revisions in expected cash flow for any one future period are likely to be correlated with revisions for other future periods, so deferred recognition incorporates economic gains and losses in accounting income over its entire life. Equivalently, deferred recognition generates persistent components of accounting income. Timely recognition incorporates unrealized gains or losses in income (and hence the balance sheet) on an accrued basis, for example as inventory write-downs or as restructuring or asset

3 Economic income i s change in market value of equity, adjusted for dividends and capital contributions. This corresponds to the Hicks (1946) definition of income as t he maximum amount that can be consumed consistent with the maintenance of wealth. Hicks discusses alternative definitions.

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impairment charges. Our tests seek to identify which recognition model is most prevalently used for economic gains and losses, and how this choice differs between public and private companies.

The following subsections discuss the disproportio nate emphasis that is placed on loss recognition in accounting, relative to gain recognition, and how this asymmetry is related to conservatism and value relevance.

2.2 Economic role of asymmetric timeliness in income-statement recognition of gains and losses

Accountants are reluctant to recognize (i.e., incorporate in audited financial statements) information managers possess about future cash flows when it is unobservable to external parties, and hence is unauditable (unverifiable). Thus, under the revenue recognition rules, reported income is based on actual cash flow realizations, adjusted for accruals that are derived from independently-verifiable predictors of future cash flows. One such predictor is the verified amount of accounts receivable, which is a predictor of future cash inflow, other things equal. Ignoring unverifiable information about future cash flows – such as that embodied in managers’ expectations, strategies and plans – reflects a trade-off between relevance and reliability (Financial Accounting Standards Board 1984, para. 77).

Financial reporting normally modifies the revenue recognition rules by adopting a lower verification standard for information about decreases in expected future cash flows (i.e., economic losses) than for increases (i.e., economic gains).4 A primary reason for asymmetric accounting recognition is that managers have an asymmetric incentive to reveal their private information.5 Timeliness of economic loss incorporation is an important attribute of earnings

4 Basu (1997, page 7), Watts (2003).

5 Gilman (1939, page 232), Watts and Zimmerman (1986, page 206).

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quality because it makes financial statements more useful in several contexts, for example in corporate governance and loan agreements. 6

The governance effect of timely loss incorporation is due to it mitigating agency problems associated with managers’ investments decisions. If managers know ex ante that losses will be recognized during their tenure, then they are less likely to make negative-NPV investments, such as “pet” projects or “trophy” acquisitions. In contrast, if managers can defer loss recognition to periods when the reduced cash flows underlying negative NPVs are realized, then the earnings consequences of their investment decisions can be passed on to subsequent generations of managers. The ability to defer loss recognition also provides managers with an accounting-based incentive to continue operating investments with ex post negative NPVs, to avoid reported losses on sale or abandonment. These agency problems are mitigated by timely loss recognition, which reports losses around the time expectations are revised downward, irrespective of managers’ decisions to continue or abandon. Timely loss recognition therefore increases managers’ incentives to act quickly to limit economic losses, and thereby increases the efficiency of contracting between firms and managers.7

The efficiency of debt agreements that utilize financial statement variables also is affected. Timely loss recognition can assist ex ante loan pricing by providing new information to lenders. It also is quicker in triggering ex post violations of covenants based on financial statement variables. This increases debt agreement efficiency by more quickly giving lenders the option to impose contractual restrictions (such as leverage, investment and dividend restrictions) on covenant violators. This applies to covenants triggered by income-statement variables such as

6 Recent awareness of the importance of losses is due to Hayn (1995), Elliott and Hanna (1996), Francis, Hanna and Vincent (1996) and Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997). Basu (1997) studies timely loss recognition, discussed below.

7 An example is reported in DaimlerBenz AG Annual Report 1996 (English language version, pages 44-45), reproduced in Ball (1998). Daimler implemented US GAAP standards for calculating earnings throughout the corporation, reducing the discretion that individual business-unit managers exercised in reporting their own performance (including their capacity to hide losses), and requiring them to focus more on shareholder value.

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minimum interest coverage and balance-sheet variables such as leverage ratios, because accounting losses flow from the income statement onto the balance sheet values of asset, liability and owners’ equity accounts. Consequently, timely income-statement incorporation of economic losses more quickly transfers decision rights from loss-making managers to lenders.

We do not focus on timely gain recognition, for three overlapping reasons. First, we conjecture there is less demand for it. Managers have a greater incentive to disclose timely information about unrealized economic gains than unrealized losses (they can realize gains by selling), so external parties are likely to demand an offsetting asymmetry in the financial statements. For example, managers have incentives to disclose economic gains to potential lenders to obtain favorable ex ante debt pricing, thereby skewing the demand from lenders toward loss recognition in the financial statements. Further, debt agreements do not generally transfer decision rights when covenants are exceeded, only when they are violated, so there is lower ex post demand for timely gain recognition.8 In the context of corporate governance, potential agency issues arise from managers undertaking or continuing negative-NPV (not positive NPV) investments, so there is less demand from investors for timely gain recognition derived from contracting with managers. Overall, the economics of contracts involving finan cial reporting predicts asymmetry in the demand for gain and loss accounting.

Second, we note that accounting rules and practice are fundamentally asymmetric. Recall that economic gains and losses involve changes in expected future cash flows, which by definition are “unrealized.” A long-standing example of asymmetric accruals is the lower of cost or market inventory rule, which recognizes unrealized economic losses arising from declines in fair values of inventory, but does not recognize unrealized gains. Accounting for gains and losses

8 Beatty and Weber (2002) report that performance-pricing, under which interest rates vary inversely with accounting performance measures, is a new feature of U.S. debt contracts. While this provides incentives for timely recognition

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on long-term assets also is asymmetric, as formalized in the asset impairment standards issued by several countries, including FAS 121 and 144 in the U.S. and FRS11 in the U.K. In contrast, upward revaluation has not been practiced in the U.S. since the SEC was established in 1934. In the U.K., although upward revaluation can be recognized in the balance sheet, gains from revaluation are not included in income like losses from asset impairment. In general, asymmetry is a fundamental property of accounting rules and practice.

Third, the evidence is consistent with timely gain recognition not being a high priority in accounting. Basu (1997) reports that loss recognition is the prime source of timeliness in U.S. earnings. The asymmetry is difficult to reconcile with a symmetric value relevance view of accounting (Holthausen and Watts 2001). It replicates for public companies in a wide range of countries, including the U.K. (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000).

The three reasons for not focusing on gain recognition are far from independent. To the extent that accounting standards are endogenous rather than imposed, asymmetry in demand will be reflected in standards (e.g., standards for asset impairment but not for upward revaluation), and the evidence will reveal an asymmetric response of earnings to economic gains and losses.

2.3 Timely loss recognition, value relevance and conservatism

Timely loss recognition is related to the concepts of value relevance and conservatism. This subsection attempts to clarify those concepts and how they relate to each other, with a view to understanding timely loss recognition, which is the attribute of reporting quality we measure.

In a Basu (1997) piecewise-linear regression with fiscal-year stock return as the independent variable and current-year accounting income as the dependent variable, timely loss recognition is equivalent to a partial stock price association criterion. In this context, stock returns proxy for economic gains and losses, assuming some degree of market efficiency. The association of economic gains, we are not aware of this being practiced in the U.K. during our sample period. In any event, our

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criterion is partial in that it focuses on losses, whereas a full association criterion also addresses gains. Further, the use of fiscal-year returns implies there is no gap in calendar time between successive return intervals, as is the case with short windows. Fiscal-year association tests therefore map directly into value relevance tests. In particular, timelier recognition of fiscal-year economic gains and losses (proxied by fiscal-year stock returns) implies a higher correlation between book and market values.

The relation between timely loss recognition and conservatism is clouded by the existence of two related but distinct definitions o f conservatism. One definition of conservatism is an accounting bias toward reporting low book values of stockholders equity (and hence, if clean surplus accounting is being followed, low average net incomes). The second definition of conservatism is an equivalent bias conditional on firms experiencing contemporaneous economic losses. Confusion of the unconditional and conditional versions of conservatism is evident as early as Gilman (1939, page 130) and APB Statement No. 4.

In the more recent literature, Watts and Zimmerman define conservatism as:9

Conservatism means that the accountant should report the lowest value among possible

alternative values for assets and the highest alternative value for liabilities. Revenues

should be recognized later rather than sooner and expenses sooner than later.

This is a variant of the first definition above, in that it does not specify conditionally low equity or income, and hence does not address loss-recognition timeliness. To illustrate, under this definition a firm’s accounting is conservative if it simply delays revenue recognition by one period, or subtracts a constant from earnings every period, independent of current economic gains and losses. This type of conservatism is an asymmetric response to uncertainty: from a range of possible values, select a low value, not the expected value. It frequently is associated with

hypothesis is that there is asymmetrically less demand – not no demand – for timely gain recognition.

9 Watts and Zimmerman (1986, pages 205-206). See al so Watts (1993, page 1).

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Germany, where under the vorsicht (prudence) principle there are unconditionally conservative practices such as charging future operating expenses against current-period income.10 Basu (1997) is an important contribution to our understanding of the conservatism concept. He defines conservatism as (page 4, emphasis added):

I interpret conservatism as capturing accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree of

verification for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements. Under my interpretation of conservatism, earnings reflects bad news more quickly than good news. Basu (pages 7-8) compares this definition – which stresses the timeliness of loss recognition – with variants of the first definition. The additional requirement of this conditional conservatism definition is that the reduction in accounting income reflects a contemporaneous economic loss. This requirement is not satisfied by expensing early, by deferring revenue, or by under-reporting income or book value on a regular basis (e.g., creating excessive provisions in all years), none of which is correlated with contemporaneous real income. The difference in definitions is most apparent in Basu’s primary research design, which studies the asymmetric incorporation of economic gains and losses (proxied by positive and negative stock returns over the fiscal year) in current-year accounting income.

The distinction between conditional and unconditional asymmetry is central to understanding the role of conservatism in efficient contracting with the firm. Watts (1993, abstract page) hypothesizes that accounting conservatism “evolved from accounting’s contracting role.” He singles out “avoidance of inappropriate distributions to claim holders” to protect more senior claims (notably, debt) as “an important contracting reason for conservatism.” Watts (1993, page 5) mentions the effect of conservatism “to offset the manager’s optimism (engendered by

10 See, for example, (Gray 1980). Delaying recognition or under-reporting income correspondingly reports lower book values of equity, hence lower asset values or higher liabilities.

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compensation based on income).”11 Gilman (1939, page 232) explores similar effects of conservatism, and also suggests a political costs motive.

The “timely loss recognition” version of conservatism provides fresh insight into its contracting role. It is difficult to see how contracting is affected by conservatism in the form of an unconditional accounting bias of known magnitude. Rational agents would simply invert the bias. For example, if book values of assets were under-reported by a known pr oportion ?, leverage covenants would increase the proportion of book value that firms could borrow by a factor of (1-?)-1, without affecting the lending rate or the circumstances under which covenants were violated. In addition, unconditional biases reduce opportunities to account in a conditionally conservative fashion (for example, writing off assets at acquisition eliminates the opportunity to impair them at the time of economic losses). Contracting-based demand for a known unconditional bias thus seems unlikely. Further, an unconditional bias of unknown magnitude introduces randomness in decisions based on financial information and can only reduce contracting efficiency.12 In contrast, the conditional form of conservatism (timely loss recognition) can improve contracting efficiency. It more quickly triggers debt covenant violations that transfer decision rights to lenders, allowing lenders to restrict managers’ actions (such as distributions, borrowing, and new investment) sooner after economic losses become apparent, thereby increasing the efficiency of debt contracting. Similarly, timely loss recognition gives managers less incentive to undertake ex ante negative-NPV projects and more incentive to abandon ex post loss-making investments quickly, thereby increasing the efficiency of compensation contracting and corporate governance.13 While unconditional conservatism seems

11 Earlier, Watts and Zimmerman (1986, page 206) hypothesized a purpose of conservatism is to “offset managerial optimism (presumably encouraged by earnings-based compensation plans).”

12 These points are made in the context of German vorsicht conservatism in Ball (1998).

13 The role of timeliness in debt and governance is discussed in Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000, page 52), Ball (2001, pages 138-140), and Ball, Robin and Wu (2002, pages 4-5).

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inefficient or at best neutral in contracting, conditional conservatism (timely loss recognition) can enhance contracting efficiency.

Confusion between the unconditional and conditional versions of conservatism helps explain why conservatism is a controversial property of accounting, despite its long–standing influence on practice.14 Ambivalence is evident in APB Statement No. 4, which seemingly approves of conservatism in its unconditional version (AICPA 1970, ?171):

Conservatism. Frequently, assets and liabilities are measured in a context of significant

uncertainties. Historically, managers, investors, and accountants have generally preferred that possible errors in measurement be in the direction of understatement rather than

overstatement of net income and net assets.

while combining the versions among accounting’s “characteristics and limitations” (?35): Conservatism. The uncertainties that su rround the preparation of financial statements are reflected in a general tendency toward early recognition of unfavorable events and

minimization of the amount of net assets and net income.

Later, FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2 defines conservatism with seeming approval as “prudent reaction to uncertainty” (FASB 1980, Glossary), which it interprets by quoting the unconditional version of APB Statement No. 4 (?171, cited above). It then appears to cite the unconditional version disapprovingly:

The convention of conservatism, which was once commonly expressed as “anticipate no profits but anticipate all losses,” developed during a time when balance sheets were

considered the prime (and often only) financial statement, and details of profits or other

operating results were rarely provided … .”

Ambivalence toward conservatism could reflect confusion between its unconditional and conditional forms. As argued above, in a contracting setting unconditional conservatism seems at best neutral (if the bias is known) and possibly inefficient (if the bias is unknown). In contrast, conditional conservatism involves timely loss recognition, and thereby increases the efficiency of

14 Basu (1997, pages 8-9) cites evidence of conservatism in accounting as early as the fifteenth century. Gilman (1939, especially pp. 201-204) describes the controversy, which persists to this day.

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debt and compensation/governance contracting. From a contracting perspective, conditional and unconditional conservatism are substantially different concepts.

2.4 Time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition

Our principal timeliness measure exploits the transitory nature of economic income [Samuelson (1965), Fama (1970)]. It measures timely gain and loss incorporation as the tendency for increases and decreases in accounting income to reverse (Basu 1997), an indicator of transitory gain and loss components. Our hypothesis is that there is less reversal of income decreases in private companies than in public companies, reflecting a lower frequency of timely loss recognition due to lower demand for financial reporting quality.

To identify transitory gain and loss components in accounting income, we therefore estimate v arious specifications of Basu’s (1997) piecewise-linear regression:

?NI t = α0 + α1D?NI t-1 + α2?NI t-1 + α3D?NI t-1*?NI t-1 + εt(1) ?NI t is change in income (alternatively defined as including and excluding extra-ordinary and exceptional items) from fiscal year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning book value of total assets.

D?NI t-1 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the prior-year change ?NI t-1 is negative.

Untimely recognition of economic gains, by deferring incorporation in income until their underlying increases in cash flows are realized, causes gains to be recognized as “persistent” positive components of accounting income that tend not to reverse. The implication is α2 = 0. Alternatively, timely recognition of economic gains implies they are recognized as “transitory” increases in income components that do tend to reverse, the implication being α2 < 0. Similarly, timely recognition of economic losses implies they are recognized as transitory income decreases, and hence reverse, the implication being α2 + α3 < 0. The hypothesis that economic losses are recognized in a more timely fashion than gains implies α3< 0.

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The independent variable in this specification is change in income, which has two primary advantages. First, changes provide the correct specification for identifying transitory income components.15 Second, the incremental coefficient α3 is less likely to be affected by survival biases in a changes specification, because survival frequencies are likely to be more similar in samples of negative and positive earnings changes than in samples of negative and positive earnings levels (i.e., loss-making firms are less likely to survive than profitable firms experiencing earnings decreases). The non-linearity is due to accounting income being a mixture of two processes: a type of moving average of current and past economic gains; and a substantially less smoothed, more transitory incorporation of economic losses.

2.5 Accruals-based test of loss recognition

Basu’s serial dependence model (1) has two poten tial limitations. First, it cannot distinguish transitory gain or loss components in earnings from random errors in accruals (such as miscounting inventory) and from some types of earnings management (such as excess provisions that revert over time). All are transitory and cause negative serial dependence in income changes. Second, the model can only identify the existence of transitory components, and not whether their recognition is timely or untimely. Basu’s association test mitigates both limitations by identifying whether transitory earnings components are contemporaneously correlated with stock returns, which proxy for economic gains and losses. Private companies do not have stock returns, so we develop an alternative model that exploits the likelihood that timely loss recognition occurs through accounting accruals. The model adapts the Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) model to incorporate the recognition of unrealized gains and losses via accruals.

15 Hayn’s (1995) bankruptcy model predicts a non-linearity, but it applies to income levels.

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The role of accruals in the Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) model is to mitigate noise in operating cash flow.16 For example, other things equal (specifically, accounts payable) the cash flow effects of a transitory fall in inventory reverse over time: an increase in the current year and a decrease in the following year. Accrual accounting attempts to eliminate these transitory effects by matching the cost of inventory sold, rather than the cost of inventory purchased, against sales revenue. A primary function of working-capital accruals thus is to construct an earnings variable that is less noisy than cash flow from operations. One implication is that accruals and cash flow from operations are contemporaneously negatively correlated (Dechow 1994).

We envision a second role for accruals, timely recognition of economic gains and losses, and hypothesize it is a source of positive but asymmetric correlation between accruals and contemporaneous cash flows. The positive correlation between accruals and cash flows arises because cash flows from an individual durable asset (such as plant and equipment, or an ongoing production process) tend to be correlated over time, or “persistent.” This implies that revisions in current-period cash flow are positively correlated with current revisions in expected future cash flows. For example, an investment experiencing decreased current-period cash flow is likely also to be experiencing a downward revision in its future prospects: i.e., in its expected future cash flows. Timely gain and loss recognition is based on expected not realized cash flows, and therefore is accomplished through accruals. It follows that timely gain and loss recognition is a source of positive correlation between accruals and current-period cash flow, thereby attenuating the negative correlation predicted by the Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) model.

The above argument is assisted by the following illustration, adapted from Ball, Robin and Wu (2002). Consider an asset that at the beginning of period t is an L-period annuity of expected future cash flows, CF. Assume new information arriving at the end of period t causes a

16 The model builds on Dechow (1994) and Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996).

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revision ?CF t in both its current-period cash flow and its expected cash flows for all remaining future periods. For example, the market for the products produ ced out of an economically specific plant might have shrunk in the current period, without prospects for recovery, thereby permanently impairing the cash flows associated with the plant. The current-period cash flow effect of the information is ?CF t. To analyze the contemporaneous effect on accruals, assume without loss of generality a discount rate of zero. The new information then generates a reduced present value of future cash flows of (L-1)?CF t, which is correlated with the revision in current-period cash flows ?CF t (perfectly correlated in this simple example) and also with the level of the current-period cash flow CF t(of which ?CF t is but a part). To the extent this reduction in present value is accrued as a component of current-period accounting income as an impairment charge, it is a source of positive correlation between accruals and both cash flows and cash flow revisions.

The asymmetry in this accruals model arises because economic losses are more likely to be recognized on a timely basis, as unrealized (i.e., non-cash) accrued charges against income. Economic gains are more likely to be recognized when realized, and hence accounted for on a cash basis.17 This asymmetry implies that the positive correlation between cash flows and accruals arising from the second role of accruals is greater in the case of losses. We therefore estimate a piecewise-linear relation between cash flows and accruals:

ACC t = β0 + β1*DCFO t + β2*CFO t + β3*DCFO t*CFO t + νt(2) Cash flow from operations (CFO t) is measured as earnings before exceptional and extra-ordinary items less accruals.18 Accruals (ACC t) initially are measured as:19

17 No such asymmetry would occur if accruals functioned only to reduce earnings variability. Accruals then would be negatively related to both negative and positive changes in cash flow from operations.

18 Exceptional and extra-ordinary items tend to be accrued liabilities or diminutions in value of fixed assets.

19 Section 6.3 also reports results for a smaller sample of firms that report cash flow statements. “Debtors” and “Creditors” in U.K. terminology are equivalent to Accounts Receivable and Payable in U.S. terminology.

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ACC t = ?Inventory + ?Debtors + ?Other current assets - ?Creditors - ?Other current

liabilities – Depreciation (3) Both accruals and cash from operations are standardized by the beginning of period total assets. DCFO t is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if CFO t is negative, and 0 otherwise.

This model provides for both roles of accruals: mitigation of noise in cash flow and asymmetric recognition of unrealized gains and losses. We predict a negative coefficient for cash flows β2, as in Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998). Under our hypothesis that accrued losses are more likely in periods of negative cash flows, we predict a positive incremental coefficient β3 for negative cash flows. We offer no prediction for the intercept β0 or the “dummy” intercept β1.

3. Hypothesis: Differen t demand for financial reporting in private and public companies

Private companies have different ownership, governance, financing, management and compensation structures than public companies. They do not have access to public capital markets, and their financial statements are not widely distributed to the public. Consequently, their financial reporting is more likely to be influenced by dividend and retention policies, as well as income tax policies. These important differences between private and public companies can be exploited to further our understanding of the economics of financial reporting generally.

In this section, we outline the institutional framework for private and public company reporting in the U.K., and develop our hypothesis that their financial reporting fulfils different economic functions and hence differs in quality, even under identical accounting standards.

3.1 Regulatory influences: U.K. company law for private and public companies

In the United Kingdom, all limited liability companies are formed by incorporation with the Companies House, the government agency that administers them. They are registered as either public or private companies. Public companies must incorporate ‘public limited company’

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or ‘plc’ in their name, whereas private limited liability companies need only include ‘limited.’20 Public companies must have a minimum share capital of ￡50,000 before they can commence business, whereas there is no minimum share capital requirement for private companies.21 The most important distinction between private and public companies relates to their ability to raise funds from the general public. A public company has an unrestricted right to offer shares or debentures to the public, whereas this is prohibited in the case of a private company.22 Since only public companies can issue shares to the general public, only they are eligible to be listed. In our empirical analysis, we define “public companies” as those listed on the London Stock Exchange.

Prior to 1967, only public companies were required to file their financial statements with the Registrar of Companies House. In the preceding years there was a substantial increase in the number of firms incorporated as private companies, and also in the percentage of private companies being liquidated or struck-off the Companies Register, which sparked political fears of abuse and creditor protection. This led to the Companies Act of 1967 requiring all companies, private and public, to file their financial statements annually with the Registrar.

The 1981 Companies Act modified this provision, allowing “small” and “medium-sized” companies to protect their financial affairs from public scrutiny by reporting only abridged financial statements. Under the Act, “Small” companies hav e (i) annual revenue (“turnover”) not exceeding ￡2.8 million, (ii) book value of total assets not exceeding ￡1.4 million and (iii) average number of employees not exceeding 50 for the last two years. “Medium” companies have (i) revenue not exceeding ￡11.2 million, (ii) total assets not exceeding ￡5.6 million and (iii) average number of employees not exceeding 250 for the last two years. Small companies are required to

20 Section 25 of Companies Act, 1985.

21 Section 117 of Companies Act, 1985.

22 Section 81 of Companies Act, 1985.

18

submit only an abbreviated balance sheet, and medium companies are required to submit also an abbreviated profit and loss account (which need not disclose sales).23

The financial statements of private (public) companies must be filed within ten (seven) months of their fiscal year. Failure to file is a criminal offense. All financial statements must be prepared in accordance with U.K. accounting standards, whether the firm is public or private.24 They must be audited if annual sales exceed ￡350,000, a threshold exceeded by all firms in our sample.25 U.K. tax laws likewise do not discriminate between public and private firms.26 London Stock Exchange listing rules require additional disclosure for public companies, but do not mandate accounting standards for financial reporting and in particular do not address the calculation of earnings. In all important respects, the U.K. regulatory regimes governing financial reporting for public companies and all but the smallest private companies are equivalent.

3.2 Market influences: demand and supply of earnings quality in private and public companies

Differences between the actual financial reporting practices of private and public companies depend on the demand for and supply of financial reporting. We reason that, relative to public companies, the demand for financial reporting in private companies arises relatively less from reducing information asymmetry between managers and other parties (lenders, shareholders, suppliers and customers) and relatively more from other sources (tax, dividend and compensation payment policies). We also reason that there is sufficient flexibility in the application of accounting rules to allow financial reporting practice to respond to demand differences between public and private companies, even under uniform regulations. In other words, we hypothesize the supply of financial reporting quality is not inelastic, rules notwithstanding.

3.2.1 The demand for earnings quality

23 Sections 246 and 246A of the Companies Act, 1985

24 Sections 221-242 of Companies Act, 1985 lay down the rules for submission of accounts and audit reports.

25 The threshold was increased to ￡1 million after June 2000 (Section 249A of Companies Act).

19

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1、乙方将该车辆用于公司事务使用时，享有第二条第2款中相应费用报销的权利。 2、乙方应提供驾驶证、车辆行驶证、保险单等有效证件并保证在协议期间的真实有效性以及车况的完好。 3、乙方在使用该车辆时应严格遵守交通规则和相关法律法规，谨慎安全驾驶并及时维护保养； 4、乙方在使用该车辆期间造成的任何侵权责任（含交通事故），均由乙方承担责任。 四、乙方应在签订本协议的同时，提供身份证复印件、驾照复印件和车辆行驶证复印件各一份，供甲方留存。 五、本协议签订前，乙方已完全理解本协议的全部内容，签订本协议是乙方的真实意思表示，乙方同意按本协议约定内容使用车辆。 六、本协议有效期年，自年月日至年月日止。 七、协议的终止及解除 1、协议期间，因车辆状况或其他原因使车辆无法为甲方提供服务的，甲方有权单方解除协议；乙方更换服务车辆应另行签署协议，另行签署日起本协议自动终止。 2、如甲乙双方在使用期届满时未达成延长使用期协议，则该协议自动终止。 3、乙方离职，此协议随同离职生效日终止。 4、协议期内，甲乙双方如有特殊情况需提前解除协议，需提前一周提出解除本协议。 八、本协议经双方签字或盖章后生效，若有其他未尽事宜，由双方另行协商解决。 九、本协议一式两份，甲乙双方各执一份。 甲方（盖章）：乙方（签字）：

员工车辆私车公用协议书

员工车辆私车公用协议书 甲方（员工）： 乙方（公司）： 甲、乙双方本着自愿平等的原则，经协商一致，特签订本协议，以兹共同遵守。 一、本协议书适用于因工作原因，甲方将自有私车提供给乙方用于各项工作使用之情形。 二、车辆基本情况 1.车辆产权为甲方所有，车牌号； 2、车辆状况为：良好，年检合格； 3、车辆具备登记证书、行驶证、保险合同，年检合格证等相关证照。 三、车辆租用 1.甲方同意将车辆提供给乙方用于工作。 2.乙方根据工作需要使用甲方车辆时，只能由甲方本人驾驶，因此而产生的燃油费、通行 费、路桥费等按乙方财务制度报销。 3.私车公用补贴：协议期限内乙方按每月0元补贴给甲方，与工资一并发放。 4.车辆的保管和维护修理由甲方负责； 5.甲、乙方在使用车辆时，必须严格遵守国家交通法律法规，违章驾驶所产生的一切后果， 由甲方全部承担； 6.如遇车辆驾驶过程中发生交通肇事，按照当地公安交通管理部门出具的《交通事故责任 认定书》，甲、乙双方各自承担相关法律责任。若由于甲方在工作时间内，发生的重大交通事故，甲、乙双方协商处理相关赔偿事宜。 四、车辆租用期限 本合同有效期一年，期满可以续签，期满前甲方离职或书面通知乙方，本合同终止。合同终止，双方互不承担违约责任，乙方应及时、完好的返还甲方车辆。 五、甲方责任 1.保证所提供的车辆具有合法性，并能满足正常工作的需要。 2.服从公司工作安排，合理、合法使用车辆，及时处理车辆的违章及肇事事故等。 3.甲方必须为租赁车辆投保以下险种： （1）机动车交通事故强制责任保险； （2）商业险，其中应当包括第三者责任险、车损险。 六、乙方责任 1.按照合同约定合法使用车辆。 2.报销甲方使用车辆而发生的燃修费、过路过桥费。 七、其它 1.本协议经甲、乙双方签字加盖公章后生效； 2.当甲方车辆年检到期，甲方没有及时年检或无法年检通过，本合同立即终止，乙方及时 返还车辆； 3.本协议未尽事宜，甲、乙双方可另行协商，签订补充协议。补充协议与本协议具有同等 法律效力； 4.如产生纠纷，甲、乙双方友好协商，协商不成的交由有乙方所在地人民法院裁决； 5.本合同一式二份，甲方执壹份，乙方执壹份。 甲方（签字）：乙方（公章）： 本协议签订日期： 1

员工车辆私车公用协议书

员工车辆私车公用协议书 一、本协议书适用于因工作原因，甲方将自有私车提供给乙方用于各项工作使用之情形。 二、车辆基本情况 1.车辆产权为甲方所有，车牌号； 2、车辆状况为：良好，年检合格； 3、车辆具备登记证书、行驶证、保险合同，年检合格证等相关证照。 三、车辆租用 1.甲方同意将车辆提供给乙方用于工作。 2.乙方根据工作需要使用甲方车辆时，只能由甲方本人驾驶，因此而产生的燃油费、通行费、路桥费等按乙方财务制度报销。 3.私车公用补贴：协议期限内乙方按每月0元补贴给甲方，与工资一并发放。 4.车辆的保管和维护修理由甲方负责； 5.甲、乙方在使用车辆时，必须严格遵守国家交通法律法规，违章驾驶所产生的一切后果，由甲方全部承担； 6.如遇车辆驾驶过程中发生交通肇事，按照当地公安交通管理部门出具的《交通事故责任认定书》，甲、乙双方各自承担相关法律责任。若由于甲方在工作时间内，发生的重大交通事故，甲、乙双方协商处理相关赔偿事宜。 四、车辆租用期限 本合同有效期一年，期满可以续签，期满前甲方离职或书面通知乙方，本合同终止。合同终止，双方互不承担违约责任，乙方应及时、完好的返还甲方车辆。 五、甲方责任 1.保证所提供的车辆具有合法性，并能满足正常工作的需要。 2.服从公司工作安排，合理、合法使用车辆，及时处理车辆的违章及肇事事故等。 3.甲方必须为租赁车辆投保以下险种：

（1）机动车交通事故强制责任保险； （2）商业险，其中应当包括第三者责任险、车损险。 六、乙方责任 1.按照合同约定合法使用车辆。 2.报销甲方使用车辆而发生的燃修费、过路过桥费。 七、其它 1.本协议经甲、乙双方签字加盖公章后生效； 2.当甲方车辆年检到期，甲方没有及时年检或无法年检通过，本合同立即终止，乙方及时返还车辆； 3.本协议未尽事宜，甲、乙双方可另行协商，签订补充协议。补充协议与本协议具有同等法律效力； 4.如产生纠纷，甲、乙双方友好协商，协商不成的交由有乙方所在地人民法院裁决； 5.本合同一式二份，甲方执壹份，乙方执壹份。 甲方（签字）：乙方（公章）： 本协议签订日期：青年人首先要树雄心，立大志，其次就要决心作一个有用的人才

私车公用车辆管理制度

私车公用车辆管理制度 第一章总则 第一条目的 为了方便公司各项工作的开展、满足公司车辆资源，提高工作效率，本着有偿使用的原则，结合公司的实际情况，特制订本制度。 第二条适用范围 本制度适用于公司在职的、有私车的员工。 第三条前提条件 1、车辆行驶证、养路费、车辆购置税、车牌、保险单等各种证件齐全； 2、因业务需要外出使用。 第二章审批程序 第四条申请条件 1、拥有私车或者可以借用公司同事车子的员工在符合第三条前提条件后，因公司业务需要，当事人可以提出申请，提交各分管部门领导审批同意后，方可外出。 2、员工确因公务需要使用私车外出时，必须事先填写《私车公用申请及行驶记录月表》（参见附件），列明去向、申请人、车牌号、使用目的、使用时间等相关信息，经审核批准后方可外出。 3、出发前必须向人力行政部门汇报出发前公里数，人力行政部不定期抽查。 4、至少提前一个工作日报准申请，非特殊情况下不允许事后补单。 5、外出车辆必须在下班前开回公司，登记行驶里程数。（如果没有在当天下班前开回公司的处理） 第五条审批流程 1、业务、采购部门 当事人发起流程→部门经理审核→副总助总审核→总经理审核→行政专员→人力行政经 2、财务部门

当事人发起流程→财务经理审核→财务总经理审核→行政专员→人力行政经理 3、行政部门 当事人发起流程→人力行政经理审核→董事长审核→行政专员→人力行政经理 第三章费用报销 第六条费用报销项目 1、私车公用费用报销项目包括：路桥费、燃油费、停车费。 2、停车费、路桥费、燃油费实报实销。燃油费发票抬头必须是公司名，指定的用油型号。 第七条报销标准 1、车辆的维护费和修理费、年检费、保险费均由车主本人承担。 2、行车发生的费用具体根据《私车公用申请及行驶记录月表》每月统一结算。 3、交通违章罚款单据不得核销或变相冲抵。 4、当私车因公外出累计行驶里程超过5000公里时，公司……，数据清零。以此类推。 5、车辆折旧费补贴计算 6、因公外出，私车产生的油耗，补贴标准参见表格 第八条报销程序 1、员工即时填写《私车公用申请及行驶记录月表》→报部门领导审核→每月31日以部门为单位统一报人力行政部稽核→核对无误，当事人填写费用报销单→报部门及分管领导审核→报财务部对费用金额进行核算→报财务总经理批准后。次月10日报销完毕。 第四章违章与事故处理 1、私车公用外出期间严格遵守《交通法》及公司《车辆管理规定》，违章罚款由当事人负责。

XX公司私车公用协议

私车公用协议 甲方： XXX有限公司 乙方： 甲方因工作需要，为提高管理人员的工作效率，允许乙方将本人私车（车牌）______一辆用于甲方的公务活动，经双方协商一致，达成协议如下： 一、使用期限： _____年_____月______日至______年_____月______日。 二、使用方式及租金： 本协议期间，车辆原则上仍由乙方本人保管使用，用于甲方的公务活动；甲方需临时安排时，乙方应服从临时安排。无租金。 三、私车公用规范 （一）乙方必须具备以下条件： 1.乙方依法获得驾驶证，且经甲方安全资格审查合格。 2.乙方提供车辆为乙方本人所有（以车辆登记证书记载为准），已使用年限未超过15年，已办理交强险、第三者险（三者险按照不低于50万元保额标准进行投保）、车损险、乘坐险、不计免赔险等安全保险项目。 3.乙方车辆须是合法手续完备、安全性能良好，能正常使用（以公司技术部审查结果为准）。 （二）乙方车辆由乙方自行保管，自行负责车辆的维修保养及年审等，保证车辆技术状况良好，保证车辆手续合法有效。乙方自行购买路桥年票，乙方自行购买各项保险。乙方车辆每年年审后需重新向甲方提交车辆登记证书、车辆行驶证、保险单等资料原件及复印件。

（三）甲方按月给予乙方定额油料补贴，具体为元、月，由甲方以油卡充值方式支付给乙方。 （四）乙方有下列情形之一的，甲方不再为乙方提供定额油料补贴： 1.乙方车辆使用年限超过15年的。 2．乙方驾驶人和车辆主要信息未到甲方登记，或车辆发生故障、丢失、主要信息改变未到甲方备案的。 3.乙方提供的车辆信息为虚假信息的。 4.乙方无故不使用本人车辆超过5个工作日的。 5.乙方不服从甲方临时安排的。 6.乙方不服从所在部门（基层单位）统筹安排的。 （五）乙方因故当月未使用本人车辆在5个工作日以上的（不含5个工作日），甲方按实际使用天数发放油料补贴。 （六）乙方因在工作时间内驾驶本人车辆办理公务发生交通事故时，应及时向甲方安全监察部报案，由安全监察部协助处理。由乙方进行事故处理并向参保保险公司索赔后，在规定范围内的超出部分费用凭有效凭据向甲方安全监察部申请，核实后，甲方按全责70%、主责75%、同责80%、次责85%、无责和意外100%的比例报销。 （七）乙方车辆在工作时间内办理公务发生交通事故时，有以下情形之一的，甲方不承担事故费用的报销，由乙方自行负责： 1.当事驾驶人存在“酒驾”或“毒驾”。 2.当事驾驶人发生事故后逃逸或私撤现场的，或其他严重违法行为的。 3.若当事驾驶人非甲方安全监察部审核认定的人员的。 （八）乙方应自觉遵守国家《道理交通安全法》等有关法律

XX公司私车公用协议

XX公司私车公用协议 私车公用协议甲方乙方甲方因工作需要，为提高管理人员的工作效率，允许乙方将本人私车（车牌）______一辆用于甲方的公务活动，经双方协商一致，达成协议如下 一、使用期限_____年_____月______日至______年_____月______日。 二、使用方式及租金本协议期间，车辆原则上仍由乙方本人保管使用，用于甲方的公务活动；甲方需临时安排时，乙方应服从临时安排。 无租金。 三、私车公用规范（一）乙方必须具备以下条件1.乙方依法获得驾驶证，且经甲方安全资格审查合格。 2.乙方提供车辆为乙方本人所有（以车辆登记证书记载为准），已使用年限未超过15年，已办理交强险、第三者险（三者险按照不低于50万元保额标准进行投保）、车损险、乘坐险、不计免赔险等安全保险项目。 3.乙方车辆须是合法手续完备、安全性能良好，能正常使用（以公司技术部审查结果为准）。 （二）乙方车辆由乙方自行保管，自行负责车辆的维修保养及年审等，保证车辆技术状况良好，保证车辆手续合法有效。 乙方自行购买路桥年票，乙方自行购买各项保险。乙方车辆每年年审后需重新向甲方提交车辆登记证书、车辆行驶证、保险单等资料原件及复印件。 （三）甲方按月给予乙方定额油料补贴，具体为元、月，由甲方以油卡充值方式支付给乙方。 （四）乙方有下列情形之一的，甲方不再为乙方提供定额油料补贴1.乙方车辆使用年限超过15年的。 2．乙方驾驶人和车辆主要信息未到甲方登记，或车辆发生故障、丢失、主要信息改变未到甲方备案的。

3.乙方提供的车辆信息为虚假信息的。 4.乙方无故不使用本人车辆超过5个工作日的。 5.乙方不服从甲方临时安排的。 6.乙方不服从所在部门（基层单位）统筹安排的。 （五）乙方因故当月未使用本人车辆在5个工作日以上的（不含5个工作日），甲方按实际使用天数发放油料补贴。 （六）乙方因在工作时间内驾驶本人车辆办理公务发生交通事故时，应及时向甲方安全监察部报案，由安全监察部协助处理。 由乙方进行事故处理并向参保保险公司索赔后，在规定范围内的超出部分费用凭有效凭据向甲方安全监察部申请，核实后，甲方按全责70%、主责75%、同责80%、次责85%、无责和意外100%的比例报销。（七）乙方车辆在工作时间内办理公务发生交通事故时，有以下情形之一的，甲方不承担事故费用的报销，由乙方自行负责1.当事驾驶人存在“酒驾”或“毒驾”。 2.当事驾驶人发生事故后逃逸或私撤现场的，或其他严重违法行为的。 3.若当事驾驶人非甲方安全监察部审核认定的人员的。 （八）乙方应自觉遵守国家《道理交通安全法》等有关法律法规，乙方及车辆若有违反国家有关法律法规行为的，其后果由乙方自行承担。 （九）甲方不承担乙方车辆任何原因的失窃、毁损等风险。 （十）乙方应遵守甲方制定的《工作用车管理办法》，并同意该办法为本协议附件。 五、协议终止及解除（一）如甲、乙双方在使用期届满时未达成延长使用期的协议，则该协议自动终止。 （二）协议期内，甲乙双方因各种原因，均可提前一周提出解除本协议。 （三）本协议期满后，若甲乙双方未提出异议，视为自动续签。

私车公用协议书

私车公用协议书 合同编号: 签订地点: 甲方:有限公司…………………………………………………(以下简称甲方) 乙方:(身份证号码:)……………………………(以下简称乙方) 乙方为甲方公司员工,鉴于乙方日常外出办事方便及业务繁忙时公司公车不能满足用车需要,乙方自愿将自己所属私家车一辆作为公司业务用车。为规范私车公用的相关事宜,明确甲、乙双方的责任及义务,经双方协商一致,达成协议如下: 一、使用范围: 有下列情况,均属于私车公用,适用于本规定: 1、乙方因公出差; 2、在本市接待甲方客户; 3、经部门负责人签批同意的本市办理其他因公业务。 二、车辆要求: 乙方所用私家车必须证照齐全、车况良好,投保交强险和其他相关保险。 三、使用方式: 1. 根据乙方所负责甲方的具体工作临时使用,但乙方需具备车辆驾驶资格,并由乙方自行驾驶,不另行配备司机。

2. 根据甲方需要,当因公需要使用乙方车辆时,乙方必须服从。 四、费用分摊: 1、需要私车公用的情况下,乙方出差填写《私车申请单》,过路费和停车费凭票实报实销,油费按照0.9元/km的标准进行报销。 2、乙方上下班路程上产生的费用(包括汽油费、停车费、过路过桥费等),相关费用由乙方自行承担。 3、私车公用期间,车辆的维护费、修理费、年检费、保险费、由于违章产生的罚金及相关费用等均由乙方自行承担。 4、根据油价涨跌,甲乙双方协商适时做出相应的调整。 注1:南通市区范围内私车公用的过路费、停车费也凭票实报实销。 五、风险承担: 1、签订本协议时,乙方必须提供驾驶证、车辆行驶证、保险卡等有效证件并留存复印件给甲方。 2、乙方在协议期内应严格遵守《中华人民共和国道路交通管理条例》及有关交通法律法规。如出现任何酒驾、违规、事故及肇事行为,乙方应承担由此产生的全部责任及损失,且甲方不承担在协议期间引发的第三者责任。 六、协议终止及解除: 1、如甲、乙双方在使用期届满时未达成延长使用协议的,则该协议自动终止。 2、因乙方车辆状况原因导致车辆无法正常行驶时,甲方有权解除协议。

关于私车公用的管理规定

关于公司私车公用的管理规定 第一章总则 第一条为加强私车公用管理，提高工作效率，增强企业凝聚力，制定本规定。 第二条本规定适用于所有公司私车公用的车辆。 第三条本规定所称私车公用，是指符合一定条件的人员报经公司总经理批准后将其私有车辆用于公务活动。 第二章条件及审批程序 第四条具备驾驶资格且符合以下条件之一的人员可申请私车公用； 1、对本公司有特殊贡献人员； 2、在本公司担任特殊职务人员； 3、确因公务所需经常使用车辆，但公司又不能满足需要的。 第五条私车用于公司业务前，必须事先提出申请，经公司总经理批准后（附私车公用申请表）方可。申请项目包括：申请人、申请时间、使用目的、使用时间、使用车辆种类和车辆、人身保险情况等。 第六条对于符合私车公用条件且已经总经理批准的，应与公司签订私车公用书面协议。第三章费用报销规定 1、每月可按区域享受区域油费补贴标准，凭发票额度内予以实报实销。 2、每月过路过桥费凭发票实报实销。 3、已享受上述第七条，在其工作所在地县市内出差，不再派用公车，也不再报销出租车票 或其他公交车票。 第八条每月报销费用一次，报销时间为每月15号。报销时应填写《私车公用费用报销汇总表》并附上相应发票后规定程序报销。 第四章法律责任及其他 第九条私车公用车辆必须向车辆所在地车管部门办理强制保险和任意保险，办理一切车辆保险所需支出由车主自负。 第十条因私车公用而发生的交通责任事故，公司不承担任何责任。与交通事故相关的其它费用（如事故处理费、车辆维修费等），由车主自理。 第五章附则 第十二条公司对私车公用的归口管理部门及费用报销的审核部门为人事行政部。 第十三条本暂行规定自年月日起试行。 ******有限公司 年月日

关于私车公用费用补贴原则及管理办法(试行)

关于私车公用费用补贴原则及管理办法（试行) 1、目的 随着公司业务发展，为提高办事效率，公司针对因公务临时外出或长期用车需要，员工使用私人车辆的情况，对私车公用的员工进行一定的费用补偿，特制定本规定。 2、适用范围 本制度适用于公司全体员工 3、责任 3.1财务办公室负责本制度的制定和修改。 3.2总经理负责本制度的审批。 3.3公司各部门负责本制度的执行、监督。 4、细则 4.1、私车公用的申请 4.1.1因公务外出应首先向行政申请使用公司的公共车辆，在公司公共车辆无法提供时，可申请私车公用。 4.1.2员工确因公务需要临时使用私车外出时，必须事先填写《私车公用申请及行驶记录表》。 4.2.3员工的私车公用申请和费用审核由总经理批准。 4.2、私车公用费用的报销程序： 4.2.1员工即时填写《私车公用申请及行驶记录表》→填写费用报销单（《私车公用申请及行驶记录表》为报销附件之一）→报行政部审核→报财务部对费用金额进行核算→报总经理批准后→到财务部报销。 5、私车公用费用报销项目、计算方式及标准 5..1私车公用费用补助标准明细：

6、关于私车公用的管理 6.1员工在执行公司指派任务并自愿使用私人产权车辆者为私车公用行为，员工在规定时间驾车上、下班的行为，不属于私车公用的情形。 6.2员工须及时填写《私车公用申请及行驶记录表》，经相关程序批准后方可外出。 6.3员工每次因公务外出，须按照《私车公用申请及行驶记录表》的内容及时地认真做好记录，不准弄虚作假欺瞒公司，否则不予报销相关费用。 6.4员工的私车公用车辆，须自行确保驾驶证、车辆行驶证、车辆保险（含第三责任险和驾乘险）等车辆管理及交管部门备查所需的证件及相关手续齐全并始终在有效期限内，否则由此产生的一切后果均由本人自行承担。 6.5私车公用驾驶员必须自觉遵守交通规则，服从交通部门的指挥和检查，维护交通秩序，文明驾车，确保行车安全。 6.6私车公用车辆的驾驶人员必须严格遵守车辆管理和交通法律法规，对于违反交通法律法规的相关处罚和造成的一切损失均由驾驶员本人承担。 总经理审批： 山东凯杰建筑工程有限公司 2

私车公用协议书范本

私车公用协议书范本 SANY GROUP system office room 【SANYUA16H-

私车公用协议书 甲方（公司）： 乙方（个人）： (车辆行驶证登记车主签字) 随着公司业务的发展和经营规模的扩大，对外经营工作和接待任务的地日益增加，交通工具在公司经营管理活动中的作用越来越明显。从提高办事效率、降低公司汽车维护成本、优化资源配置等方面考虑，经甲乙双方共同协商一致，特制定本协议： 一、车辆现状 车辆名称：车牌号：车架号： 车辆购置时间：年月日车辆状况：。 登记车主：（□乙方 / □非乙方）。 （若登记车主非乙方，需要提供： 1、关系说明文件：如夫妻，提供结婚证复印件一份；如家庭亲属，提供户口本复印件一份。 2、登记车主签字确认的“知晓并同意乙方私车公用行为，并同意与乙方共同承担该协议约定的义务。”的证明文件。） 二、甲方的权利义务 1、协议期内甲方享有该车辆的有效使用权。 2、甲方负责承担乙方在使用该车辆办理公务时，经核定合理发生的燃油费、过路费、存车费、协议期内年限发生的年检费及保险费用。此项补贴仅限于郑州市内，市外另行约定。 3、甲方除承担第二条第2款中涉及的相关费用外，不再承担任何由该车辆使用造成的费用及法律责任。 4、甲方对于该车辆除使用权外的其他物权纠纷一概不承担责任。 三、乙方的权利义务

1、乙方将该车辆用于公司事务使用时，享有第二条第2款中相应费用报销的权利。 2、乙方应提供驾驶证、车辆行驶证、保险单等有效证件并保证在协议期间的真实有效性以及车况的完好。 3、乙方在使用该车辆时应严格遵守交通规则和相关法律法规，谨慎安全驾驶并及时维护保养； 4、乙方在使用该车辆期间造成的任何侵权责任（含交通事故），均由乙方承担责任。 四、乙方应在签订本协议的同时，提供身份证复印件、驾照复印件和车辆行驶证复印件各一份，供甲方留存。 五、本协议签订前，乙方已完全理解本协议的全部内容，签订本协议是乙方的真实意思表示，乙方同意按本协议约定内容使用车辆。 六、本协议有效期年，自年月日至年月 日止。 七、协议的终止及解除 1、协议期间，因车辆状况或其他原因使车辆无法为甲方提供服务的，甲方有权单方解除协议；乙方更换服务车辆应另行签署协议，另行签署日起本协议自动终止。 2、如甲乙双方在使用期届满时未达成延长使用期的协议，则该协议自动终止。 3、乙方离职，此协议随同离职生效日终止。 4、协议期内，甲乙双方如有特殊情况需提前解除协议，需提前一周提出解除本协议。 八、本协议经双方签字或盖章后生效，若有其他未尽事宜，由双方另行协商解决。 九、本协议一式两份，甲乙双方各执一份。

南京xx集团xx中心私车公用管理制度(含全套表格及协议)

南京xx科技集团股份有限公司 xx中心私车公用管理制度 2018年5月23日修订第1版 Xx中心发布

目录 一、目的 (3) 二、适用范围 (3) 三、管理职责 (3) 四、申请条件及审批程序 (3) 五、报销标准 (4) 六、报销要求 (5) 七、车辆的管理 (5) 八、违章与事故处理 (5) 九、关于私车损失的赔偿 (5) 十、附则 (5) 附件一： (7) 附件二： (8) 附件三： (9) 附件四： (10)

一、目的 为满足公司外出业务的临时用车需求，提高外出工作效率，本着资源利用最大化的原则，根据公司《车辆管理制度》及其他相关规定，特制定本制度。 二、适用范围 本规定所称私车公用，是指符合一定条件的人员自愿申请，并报经公司领导层批准将其私有车辆用于公司公务的行为。适用于经公司审核、审批后确认符合条件的外联、外出工作人员和管理人员。 三、管理职责 （一）综合管理部 1.行政主管负责私车公用管理制度的拟定，并根据业务部门的意见进行修订。 2.行政主管负责私车公用协议的签订和备案。 3.行政主管负责私车公用的车辆资料的登记、审核及备案。 4.车队负责私车公用的出车安排及临时调度管理。 5.行政主管负责私车公用里程的计算、审核及相关费用的初审。 6.车队有责任为私车公用驾驶员提供相关路线指导及其他后勤保障等。 7.车队有责任及时统计公司现有业务车辆最新使用、调度情况，以便私车公用提请及审批。（二）财务部 1. 负责私车公用费用补贴的审核。 2. 负责相关费用的发票、收据等的审核。 3. 负责相关费用的补贴的发放及报销手续等。 （三）私车公用的执行、使用部门 1. 负责私车公用车辆的申请、登记、备案。 2. 负责私车公用的出车使用审批。 3. 负责私车公用外出工作需求、外出线路、行使里程及外出人员考勤的审核。 4. 负责对私车公用所产生的费用等进行核实、初审。 四、申请条件及审批程序 1、拥有其名下的私人汽车、汽车保险及登记手续齐备、驾龄超过3年且符合外联或外出作

私车公用协议书签字版本

私车公用协议书签字版本 Revised by BLUE on the afternoon of December 12,2020.

私车公用协议书甲方： 乙方： 鉴于乙方为甲方单位在职员工，为提高办事效率、降低公司汽车维护成本，甲方因业务需要安排乙方使用私有车辆办理公务经双方协商一致达成私车公用协议如下： 一、车辆现状 若登记车主非乙方，需提供： 1、关系证明：如夫妻，提供结婚证复印件；如家属亲属，提供户口本复印件。 2、登记车主签字确认的“知晓并同意乙方私车公用行为，并同意与乙方共同承担该协议约定的义务”的证明。 二、私车公用期限为乙方向甲方供职服务期限： 自年日至年月日止，以乙方实际供职期限为准。

三、乙方在使用该车辆时应严格遵守交通规则和相关法律法规，安全驾驶并及时维护保养。乙方应保证第三者责任险保额50万以上，因乙方原因造成第三者责任险免赔的，由乙方承担相应赔偿。 四、车辆使用由乙方自行安排,但乙方工作期间必须同时提供本协议所指定车辆为甲方服务，不得以车辆原因作为解释未完成工作任务的理由。 五、甲方承担一定限额的车辆燃油费用，燃油费用以外的其他任何费用及法律责任一律由乙方自行承担。 1、甲方负责开立（充值）指定车牌号的加油卡提供给乙方汽车加油使用。一车一卡、专卡专用的制度，不得转借。 2、乙方汽车除加油卡充值以外的任何费用及法律责任一切由乙方自行承担，包括但不限于车辆维修费用及交通事故责任。 六、协议终止及解除 1、协议到期自动终止。 2、因车辆状况或其他原因使车辆无法为甲方提供服务的，甲方有权单方解除协议；乙方更换服务车辆应另行签署协议，另行签署日起本协议自动终止。 3、乙方离职，此协议随同离职生效日终止 4、双方如有特殊情况需提前解除协议，需提前一周通知。

私车公用车辆租赁协议范本模板

编号： JT-20219071 甲 方：______________________________ 乙 方：______________________________ 日 期：_________年________月_______日 私车公用车辆租赁协议范本模板 The parties may dissolve the contract upon consensus through consultation.

[标签:titlecontent] 私车公用协议 甲方： 乙方： 甲方因单位业务需要，使用乙方（车牌）（私）汽车一辆，经双方协商一致，达成协议如下： 一、使用期限： 乙方自_201_年__1_月__1_日起，将车辆（）交付给甲方使用，至_201_年_12_月_31_日收回。 二、使用方式： 甲方使用乙方汽车期间，乙方不得再将该车作为私车使用。 三、费用分摊： （一）甲方承担对乙方汽车在业务范畴内进行使用所发生的一切费用，包括汽油费、过路费、过桥费、停车费、清洗费、正常保养（修）等日常费用。 （二）甲方承担对乙方汽车使用期间的投保费用，包括交强险、车辆损失险、盗抢险、自燃险、第三责任险。

四、风险承担： （一）甲方在使用期内，承担乙方汽车发生的交通事故、失窃、毁损等风险，以下情况除外： 1、乙方违反《中华人民共和国道路交通管理条例》驾驶汽车发生交通事故； 2、乙方故意捏造汽车失窃、制造汽车毁损情况的。 五、协议终止及解除： （一）如甲、乙双方在使用期届满时未达成延长使用期的协议，则该协议自动终止。 （二）因车辆状况原因导致车辆无法正常行驶时，甲方有权解除协议。 （三）双方如有特殊原因需提前解除协议，需提前两周告知对方。 六、其他： （一）本协议未尽事项由双方协商解决。 （二）本协议自甲、乙双方签字（盖章）后生效。本协议一式两份，由甲、乙双方各执一份，具有同等法律效力。 （三）有关协议的一切争议，双方经协商解决未能达到一致的，任何一方可向甲方方所在地的法院提出起诉。 甲方（签字盖章）乙方（签字盖章） 年月日年月日

XX公司私车公用协议

XX公司私车公用协议 私车公用协议 甲方：XXX 有限公司 乙方： 甲方因工作需要，为提高管理人员的工作效率，允许乙方将本人私车（车牌）_________________ 一辆用于甲方的公务活动，经双方协商 一致，达成协议如下： 一、使用期限： ____ 年 ___ 月_______ 日至 _____ 年_____ 月 ______ 日。 二、使用方式及租金： 本协议期间，车辆原则上仍由乙方本人保管使用，用于甲方的公务活动；甲方需临时安排时，乙方应服从临时安排。无租金。 三、私车公用规范 （一）乙方必须具备以下条件： 1.乙方依法获得驾驶证，且经甲方安全资格审查合格。 2.乙方提供车辆为乙方本人所有（以车辆登记证书记载为准），已使用年限未超过15 年，已办理交强险、第三者险（三者险按照不低于50 万元保额标准进行投保）、车损险、乘坐险、不计免赔险等安全保险项目。 3.乙方车辆须是合法手续完备、安全性能良好，能正常使用（以公司技术部审查结果为准）。 （二）乙方车辆由乙方自行保管，自行负责车辆的维修保养及年审等，保证车辆技术状况良好，保证车辆手续合法有效。乙方自行购买路桥年票，乙方自行购买各项保险。乙方车辆每年年审后需重新向甲方提交车辆登记证书、车辆行驶证、保险单等资料原件及复印件。 XX公司私车公用协议

（三）甲方按月给予 乙方定额油料补贴，具体为—元、月， 由甲方以油卡充值方式支付给乙方。 （四）乙方有下列情形之一的，甲方不再为乙方提供定额油料补贴： 1?乙方车辆使用年限超过15年的。 2 .乙方驾驶人和车辆主要信息未到甲方登记，或车辆发生故障、丢失、主要信息改变未到甲方备案的。 3?乙方提供的车辆信息为虚假信息的。 4.乙方无故不使用本人车辆超过5个工作日的。 5?乙方不服从甲方临时安排的。 6?乙方不服从所在部门（基层单位）统筹安排的。 （五）乙方因故当月未使用本人车辆在5个工作日以上的 （不含5个工作日），甲方按实际使用天数发放油料补贴。 （六）乙方因在工作时间内驾驶本人车辆办理公务发生交通 事故时，应及时向甲方安全监察部报案，由安全监察部协助处理。 由乙方进行事故处理并向参保保险公司索赔后，在规定范围内的 超出部分费用凭有效凭据向甲方安全监察部申请，核实后，甲方 按全责70%、主责75%、同责80%、次责85%、无责和意外100%的比例报销。 （七）乙 方车辆在工作时间内办理公务发生交通事故时，有以下情形之一的，甲方不承担事故费用的报销，由乙方自行负责： 1.当事驾驶人存在“酒驾”或“毒驾”。 2?当事驾驶人发生事故后逃逸或私撤现场的，或其他严重违 法行为的。 3.若当事驾驶人非甲方安全监察部审核认定的人员的。

公司员工私车公用协议

. 私车公用协议 甲方： 乙方：身份证号码： 乙方为公司员工，因办理甲方业务，需使用乙方汽车一辆（私）（车牌号：），经双方协商一致，达成协议如下： 一、协议期限及租金： 自年月日至年月日止，无租金。 二、车辆使用方式： 1. 使用方式：根据乙方所负责甲方的具体工作临时使用，但乙方需具备车辆驾驶资格，并由乙方自行驾驶，不另行配备司机。 2. 根据甲方需要，当因公需要使用乙方车辆时，乙方必须服从。 三、费用分摊： 1.甲方承担乙方汽车的汽油费、过路费、过桥费、停车费、维护费，不承担车辆的维修费用及违章罚款等。 2.只有经甲方负责人签字批准使用，并在批准使用期限内所发生的上述费用由甲方承担，甲方根据乙方提供的费用原始单据、发票支付上述费用。 四、风险承担： 乙方在租期内应严格遵守《中华人民共和国道路交通管理条例》及有关交通法律法规。如出现任何酒驾、违规、事故及肇事行为，乙方应承担由此产生的全部责任及损失，且甲方不承担租用车辆于租用期间引发的第三者责任。 五、协议终止及解除： 1. 如甲、乙双方在使用期届满时未达成延长使用期协议的，则该协议自动终止。 2. 因车辆状况原因导致车辆无法正常行驶时，甲方有权解除协议。 3. 租车期间，乙方应服从甲方管理，遵守甲方规章制度，服从车辆调配，如不服从甲方管理或出现违纪现象，甲方有权提前解除协议。 4. 乙方离职情况下，自乙方办理离职手续之日起本协议自动终止。 5. 双方如有特殊原因提前解除协议，需提前一周告知对方。 六、其他： 1. 有关费用报销及支付按公司财务管理制度执行，协议未尽事项由双方协商解决。 2. 本协议自甲、乙双方签字（盖章）后生效。本协议一式两份，由甲、乙双方各执一份，具有同等法律效力。 3. 有关协议的一切争议，双方经协商解决未能达到一致的，任何一方均可向当地法院提出起诉。 甲方（签字盖章）：乙方（签字盖章） 年月日年月日 精选编辑word