Social comparison The end of a theory and the emergenceof a field

Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 102 (2007) 3–21

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doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.09.007

Social comparison: The end of a theory and the emergence of a W eld

Abraham P. Buunk a , Frederick X. Gibbons b,¤

a

University of Groningen, Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Groningen, The Netherlands

b

Iowa State University, Department of Psychology, Ames, IA 50011-3180, United States

Received 26 July 2005

Abstract

The past and current states of research on social comparison are reviewed with regard to a series of major theoretical develop-ments that have occurred in the past 5 decades. These are, in chronological order: (1) classic social comparison theory, (2) fear-a Y li-ation theory, (3) downward comparison theory, (4) social comparison as social cognition, and (5) individual di V erences in social comparison. In addition, we discuss a number of expansions of research on social comparison as they are currently occurring, and we outline what we see as likely and desirable future directions, including an expansion of areas, methods, and conceptualizations, as well as a stronger focus on cognitive, neuroscienti W c, and evolutionary aspects of social comparison.? 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords:Social comparison theory; New developments; Theory evolution

It has been widely acknowledged that social compari-son is a central feature of human social life. Even more so, according to Gilbert, Price, and Allan (1995), the need to compare the self with others is found in many other species as well, and has evolved as a very adaptive mechanism for sizing up one’s competitors. With respect to humans, theorizing and research on social compari-son can be traced to some of the classic contributions to Western philosophy (Suls & Wheeler, 2000). In the social sciences, the notion that comparisons with others play an important role in evaluating and constructing social reality goes back to the seminal work of Sherif (1936),who showed that two individuals who face the same unstable situation together develop through a process of mutual social in X uence a single characteristic reference point. Comparison processes were also highlighted in the sociological research on reference groups that was prompted by the work of Hyman (1942), who demon-strated that the assessment of one’s own status on such dimensions as W nancial position, intellectual capabilities,

and physical attractiveness is dependent on the group with whom one compares oneself.

Nevertheless, it was not until Festinger’s (1954) clas-sic paper that the term social comparison was proposed and a detailed theory on social comparison that included speci W c propositions and corollaries was outlined. As suggested by Mettee and Smith (1977), this theory is about “our quest to know ourselves, about the search for self-relevant information and how people gain self-knowledge and discover reality about themselves” (pp.69–70). As social comparison theory states, this quest for self-knowledge is ful W lled not just by obtaining objective information but also by comparing oneself with others.Although Festinger’s original theory on social compari-son had a somewhat restricted focus on the comparison of abilities and opinions, over the past 5 decades, work on social comparison has undergone numerous transitions and reformulations, and, in the process, has developed from a focused theoretical statement on the use of others for self-evaluation into a lively, varied, and complex area of research encompassing many di V erent paradigms,approaches, and applications (e.g., Buunk & Gibbons,1997, 2000; Suls & Wheeler, 2000; Wheeler, 1991). Current

*

Corresponding author. Fax: + 515 294 6424.

E-mail address: fgibbons@https://www.wendangku.net/doc/0b17546266.html, (F.X. Gibbons).

4 A.P. Buunk, F.X. Gibbons / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 102 (2007) 3–21

research on social comparison uses many di V erent meth-ods, including interviewing people about their compari-son habits and preferences and confronting individuals with vivid social comparison information. Moreover, the theory has come out of the lab and looks at social com-parison in relation to issues—getting cancer, eating dis-orders, the task division at home, or job satisfaction, for example—that no researcher would have considered during the early years of the theory. In the present arti-cle, we discuss current work in social comparison in the context of a series of major theoretical developments that have occurred in the past 5 decades in the following chronological order: (1) classic social comparison the-ory, (2) fear-a Y liation theory, (3) downward comparison theory, (4) social comparison as social cognition, and (5) individual di V erences in social comparison. Finally, we describe a number of expansions of research on social comparison as it is currently occurring and outline what we see as likely and desirable future directions.

Classic social comparison theory

According to Festinger (1954), individuals are driven by a desire for self-evaluation, a motivation to establish that one’s opinions are correct and to know precisely what one is capable of doing. Festinger believed that individuals generally prefer objective information to evaluate their standing on a given attribute but will, when such information is not available, turn to others for social information. He emphasized the interpersonal consequences of social comparison, by suggesting, for example, that people will seek out the company of others similar to themselves and will try to persuade others who are dissimilar. Although Festinger’s original theory stemmed to a large extent from theorizing and experi-ments on opinion convergence in groups, as noted by Suls (2000), actually, very little research has been done on this topic. Suls recently provided an interesting expansion of Festinger’s work, however, by suggesting that there are three types of opinion comparison that can be conceptualized with regard to three basic ques-tions: (l) preference assessment (do I like X?), (2) belief assessment (is X true?), and (3) preference prediction (will I like X?). As Suls notes, there are many important implications of theorizing and research on opinion for-mation that have yet to be explored, a primary example being the ways in which new ideas and beliefs spread within a population.

The upward comparison of abilities

In the W rst decade, some research was done on the other cornerstone of Festinger’s original paper, the com-parison of abilities. Wheeler’s (1966) rank order para-digm, in which participants were presented with the rank order of the scores of others in their group and then asked with whom they wanted to compare their score, was an important impetus to research in this area. Research in this tradition has shown that individuals generally prefer to compare with others who are thought to be slightly better o V, providing support for Festinger’s well-known notion of “upward drive” (e.g., Miller & Suls, 1977). However, subsequent research has suggested that the strength of this upward drive depends on a num-ber of factors. First, experimental studies have shown that the tendency to compare upward is stronger when the comparison can be made privately than when one anticipates actual contact with the comparison other (e.g., Gibbons et al., 2002a; Smith & Insko, 1987; Wilson & Benner, 1971; Ybema & Buunk, 1993). A number of survey studies have also found that when social compar-ison does not require people to reveal their inferiority to the other and does not involve the risk of the other look-ing down on them, comparison preferences are more upward than when one has to a Y liate with the other (Buunk, 1995; Buunk, Schaufeli, & Ybema, 1994). Sec-ond, some studies in recent years have shown that the upward preference is found only when the motive of self-improvement is salient, that is, when individuals have an interest in doing better. For example, Smith and Sachs (1997)o V ered participants the option of seeing the scores of another individual on a test that they had com-pleted. Participants who were told that the experimenter was interested in how well they could predict their own score on a second test chose to see the score of another who had performed at the same level, whereas partici-pants who were told that the experimenter was inter-ested in how they could improve their scores chose to see the score of someone who had performed better (for comparable W ndings, see Ybema & Buunk, 1993).

Given these and similar W ndings, and consistent with Festinger’s (1954) “unidirectional drive upward,” a number of recent perspectives have emphasized the util-ity and adaptive function of upward comparisons (e.g., Aspinwall, 1997; Collins, 1996). For example, in a recent study, Buunk, Kuyper, and Van der Zee (2005) found among high school students that the most frequently mentioned goal of social comparison was the hope that in the future they might receive grades that were similar to those of students who were currently performing bet-ter than they were. More importantly, there is some work indicating that upward comparison choice can indeed have signi W cant e V ects on performance in impor-tant, real-world settings (e.g., Nosanchuk & E rickson, 1985). For example, Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons, and Kuy-per (1999) found that high school students who com-pared academically with students who were doing well in school—as indicated by the actual GPAs of their pre-ferred targets—had the highest grades at the end of the semester, controlling for their grades at the earlier assessment. These W ndings were replicated and extended

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by Huguet, Dumas, and Monteil (2001) and by Gibbons, Blanton, Gerrard, Buunk, and E ggleston (2000), both also with regard to academic performance, and by Gerr-ard, Gibbons, Lane, and Stock (2005) with regard to suc-cess at quitting smoking (i.e., smokers who compared with other smokers who were successful at quitting were more likely to succeed at quitting themselves).

Despite this potential adaptive function of upward comparisons, a considerable body of research indicates that individuals may respond in a variety of defensive ways when confronted with someone who outperforms them—for example, by biasing the reconstruction of one’s past when it appears that others are actually behaving in a more healthy manner than one expected (Klein & Kunda, 1993), by choosing a clearly superior other as a comparison target as a way of self-handicap-ping (Shepperd & Taylor, 1999), by labeling a better-per-forming other as a “genius” (Alicke, LoSchiavo, & Zerbst, 1997), by distancing oneself from the other (Tes-ser, 1988), or by giving less helpful information to others (Pemberton & Sedikides, 2001). In addition, Mussweiler, Gabriel, and Bodenhausen (2000) showed that, after per-forming worse than a target, participants, especially those with high self-esteem, de X ected the comparison by strategically emphasizing aspects of their identity that di V erentiated them from the standard. To conclude, although people may indeed exhibit an upward drive in their comparisons to con W rm their similarity to others better-o V and to learn from such others, a superior other may, at the same time, induce a threat that needs to be counteracted.

Other expansions

There have been a number of other recent expansions of Festinger’s (1954) early theorizing. First, Martin (2000) argued in her proxy model that, when trying to predict performance on a novel and important task that they are contemplating, people will often rely on perfor-mance information from another person—a proxy. A proxy is most informative when he or she has performed similarly on a previous task and has put out maximum e V ort on that earlier task (or is similar on related attri-butes, such as age or physical condition). Recent research has provided initial support for these predic-tions (Martin, Suls, & Wheeler, 2002). Second, it has been argued from an evolutionary point of view that the drive upward may be an inherent part of the evolution of human beings into a species that uses symbolic, internal means to attain prestige in a social group (Buunk & Ybema, 1997; Gilbert, 1990). Indeed, an important line of recent research in this area has been the “better-than-average e V ect,” which is the tendency to view oneself as better than most others—a tendency that seems robust and resistant to attempts to undermine it experimentally (Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Hoorens & Buunk, 1993).However, while there is quite an extensive research tradi-tion trying to elucidate which factors may underlie this tendency to view oneself as better than others, as Moore (this issue) points out, the better-than-average e V ect is not as common as is often assumed, and, in fact, a “worse-than-average e V ect” is more prevalent under many conditions.

In sum, many of the issues raised by Festinger either directly (through the various corollaries of the theory) or indirectly (e.g., the implications of his upward prefer-ence) interested researchers for some time. Indeed, one can seen elements of his earlier thinking in much of the work that was done in the years after the theory was W rst published. In fact, if anything, Festinger underestimated the importance of the social comparison process in the original paper, by suggesting that it took a back seat to a desire for more objective information. Five decades of research have shown that this is often not the case.

Fear-a Y liation theory

Shortly after publication of Festinger’s (1954) seminal paper, a second major development in social comparison theory came in the form of the pioneering work of Schachter (1959) on stress and a Y liation. In his experi-ments with female students, Schachter showed that fear due to anticipation of having to undergo an electric shock evoked in most subjects a desire to wait with someone waiting for the same event rather than with someone in a di V erent situation. As Schachter (1959) concluded: “Misery doesn’t love just any kind of com-pany, it loves only miserable company” (p. 24). Schach-ter argued that social comparison was the main motive behind a Y liation under stress and, in particular, was more important than the desire for cognitive clarity con-cerning the nature of the threat. In line with the social comparison hypothesis, later experimental studies have shown that a Y liative needs are especially aroused when individuals feel uncertain about their own responses (e.g., Gerard & Rabbie, 1961; Gerard, 1963; Mills & Mintz, 1972). More recently, a series of survey studies has provided evidence that people who experience uncer-tainty—in their work (Buunk et al., 1994) or their mar-riage (Buunk, VanYperen, Taylor, & Collins, 1991) or because of their work-disability status (Buunk, 1995)—manifest a heightened desire to learn more about what similar others experience and to talk to such others.

A Y liation in hospital settings

The research by Kulik and Mahler and their col-leagues on stress and a Y liation in hospital settings (e.g., Kulik & Mahler, 1997; Kulik, Mahler, & Earnest, 1994) was inspired by Schachter’s work. Their research focuses more on the informational value of a Y liation, however,

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and, as a result, they reach conclusions di V erent from those of Schachter. In fact, Kulik and Mahler (2000) have suggested that the evidence for a number of widely cited conclusions from Schachter’s own research is scarce. This is particularly true for Schachter’s conclu-sion that there exists a predominant preference for a Y li-ation with similar others under stress. In fact, participants in the high-threat condition in Schachter’s original studies did not choose to wait more with similar others than did low-threat participants. Only internal analyses showed a correlation between fear level and a Y liative tendency. This nonexperimental evidence does not support the oft-cited implications of Schachter’s work. Also, threat did enhance a Y liative tendencies when there were no restrictions on talking with the other participants, a situation that would, according to Schachter, be more suitable for cognitive clarity than for social comparison. Thus, there appears to be little evi-dence for the conclusion that the desire for cognitive clarity is a relatively unimportant motive for such prefer-ences. In fact, unlike what Schachter (1959) would have predicted, various studies discussed by Kulik and Mah-ler (2000) suggest that individuals tend to prefer to a Y li-ate with others who are likely to have the most information about the threat that they face. And that often happens to be people who have already experi-enced the stressor (e.g., postoperative patients) rather than others who are also awaiting it—i.e., similar others, as Schachter’s reasoning would predict. These conclu-sions of Kulik and Mahler were in line with that of an early review by Rofe (1984), who noted that, in the case of real life stress, the main concern is to use a Y liation to eliminate or reduce the stress rather than to compare one’s emotional reactions with others.

In sum, Schachter’s work signi W cantly expanded the scope of social comparison theory—from a focus on just abilities and opinions to a focus that also included emo-tions and a V ect. As is often the case with pioneering early work like his, however, the research that his work stimulated has shown that some of his conclusions were wrong. In particular, it appears to be information rather than just perceived similarity (as Schachter believed) that helps to reduce the stress of anxious individuals, and this is what motivates their a Y liation (and presum-ably their comparison) preferences.

Downward comparison theory

A third important development in the evolution of social comparison theory was the emergence of down-ward comparison theory. The W rst social psychologists to address the issue of downward comparison empiri-cally were Thornton and Arrowood (1966) and Hakmil-ler (1966). The latter showed that individuals who are threatened on a particular dimension prefer to socially compare with others who are thought to be worse o V on this dimension. A few years later, Friend and Gilbert (1973) demonstrated that individuals threatened by fail-

ure on a test were more inclined to avoid information about better-o V others than were individuals who had done well (see also Wilson & Benner, 1971). These early studies eventually resulted in a major turn in social com-

parison theory emphasizing the role of downward com-parisons under threat. In this development, three pioneering articles played a crucial role. The W rst was Brickman and Bulman’s (1977) chapter entitled “Plea-

sure and Pain in Social Comparison,” which made a convincing argument that comparison with others who are thought to be doing better, though potentially infor-mative, may also be threatening. For this reason, such

comparisons are often avoided, especially by persons who feel threatened, and, instead, comparisons with oth-ers who are thought to be worse o V may be sought.

A few years later, this notion was elaborated in the

in X uential integrative paper by Wills (1981) on down-ward social comparison theory. Wills argued that indi-viduals who are experiencing a decline in well-being will often compare themselves with others who are thought

to be worse o V in an e V ort to improve their well-being especially when instrumental action is not possible. Wills identi W ed two versions of the downward comparison process: one in which the individual enhances subjective

well-being by comparing with a person who is worse o V than the self and another in which well-being may be enhanced by comparison with a person who is also expe-riencing problems but is at essentially the same level as

the self (lateral comparison). Most work on social com-parisons under stress following Wills (1981) theory has focused on the downward comparison version. Wills also talked about two di V erent types of downward com-

parison: active downward comparison, which involves “creating” a downward target by derogating, or making fun of, or even physically harming, another person; and passive downward comparison, which involves respond-

ing to information indicating that another is worse o V. Wills provided examples of both types. However, subse-quent work (see below) has suggested that active down-ward comparison may be less common.

The third article fostering the shift to a focus on downward comparisons (and a shift from the lab to the W eld) was the study by Taylor, Wood, and Lichtman (1983) among women with breast cancer and their hus-

bands, which was undertaken to examine the psycholog-ical aspects of the strategies that they were using in coping with the disease (see also Wood, Taylor, & Licht-man, 1985). Though somewhat unexpected, evidence of downward comparison was quite apparent in this sam-ple. For instance, when asked how well they were coping with their problems in comparison with other breast cancer victims, 80% of the women interviewed reported they were doing “somewhat” or “much” better than

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other women. Perhaps more important, an analysis of the comments that were made spontaneously by these women during the interview indicated that the vast majority of them had engaged in some kind of down-ward comparison with other cancer victims. No matter how serious these women’s problems were, they believed that there were others who were worse o V. And if they did not know of a speci W c person who had been more seriously a Z icted, they imagined others or even fabri-cated such a target. Taylor et al. concluded that compar-ison with these worse-o V targets, in particular, and downward comparison, in general, somehow helped these women cope with their problems, perhaps, as Wills (1981) suggested, by allowing them to feel better about themselves and their own situation.

Downward comparisons in populations under threat Inspired by these pioneering contributions, the importance of downward comparisons has been high-lighted in a series of studies in populations facing di V er-ent kinds of threat. For instance, research conducted in di V erent types of support groups indicated that partici-pants with fairly serious behavioral problems [eating dis-orders in one case (Gerrard, Gibbons, & Boney McCoy, 1993) and smoking in another (Gibbons, Gerrard, Lando, & McGovern, 1991)] showed a preference for having other members in their group who had more seri-ous problems. This downward preference declines over time, however, as the threat (perceived seriousness of the problem) declines (Gibbons et al., 2002a, Study 5). In a similar vein, a study by DeVellis et al. (1991) showed that arthritis patients more often preferred to read about another patient who had worse arthritis than they had (a form of passive downward comparison). There is some experimental research that seems to con W rm indirectly these correlational W ndings. For example, Spencer, Fein, and Lomore (2001, Study 3) showed that, when con-fronted with the option to choose an upward or a down-ward comparison, those who were self-a Y rmed (i.e., were encouraged to think about their own positive qual-ities) chose more often to listen to an upward compari-son target, whereas those who were not self-a Y rmed (thus experiencing more threat) chose more often to lis-ten to a downward comparison target. In general, studies among victimized or stigmatized populations show that downward comparisons are quite prevalent in groups such as mothers with medically fragile infants (A Z eck, Tennen, Pfei V er, Fi X ied, & Rowe, 1987), arthritis patients (Giorgino, Blalock, & DeVellis, 1994), cancer patients (Van der Zee et al. (1996), mentally handi-capped individuals (Gibbons, 1985), and disabled indi-viduals under stress (Buunk & Ybema, 1995). Indeed, in their comprehensive review of 23 studies examining social comparison among populations facing a health threat, such as those with rheumatoid arthritis, cancer,and chronic pain, Tennen, McKee, & A Z eck (2000) con-cluded that downward comparisons are prominent in populations with serious medical problems.

Positive a V ect as a result of downward comparison There is also evidence that downward comparisons may indeed make individuals under threat feel better about themselves. In particular, a series of laboratory experiments conducted by Gibbons and his colleagues showed that the information that another individual is doing worse can help alleviate negative a V ect (e.g., Gib-bons, 1986; see Gibbons & Gerrard, 1997, for an over-view). In one such study, Gibbons & Boney McCoy (1991) demonstrated that, when threatened, high self-esteem persons are more likely to engage in active down-ward comparison by derogating a comparison target, whereas low-self-esteem individuals do not derogate comparison targets under these circumstances; both groups, however, bene W t from the downward compari-son with regards to mood improvement. Another exam-ple of positive reactions to downward comparison was reported by Gibbons & Eggleston (1996), who suggested that people trying to overcome a health-relevant behav-ioral problem, such as smoking or other types of addic-tive behaviors, may engage in active downward comparison with a prototype that they associate with the behavior (e.g., a “typical smoker” or “junkie”) in an e V ort to distance themselves from that prototype and the group that it represents. This form of downward com-parison is thought to facilitate the quit attempt (see Gib-bons & Gerrard, 1997, for further discussion). In a similar vein, Buunk, Ybema, Gibbons, & Ipenburg (2001) found that people facing distress in their close relationships experienced an increase in satisfaction and shorter response latencies when they were asked to list the ways in which their relationship was better than that of most others (as opposed to just listing the ways in which their relationship was good). Similarly, older per-sons’ assessments of their health were more positive if they were presented with a similar comparison target that was in relatively poor health (Suls, Marco, & Tobin, 1991). In addition, many correlational studies in populations facing some kind of threat have shown that well-being, measured in a variety of ways, is positively associated with perceiving oneself as better o V than oth-ers. For example, men and women who were faced with the prospect of infertility were less threatened by their problem when they engaged more in downward compar-isons (Stanton, 1992); individuals attending a cardiac rehabilitation clinic experienced less psychological dis-tress when they felt better o V than others (Helgeson & Taylor, 1993); pregnant women experienced less pro-nounced increase in anxiety over time when they evalu-ated themselves more favorably on such dimensions as controlling one’s emotions and being troubled by

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physical symptoms (Dias & Lobel, 1997); older adults exhibited higher levels of physical activity when they made more self-enhancing comparisons (Rickabaugh & Tomlinson-Keasy, 1997); cancer patients reported a higher level of subjective well-being when they were feel-ing better o V than others, independent of the level of physical and psychological distress (Van der Zee, Buunk, & Sanderman, 1998) and, W nally, survivors of childhood cancer who made more favorable comparisons than unfavorable comparisons experienced relatively fewer health problems (Eiser & Eiser, 2000). As noted by Ten-nen et al. (2000) in their review, there is considerable evi-dence that evaluating oneself favorably in comparison with others—the result of a social comparison–is gener-ally associated with positive adjustment.

The avoidance of downward comparisons

Although these W ndings seem quite strong and con-vincing, it has become evident that people facing some kind of threat often make (or prefer) upward compari-sons and avoid downward comparisons. E ven in some early studies, an aversion to contact with worse-o V oth-ers had been found, particularly among those under stress (e.g., Gerard, 1963; Rabbie, 1963). In a recent experiment in which sociotherapists were confronted with a vivid description of either a well-functioning tar-get (i.e., an upward comparison) or a poorly functioning target (a downward comparison), it was shown that the higher the level of burnout, the more negative a V ect a downward comparison target evoked (Buunk et al., 2001). In a similar vein, a study by Wheeler and Miyake (1992) showed that respondents reported that they were more likely to compare upward when they felt bad and downward when they felt good. Studies among individu-als with a high degree of marital stress (Buunk et al., 1991), individuals on work-related disability (Buunk, 1995), and cancer patients (Molleman, Pruyn, & Van Knippenberg, 1986) all suggest a relative preference for upward comparisons among those facing stress. Evaluation vs a Y liation

In an e V ort to reconcile these contradictory W ndings, Taylor & Lobel (1989) proposed a useful distinction: that between evaluation and a Y liation. A Y liation with others undergoing a similar experience (or information about such others) who are coping well with their prob-lems may provide one with valuable information for suc-cessful problem-focused coping and may induce hope, motivation, and inspiration. This function of social com-parison—self-improvement—has also been addressed by Wood (1989), who suggested that, in addition to self-evaluation (Festinger, 1954) and self-enhancement (i.e., feeling better about the self; Thornton & Arrowood, 1966; Wills, 1981), social comparison may also serve the function of self-improvement—helping to enhance one’s current status. According to Taylor & Lobel (1989), in addition to engaging in upward a Y liation with the pur-pose of self-improvement, individuals under stress tend to engage in downward evaluation with the purpose of self-enhancement. They tend to use such evaluation as a form of emotion-focused coping, aimed at alleviating the negative emotions that stress produces by contrasting their situation with that of others who are worse o V. According to Taylor and Lobel, these evaluations are not the result of actively seeking contact with worse-o V others (i.e., active downward comparison), but are based on unavoidable contacts with actual patients or on the cognitive manufacturing of a comparison target who is doing worse (i.e., passive downward comparison). The Taylor & Lobel (1989) approach led eventually not only to a better understanding of the meaning of downward comparison under stress but also to the recognition that, in stressed populations, upward comparisons may play an important role in coping by providing one with posi-tive role models and by giving inspiration and hope (for a review, see Collins, 1996).

Although the Taylor & Lobel (1989) model was very in X uential, there are a number of W ndings that it cannot explain (cf. Wood & Van der Zee, 1997). First, evidence of downward evaluation is found not only among indi-viduals under threat but also among healthy, well-adjusted individuals. For example, within a sample of older adults, Rickabaugh & Tomlinson-Keasy (1997) found that the majority (71%) reported downward com-parisons by describing themselves as relatively advan-taged compared to others of the same age and that 63% of the sample did not report any upward comparison. Research by Cunningham & Glenn (2004a, 2004b) has shown that among people with limited cognitive abilities (in this case, individuals with a verbal mental age of around 8 years), downward comparisons were very prev-alent (cf. Gibbons, 1985). At W rst glance, this might be interpreted as evidence for downward comparisons among persons under stress. However, these people all had high self-esteem, suggesting that downward compar-isons are not necessarily associated with low well-being (assuming that low self-esteem is indicative of low well-being). Moreover, downward comparison has been asso-ciated with better adjustment in normal populations, not just in populations facing a threat. To give just one recent example from numerous studies, Kleinke & Miller (1998) found that how people felt they were doing com-pared with people of their own age on such dimensions as intelligence and physical attractiveness (among oth-ers) was a strong predictor of their well-being (including positive a V ect and satisfaction with life), even when con-trolling for the Big Five, social desirability, and coping style.

A second type of W nding that the Taylor & Lobel (1989) model cannot explain is that a preference for

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exposure to better-o V others, while higher than a prefer-ence for others worse o V, may often be lower among those experiencing stress. In a sample of nurses, Buunk et al. (1994) found that, while those under stress did gen-erally prefer upward comparisons, they preferred rela-tively less upward information than did those who were not under stress. In a similar vein, a number of studies have shown that higher levels of stress are associated with less positive a V ect after upward comparisons (e.g., Buunk, Collins, Taylor, VanYperen, & Dako V, 1990; Aspinwall & Taylor, 1993; Ybema & Buunk, 1995).

Finally, it should be noted that it has been questioned whether downward comparisons do re X ect a coping pro-cess in the way proposed by Taylor & Lobel (1989). Ten-nen & A Z eck (1997) argued that if downward comparison is a coping strategy then it should behave like one; i.e., it should meet these three criteria: be e V ort-ful, do more than just regulate mood, and change in pre-dictable ways over time. Based on their review of the literature, Tennen and A Z eck believe that there is no convincing evidence that downward comparison does all of these things, and so they conclude that it cannot be viewed as a coping strategy. In contrast, Wills (1997), employing a number of data sets, came to a very di V er-ent conclusion: because downward comparison items reliably load on the same factor as cognitive coping items, downward comparison should be seen as a form of cognitive coping. In part, the di V erence in opinion between Wills and A Z eck and Tennen may be a matter of how one de W nes a coping strategy. In fact, it may be the case that many items of current coping inventories do not meet Tennen and A Z eck’s, criteria for a coping strategy.

Downwards shifts

In an attempt to further clarify the meaning of down-ward comparisons under stress, Gibbons, Benbow, & Gerrard (1994) emphasized a point that has often been overlooked in this literature, i.e., the distinction between “true” downward comparison, de W ned as comparison with others who are, or are thought to be, worse o V than the self, and “downward shift,” which is simply a lower-ing of one’s preferred comparison level. There are a number of reasons for such a shift, including discomfort or guilt associated with the downward comparison pro-cess (which may be seen as gloating cf. Wills, 1981; or what Smith, 2000, calls “Schadenfreude,” meaning “joy from damage”) and the fact that the general perfor-mance level of a particular target is more likely to be known than his or her speci W c standing vis-a-vis the self. Moreover, availability of upward and downward targets on a particular dimension is often confounded with one’s own standing on that dimension (cf. Wood, Giord-ano-Beech, & Ducharme, 1999)—if you are at the 90th percentile, for example, then 9 of 10 of your potential comparison targets are actually downward comparisons. Thus, what may appear to be a tendency for persons experiencing threat to report upward comparison prefer-ences may in part be a re X ection of the fact that for someone who has failed, or is facing a di Y cult situation, most comparisons are, in fact, upward. By the same token, someone with low self-esteem is likely to believe that most others with whom they have compared are doing better. Focusing on absolute preferred level (e.g., a high performer vs a mediocre or poor performer), rather than target level vis-a-vis the self, will avoid many of these confounds and ambiguities.

In line with this reasoning, Gibbons et al. (2002a) argued that an appropriate test of downward compari-son theory would involve assessing downward shifts in comparison level, as well as “true” downward compari-son. They conducted W ve studies to test this argument. In the W rst two studies, participants were led to believe that either they had succeeded or that they had failed on a test and then were presented with the (bogus) percentile scores of seven other students on the test and asked how interested they were in discussing the test with each per-son. After failure, participants had a much stronger pref-erence for others with lower scores, and after success they had a much stronger preference for others with higher scores. Another study (Study 3) looked at stu-dents’ comparison level preferences right after they received feedback on an actual test they had taken in class. This study also assessed comparison motives, by asking participants to indicate why they chose the com-parison target they did. Results indicated that students who chose high-performing targets said they did so because they thought those targets could help them improve in the class; those who chose low said they did so because they thought such a comparison would help them feel better. Finally, in a longitudinal study with smokers who had joined a cessation group (Study 5), smokers who eventually relapsed started with a prefer-ence to have in their group others who had more prob-lems quitting smoking than they had, and this preference increased over time after they relapsed. In sum, these studies provided evidence of downward shifts among people who were experiencing some dysphoria because they had done poorly. The studies also provided some evidence of why people do this—because they believe that it will help them feel better (self-enhancement)—and why they engage in higher level comparison—because they think it will help them do better in the future (self-improvement).

Conditions moderating the e V ects of downward comparison

Whereas Gibbons et al. (2002a) focused on changes in comparison choice, other research and theorizing have clari W ed the conditions under which the e V ect of

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downward comparisons may be either positive or nega-tive. Lockwood (2002) argued that when one considers one’s situation relative to that of an inferior other, one may either delight in one’s superiority or feel alarmed at the prospect of falling prey to a similarly unhappy fate. Which perception dominates will, according to Lock-wood, depend on the ease with which one can imagine that one might become like the worse-o V target. In a series of studies, Lockwood exposed participants to a peer who was coping poorly with the W rst year of univer-sity. Compared with a control condition, those who were asked to think about how they might become like the poorly coping peer rated themselves more positively, supposedly because the outcome would seem highly implausible to the participants (what Olson, Buhrmann, & Roese, 2000—from a counterfactual perspective—would consider a situation that could but will not hap-pen to oneself). However, in response to a target that had just graduated from their own major and had seri-ous problems in W nding a good job (a situation that might indeed happen to them), self-ratings were less pos-itive than those in the control condition. In a similar study, Kemmelmeier & Oyserman (2001b) found that, following downward comparison (i.e., bringing to mind someone who was doing very poorly at school and might even have failed), a focus on similarities (i.e., having to describe ways in which they were similar to the target) led to less satisfaction than a focus on di V erences (i.e., having to describe ways in which they were di V erent from the target); these e V ects were found only among women, however. In line with these W ndings, Buunk et al. (2005) found in a study among high school students that those with a low performance level responded more often to downward comparison with the fear that they would receive a similar low grade on a subsequent test.

In sum, the following conclusions can be drawn from the (large) body of literature on downward comparison. On one hand there is relatively little evidence that indi-viduals under stress engage in active downward compar-ison by actually seeking comparison targets who are thought to be doing worse than they are. On the other hand, stressed individuals do appear to bene W t from information suggesting that there are others who are worse o V (i.e., passive downward comparison) as long as they are con W dent that their own situation will not become like that of the downward target. Thus, people with terminal or degenerative illnesses are not likely to engage in much downward comparison, at least not with regard to the illness itself (they may do so with regard to coping abilities, however). Similarly, it appears that indi-viduals who have failed or performed poorly do not seek comparison with others who are doing worse than they are, but they will lower their comparison level, in part so they can avoid painful upward comparisons. This ten-dency is usually short-lived—mostly because people realize that lower level comparisons do not promote improvement. If the downward shift does persist, then performance is likely to su V er.

Social comparison as social cognition

The foregoing brings us to the next development in social comparison research, i.e., the increasing in X uence of theories and methods from the social cognition litera-ture. Although social comparison theory has been related in the past to work on social cognition (e.g., pro-totypes, false consensus, attribution; cf. Buunk, Gibbons, & Reis-Bergan, 1997; Gibbons & Gerrard, 1997; Goe-thals & Darley, 1977), it is surprising that, until very recently, social comparison research existed quite inde-pendently from work on the cognitive processes that characterize psychological functioning in any situation.

A social cognition approach takes an informational per-spective on the social comparison process (for an over-view, see Bargh, 1996; Higgins, 1996). In particular, it is assumed that to understand the consequences social comparisons have for self-evaluation and self-percep-tion, one needs to examine what self-knowledge is ren-dered accessible during the comparison and how this knowledge is later used to judge and evaluate the self; in other words, one needs to study the cognitive processes that occur during comparison. For example, in their selective accessibility model, Mussweiler & Strack (2000, 2001) argued that in many situations, social comparison involves a selective search for evidence indicating that one is similar to the comparison other. This selective search typically increases the accessibility of such stan-dard-consistent self-knowledge so that self-evaluations are often assimilated toward the standard. Using a lexi-cal decision task, Mussweiler and Strack showed that engaging in a comparison enhances the accessibility of words associated with the particular comparison target, but only after a self-related prime (see also Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). In a related vein, Dunning & Hayes (1996) demonstrated that individuals give quicker responses about their own characteristics after judging others on these characteristics, supposedly because judging others on certain dimensions makes the same characteristics in oneself salient and cognitively accessible—i.e., it induces social comparison.

Self-evaluation

Approaches from the social cognition literature have become particularly important in theory and research with respect to the e V ects of social comparison on self-evaluation of the comparer. Indeed, one of the remark-able aspects in the development of social comparison theory is that in the W rst 3 decades of its existence, little attention was paid to the e V ects that social comparison may have on self-evaluation. However, in the past few

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decades there have been a plethora of studies on the con-sequences of social comparison—on mood (studies already discussed) and on self-evaluation. Many of these

studies have involved either assessing or manipulating the extent to which individuals see themselves as similar to or di V erent from the comparison target—i.e., assimila-tion vs contrast—and then examining the impact of the

comparison on the self.

Moderators of contrast and assimilation

Among the W rst studies to demonstrate empirically that social comparison might induce not only contrast with the comparison target but also assimilation were

those by Brown, Novick, & Kelley (1992) with the telling title When Gulliver Travels and Buunk et al. (1990), which indicated that both upward and downward com-parisons have their “ups and downs.” Generally speak-

ing, these studies showed that contrast with an upward target and assimilation to a downward target lowered mood and or self-evaluation; the opposite occurred with upward assimilation and downward contrast. More

recently, a series of theoretical models has aimed at out-lining the conditions under which upward and down-ward comparison will have contrast or assimilation e V ects. They have done so in a variety of ways, including:

(a) illuminating the di V erent motives that social compar-isons may serve (Wood, 1989)—self-enhancement motives, for example, lead to contrast with a downward target, whereas self-improvement motives lead to identi-W cation with an upward target; (b) underlining the role of control and attainability (Aspinwall, 1997; Lockwood & Kunda, 1997; Major, Testa, & Bylsma, 1991)—assimi-lation with an upward target and contrast with a down-

ward target are both more likely when perceived control is high (i.e., when there is something that can be done to improve and or avoid failure); (c) emphasizing the extent to which features of the comparison situation (such as the comparison dimension) promote identi W cation with the target (Buunk & Ybema, 1997); (d) outlining the moderating role of the type of self (positive, negative, or neutral) that is activated (Schwinghammer, Stapel, & Blanton, 2006); and (e) emphasizing the focus of the comparison—e.g., similarity versus di V erence testing (Mussweiler, 2001). For example, in a series of studies, Mussweiler, Ruter, & E pstude (2004a) found that pro-fessional water polo players and students had higher self-evaluations after comparing themselves with a mod-erately high than with an extremely high standard, because of a stronger similarity focus when comparing with the moderately high standard. This focus was set up with a task in which participants were asked to indicate the similarities between two pictures. Future studies in this area are likely to examine such moderating factors as personality (see discussion of individual di V erences in comparison tendencies below), levels of stress (e.g., Does stress promote contrast with upward targets?), and the media. For example: Do models and movie stars pro-mote contrast or assimilation? What are the e V ects of these very common comparisons? (See discussion below).

Self-construal and social comparison

A particularly prominent approach to the study of contrast and assimilation e V ects in social comparison has been to relate the impact of the comparison to the self-construals that have been made salient. Stapel & Koomen (2001, Study 1) showed that contrast e V ects are more likely to occur when personal self-construals are made accessible, through priming participants with the pronoun “I,” whereas assimilation e V ects occur when collective self-construals are made salient through prim-ing participants on “we”. ln a similar vein, Gardner, Gabriel, & Hochschild (2002, Study 1) gave participants either an independent prime (emphasizing the autono-mous self and rewarding people for their qualities) or an interdependent prime (emphasizing loyalty to groups such as one’s family). They found that men primed on independence showed the classic pattern predicted by Tesser’s (1988) self-evaluation maintenance model: They felt that their friend would perform better on irrelevant than on relevant dimensions, with the opposite pattern for the predicted performance of a stranger. However, the men who were primed on interdependence felt that their friend would perform better on relevant than on irrelevant dimensions. Among women, the prime did not work, supposedly because women have a chronically activated interdependent self (Cross & Madson, 1997). Consistent with this notion, Gardner et al. (2002, Study 2) found that women primed with interdependence reported a less positive mood after out-performing their in-group that generally had done poorly and a more pos-itive mood after under-performing their in-group that had generally done well. Similarly, Kemmelmeier & Oys-erman (2001a) showed that, compared to a control con-dition, after bringing to mind someone who was doing very well in school, individuals with a low interdepen-dent self-construal were less satis W ed with their perfor-mance, whereas individuals with a high interdependent self-construal were more satis W ed. In a related vein, Neighbors et al. (2003) showed that individuals with a high autonomy orientation (i.e., the experience of choice and a non-contingency-based sense of self) responded with less positive a V ect and less state self-esteem to a better-performing confederate. To conclude, there is now considerable evidence that responses to social comparison depend to a large extent on one’s self-con-cept, whether it is state-based (e.g., which aspects of the self are activated and or salient at the time) or trait-based (e.g., di V erent types of self-construal, autonomy orientation).

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Automatic and subliminal comparisons

The social cognition literature is also contributing to social comparison research in other ways. For example, an important study by Daniel Gilbert and his colleagues (1995) looked at the e V ects of “cognitive busyness” on social comparison. Gilbert et al. suggested that social comparison is often a two-step process. The W rst step is more or less automatic—whether or not we intend (or want) to compare, we do, oftentimes without thinking much about the target or factors that contributed to his/ her behavior. In other words, the initial response is top-of-the-head: one might initially respond negatively to information about a highly successful athlete or business tycoon, for example, because of this automatic compari-son. After this initial response, however, individuals may engage in a process of “decomparing,” in which they “undo” the unpleasant e V ects of the comparison, by con-sidering why the target may have been advantaged (e.g., she is wealthy, he had more time to practice). As Gilbert et al. showed in their research, such an undoing process requires cognitive e V ort, and so it is less likely to occur when information processing capacity is blocked or, in their terms, when people are cognitively “busy.” What this research suggests, W rst, is that the comparison pro-cess may be more complex than most researchers thought. Second, it would seem that in much of the research on the e V ects of social comparison, decompar-ing may have neutralized the original e V ects; in other words, there may be more comparison activity going on than even social comparison researchers suspected. Also highlighting the role of automatic cognitive processes, Mussweiler, Ruter, and E pstude (2004b) and in Stapel and Blanton (2004) were among the W rst to demonstrate that social comparison may occur outside awareness. In one of their studies (Experiment 2A), Stapel and Blanton found that participants primed subliminally with a pic-ture of a very young person (i.e., a baby) evaluated them-selves as older than participants primed with a very elderly woman.

What these studies reveal once again, is that Festinger underestimated the importance and especially the ubiq-uity of social comparisons. They occur frequently and, in many cases, automatically—oftentimes without full awareness. They also can be quite complex, however. Given the time and inclination, the initial, automatic reaction to hearing about the good fortune of an old rival from college, for example, may be followed by a more systematic and thorough review of the target’s sit-uation vis a vis that of the self, which then results in a very di V erent and perhaps more rational conclusion about one’s own status. Moreover, as suggested below, it appears that there are individual di V erences in this pro-cess; some people may be more likely to be inclined to take the time to “uncompare” or perhaps “recompare”than are others. Clearly, social comparison research has been strengthened considerably by employing social cog-nitive techniques and models such as those described here. It seems very likely that that trend will continue in the future and perhaps expand to include more work using techniques from the area of social neuroscience (e.g., brain imaging during comparison).

Individual di V erences in social comparison

E ven more recent than the work on the e V ects of social comparison that was inspired by social cognition is the W fth development that we want to mention: the relation between personality variables and social com-parison processes. Although early studies had consid-ered variables such as fear of negative evaluation (Wilson & Benner, 1971) and self-consistency (Morse & Gergen, 1970) in relation to social comparison, it is only recently that the role of personality with respect to social comparison has been studied systematically. As Tennen et al. (2000) pointed out, however, the W ndings on the role of personality variables, such as self-esteem, in mod-erating the e V ects of social comparison in populations under stress are rather equivocal. In a similar vein, Wheeler (2000) noted many inconsistencies in the literature on the e V ects of social comparison as related to person-ality variables. Wheeler concluded that low-self-esteem (or depressed) individuals tend to respond with more positive a V ect to downward comparison, a pattern that was interpreted as support for one aspect of downward comparison theory (Wills, 1981). However, according to Wheeler, the evidence for the preferred direction after failure among high- versus low-self-esteem individuals is inconsistent.

More evidence has been found for the role of neuroti-cism—a personality trait characterized by worrying, depression, and anxiety—in moderating the e V ects of social comparison. In a series of correlational studies, Van der Zee, Buunk, and their colleagues (Van der Zee et al., 1998) showed that neuroticism was related to a greater tendency to compare oneself with others and to derive more negative feelings from social comparison. In two independent experimental studies it was shown that cancer patients (Van der Zee et al., 1998) and nurses (Buunk, van der Zee, & van Yperen, 2001) who were higher in neuroticism responded with less positive (but not with more negative) a V ect to confrontation with an upward (but not a downward) comparison target. Other personality traits have been examined, as well. For instance, in a study in which participants were asked to record their spontaneous interactions (Locke & Nekich, 2000), those high in agentic traits (e.g., dominant, ambi-tious, and competitive) reported more downward than upward and lateral comparisons, whereas those low in agentic traits reported similar proportions of all three types of comparisons.

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Social comparison orientation

Whereas the work just mentioned relates social com-parison to general personality characteristics, recently several theorists have suggested that the tendency to make (or not make) social comparisons may actually be a personality characteristic (e.g., Hemphill & Lehman, 1991). One reason this was suggested is that people often are reluctant to admit they compare themselves with oth-ers. As an example, many cancer patients in the classic work by Wood et al. (1985) who made statements that clearly re X ected some kind of self-other comparison ini-tially denied engaging in social comparison with other cancer patients. In a series of studies, Wilson & Ross (2000) found that in open-ended descriptions, social (i.e., interpersonal) comparisons were much less frequently used to characterize oneself than were temporal (intra-personal) comparisons with one’s own self in the past. This reticence most likely results from a variety of fac-tors. It may be partly cognitive—a lack of awareness or problems in selectivity, recall, and aggregation, for exam-ple (cf. Wood, 1996). It may also be partly self-presenta-tional, because, as outlined by Wood (1996, 2000) and others, social comparison, in general, and downward comparison, in particular, are viewed by many as socially undesirable (e.g., Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Wills, 1981).

This reluctance is probably also partly dispositional, however: some individuals may deny that they compare themselves with others because they truly have little inter-est in comparative information and therefore engage in social comparison relatively infrequently. In fact, several researchers have theorized that people may di V er in their disposition to compare themselves with others. For instance, Diener & Fujita (1997) suggested, “making any comparisons at all, may often be a function of one’s per-sonality” (p. 349). Hemphill & Lehman (1991) mentioned “the need for researchers to include measures of social comparison that acknowledge the fact that people may not wish to compare with others to an equal extent” (p. 390). Thus, when research participants explain their di Y-culties with social comparison questionnaires and claim they seldom compare themselves to others, this may mean that they really do lack an interest in social comparison information and thus are not disposed to assess their own situation vis a vis that of others. Indeed, it has become increasingly clear that there are important individual di V erences in the extent to which people compare with others and in the way that comparison information is interpreted. This belief led to our e V orts to develop a scale assessing individual di V erences in what we labeled social comparison orientation (SCO; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). Personality and SCO

Many personality characteristics have been shown to correlate with SCO. On the basis of these W ndings, we would conclude that the “typical” comparer is character-ized by three features. First, those high in SCO seem to have a high chronic activation of the self. E vidence of this comes from correlational research; e.g., SCO is strongly related to public and private self-consciousness (Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). E vidence also comes from experimental research; Stapel & Tesser (2001), for exam-ple, showed that those high in SCO have a more chroni-cally activated self, as apparent from their tendency to mention more W rst-person nouns when trying to guess the correct translation of pronouns from an unknown language. Second, individuals high in SCO are character-ized by a strong interest in what others feel, a strong empathy for others, and a general sensitivity to the needs of others. This may, at W rst blush, seem odd, because, as suggested by Gardner et al. (2002), social comparison would seem to be associated with a sense of indepen-dence that is oriented toward di V erentiating oneself in a competitive way from others. However, the evidence suggests that SCO is di V erent from competition; instead, it involves a more prosocial orientation and a more interdependent self. Indeed, in addition to self-con-sciousness, one of the strongest correlates of SCO is interpersonal orientation, a construct that includes an interest in what makes people tick, as well as a tendency to be in X uenced by the moods and criticism of others, and an interest in mutual self-disclosure—all aspects that are characteristic of individuals with a high interde-pendent self (Swap & Rubin, 1983). In a similar vein, SCO is also correlated moderately with Clark, Ouellette, Powell, & Milberg’s (1987) Communal Orientation Scale, which measures sensitivity to the needs of others, and a willingness to help others in need. As would be expected among individuals with an interdependent self, there is also a negative correlation between the SCO and the Big Five trait intellectual autonomy (or openness to experience as it is sometimes called; Gibbons & Buunk, 1999). This means that those high in SCO are generally somewhat lower in independent and creative thinking and somewhat higher in conformity.

A third main feature of SCO is its relation with nega-tive a V ectivity and uncertainty of the self, including low self-esteem and neuroticism, although the correlations with these variables vary and are lower than those with self-consciousness and interpersonal orientation. Inter-estingly, recent research suggests that SCO is correlated with narcissism, as measured by the Narcissistic Person-ality Inventory, and, in particular, with the subscales measuring leadership or authority, superiority or arro-gance, and exploitiveness or entitlement (Bogart, Ben-otsch, & Paadovic, 2004). This seems di Y cult to reconcile with the general low self-esteem of those high in SCO, but it does suggest that high-SCO persons may have a dynamic self-concept that varies in di V erent social situations and is more susceptible to social in X uence. More generally, these W ndings suggest that those with

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high SCO are characterized by a combination of (a) a high accessibility and awareness of the self, (b) an inter-est in what others feel and think, and (c) some degree of negative a V ectivity and self-uncertainty.

Extent and e V ect of social comparison among people high in SCO

An increasing number of studies in a variety of con-texts have shown that those high in SCO do indeed com-pare themselves more often with others. For instance, in a study by Van der Zee, Oldersma, Buunk, & Bos (1998), cancer patients who were o V ered a computer program that contained 24 interviews with other cancer patients selected more interviews and spent more time reading the interviews if they were high in SCO. Research among Spanish health care workers has shown that those high in SCO reported that they compared themselves rela-tively more with colleagues performing better and with colleagues performing worse than they did (Buunk, Zur-riaga, Gonzalez-Roma, & Subirats, 2003; Buunk, Zurri-aga, Peiro, Nauta, & Gosalvez, 2005). In addition, there is considerable evidence that those high in SCO are more a V ected by social comparisons. For instance, Gibbons, Lane, Gerrard, Pomery, & Lautrup (2002b) found that the more common that college students thought drunk driving behavior was among their comrades, the less risk that they ascribed to it (e.g., “people do it all the time and get away with it”) and, as a consequence, the more drunk driving that the students engaged in subsequently. However, this tendency was signi W cant only among those who were high in SCO. In a similar vein, Stock, Gibbons, & Gerrard (2006) exposed students who had engaged in high-risk sexual behavior to a bogus social comparison target who reported that she or he had con-tracted a sexually transmitted disease despite having engaged in relatively low-risk sex. After the comparison, these high-risk students expressed a greater willingness to engage in future risky sex than did those students con-fronted with an infected target who had engaged in high-risk sex—and this tendency was signi W cantly stronger among those who were high in SCO. The authors argued that after comparing with the low-risk, but nonetheless infected, target, the high-risk (but uninfected) partici-pants decided they were somehow immune (Weinstein, 1987). In a laboratory experiment by Buunk (2005), par-ticipants were exposed to a scenario in which a target talked about his or her romantic relationship that was characterized by either a high degree of autonomy, inde-pendence, and mutual freedom (supposedly valued more by men) or a high degree of commitment, intimacy, and togetherness (supposedly valued more by women). Only when they were high in SCO did men respond more pos-itively to the autonomy scenario and did women respond more positively to the commitment scenario. In clinically depressed individuals with high levels of SCO,a low-e V ort target evoked a relatively more positive mood change, and a high-e V ort target evoked a rela-tively more negative mood change (Buunk & Brennink-meijer, 2001). This was predicted given the typical outlook of depressed individuals—i.e., the sense of defeat, the lack of control, and the helplessness—for whom every act can be a struggle (cf. Hammen, 1997; Seligman, 1975). It seems likely that, for these people, it might be threatening to learn that overcoming a bout of depression involves a great deal of e V ort.

Negative e V ects of social comparison among people high in SCO

Those high in SCO are not only more a V ected by social comparisons per se; there is increasing evidence that they are, in particular, a V ected more negatively by social comparisons. In a study among 653 undergradu-ate business students, Buunk, Nauta, & Molleman (2004) examined the impact on satisfaction with one’s educational group of SCO and a Y liation orientation, i.e., the preference for doing things together and in groups versus a preference for doing things alone. Whereas among those low in SCO a high a Y liation ori-entation was associated with more group satisfaction, among those high in SCO a high level of a Y liation ori-entation was actually negatively associated (though not very strongly) with group satisfaction. Furthermore, there is evidence from a number of studies that individu-als high in SCO tend not to respond particularly nega-tively to upward comparisons but respond primarily to downward comparisons. For example, Buunk, Old-ersma, & De Dreu (2001) presented sociotherapists with a bogus interview with someone involved in the same profession who was either very successful (upward com-parison) or very unsuccessful (downward comparison). SCO did not a V ect the feelings evoked by the upward comparison. However, the higher the level of burnout, the more negative a V ect evoked by the description of the downward comparison target, but only among individu-als high in SCO. Similar results were obtained by Buunk et al. (2001) among a sample of nurses. The fact that those high in SCO tend to respond more negatively to downward comparisons may be interpreted as indicating that they view the situation of comparison targets as re X ecting upon their own situation and that they are concerned that they may be like, or may become like, low-status targets (cf. Lockwood, 2002).

More cognitive distancing among people high in SCO Although, or maybe because, individuals high in SCO are concerned about becoming like downward compari-son targets, they seem particularly e V ective in alleviating this concern by cognitively distancing themselves from such others (e.g., Buunk et al., 2001). For example, a

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series of studies examined the impact that downward comparison with health images can have on health behavior (see Gibbons & Gerrard, 1997, for a review). According to the prototype- willingness model of adoles-cent health behavior (Gibbons, Gerrard, Reimer, & Pomery, 2006; Gerrard et al., 2006) people who have an unfavorable image of smokers, for example, are less likely to smoke when given the opportunity. The model postulates that this prototype in X uence occurs via a social comparison process—self with the image. In sup-port of this contention, a number of studies have shown that prototypical health images (e.g., “the typical smoker” the “typical drug addict”) have more impact on the health behavior of those high in SCO. Using one such study as an example, Ouellette, Hessling, Gibbons, Reis-Bergan, & Gerrard (2005) asked college students to think about the typical person their age who does or does not regularly engage in exercise. Actual exercise behavior was assessed at the start of the session and then again several weeks later. As expected, prototype con-templation had signi W cantly more of an impact on stu-dents’ subsequent (exercise) behavior if they were high in SCO. To conclude, then, comparison is common and vir-tually everyone does it from time to time; however, there are important individual di V erences in both the amount of comparison in which people engage and the impact that comparison can have on them (for a more extensive review, see Buunk & Gibbons, 2006).

Recent expansions in social comparison theory

As is evident from the discussion so far, there is a still broadening expansion of research in social comparison in a variety of ways, including the issues that are explored from a social comparison perspective, the methods that are being used, and the concept of social comparison itself. We explore, brie X y, some of those expansions here.

Expansion of issues

First, the realm of social comparison theory is contin-uously expanding, with more and more issues being explored from a social comparison perspective. While it is surprising, given the amount of time people spend at their work, that social comparison in organizations has received little attention, this situation is changing now as is apparent from the review by Ashkanazy, Greenberg et al. (this issue). For instance, Heslin (2003) found that to establish whether their career was successful, most people used others as referents, especially those with an entity personality theory, and Buunk et al. (2003) found that engaging in upward comparisons increased feelings of relative deprivation at work for those high in SCO. Furthermore, the relevance of social comparison for processes in close relationships is receiving increasing attention. Buunk, Kluwer, Schuurman, & Siero (2000), for example, found that egalitarian women more often compared their own housework contributions with their partner’s contribution, as well as with other women’s division of labor; and Buunk & Ybema (2003) found that downward comparisons with other couples led to a higher relationship satisfaction than upward compari-sons. Another area on which social comparison theory is beginning to have an important impact is the e V ect of social comparison with models in the media on body image and eating disorders among women. For example, Carlson Jones (2001) showed that models that appear in the media were indeed targets of social comparison, and various authors have found that exposure to a thin tar-get results in an increase in body dissatisfaction (e.g., Irving, 1990; Jones & Gerard, 1967; Krone et al., 2005). The relevance of social comparison for economic behav-ior is also increasingly being acknowledged. For instance, Karlsson, Dellgran, Klingander, & Garling (2004) found that individuals’ household consumption increased with the degree to which they considered themselves better o V than others, and Novemsky & Schweitzer (2004) found that downward external com-parisons (e.g., with other buyers) increased buyers’ satis-faction but that downward internal downward comparisons (e.g., with the seller) decreased satisfaction. Last but not least, it must be noted that social compari-son research appears to have rediscovered the group, exploring, for example, the role of social comparison in brain storming situations (Dugosh & Paulus, 2005). It can be expected that in the future more and more other new issues will be explored from a social comparison perspective.

Expansion of methods

A second expansion concerns the use of more diverse and sophisticated methods to study social comparison. This includes methods that have been used in other areas of social psychology, such as physiological measures, diary methods, and social cognitive measures, but there are also methods developed speci W cally to study social comparison (see Van der Zee et al., 1998). For example, Mendes, Blascovich, Major, & Seery (2001) examined reactions to comparisons with similar versus dissimilar standards on physiological measures, such as cardiovas-cular activity, and demonstrated that taking a biopsy-chological approach promises to be a fruitful path of analysis for future social comparison research. It can be expected that such approaches will become more preva-lent in the future. An interesting new approach to study-ing social comparison was developed by Wood (2000), who argued that three comparison strategies have been relatively neglected: the W rst is simply avoiding compari-sons, the second is selecting new comparison dimensions,

16 A.P. Buunk, F.X. Gibbons / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 102 (2007) 3–21

and the third is seeking new comparison on the same dimension. Wood and her colleagues developed a new measure, the test selection measure, that is particularly useful in assessing the extent to which people seek versus avoid comparisons. Participants can choose which new tests they would like to take and which new tests a coparticipant will take. Choosing di V erent tests suggests that they want to avoid comparisons. This seems to be a very fruitful method for exploring issues related to social comparison—the avoidance of comparison being a prime example—that have been suggested to occur for a long time (e.g., Brickman & Bulman, 1977).

Expansion of the notion of social comparison

A third expansion in current social comparison research is a much broader notion of what constitutes social comparison than was originally envisaged by Festinger (1954). It would appear that social comparison is now thought to be any process in which individuals relate their own characteristics to those of others. It is even assumed now that impression formation (or person perception) necessarily involves some social comparison (cf. Dunning, 2000), which, of course, expands the pur-view of the theory considerably. Furthermore, anxiety reduction, which Schachter (1959) viewed as an alterna-tive explanation to social comparison, would, from a current perspective, be considered another type of com-parison (Bennenbroek et al., 2003). In other words, indi-viduals may compare their levels of anxiety with those of similar others and may, when they perceive others to be less anxious than they are, conclude that they are not that anxious. In a recent chapter on social comparison in groups, Forsyth (2000) considered a wide range of clas-sic social psychological phenomena—most referring to some type of social in X uence—as social comparison phe-nomena. Social projection and false consensus, in which assumptions about the characteristics of others are made on the basis of one’s own characteristics (Krueger, 2000), are cognitive processes that have not typically been thought to fall within the realm of social comparison but are now included in handbooks in this area. In addition, social identity theory, as developed by Tajfel (1978) & Turner (1975), has traditionally existed outside the social comparison mainstream, even though it was based in part on Festinger’s (1954) theory. However, although this theory was absent in the Suls & Miller (1977) vol-ume, it seems now to be moving toward a well-deserved place in social comparison theory, as apparent from the chapter by Hogg (2000) in the recent Handbook of Social Comparison(Suls & Wheeler, 2000) and in a recently edited volume by Guimond (2006) that links social comparison as it occurs on various levels. In fact, social identity theory gave self-enhancement—or rather group-enhancement—a central place long before Wills’s (1981) seminal paper on downward comparison theory and rec-ognized from the start the importance of social compari-sons in shaping one’s identity, an emphasis that developed in social comparison theory only decades after the original formulation (e.g., Tesser, 1988). Conclusion and future prospects

Social comparison is a ubiquitous social phenome-non. Virtually everyone does it from time to time, mostly because it can ful W ll functions that are fundamental, such as providing useful information about where one stands in one’s social world, feeling better about oneself, and learning how to adapt to challenging situations. It is remarkable that, despite this ubiquity, until 2 decades ago, social comparison—clearly a very basic and proto-typical social psychological process—was a more or less peripheral topic in social psychology. This situation has changed radically. Recent research is focusing not only on the various functions of social comparison but also on the fact that people do di V er quite a bit in their ten-dency to compare themselves with others and on the implications of such di V erences. The ongoing expansion of research on social comparison will probably move social comparison still more to the center stage of social psychology, as it may demonstrate the relevance of a social comparison approach for a variety of issues and will link social comparison perspectives more to other areas in social psychology.

Given the dramatic expansion of the realm of social comparison research, it is not possible to outline all future directions the W eld might take, or would need to take.A number of basic issues still need a considerable degree of theoretical and empirical clari W cation, how-ever, including, for example, the still relatively unex-plored issue of social comparison of opinions, the question of what exactly is social comparison and what is not, the question to what extent a Y liation is motivated by social comparison needs, the e V ect of self-a Y rmation on social comparison, the relation between social com-parison and coping and health behavior, and the role of individual di V erences in social comparison. Two particu-larly interesting issues that might be explored in future research are the long-term e V ects of feeling better o V than others on longevity, for which there is now prelimi-nary evidence (Bailis, Chipper W eld, & Perry, 2005), and the cultural in X uences on social comparison, which are just beginning to be explored (e.g., Lockwood, Marshall, & Sadler, 2005; White & Lehman, 2005).

A major turn that social comparison research seems to be taking, and needs to take, is focusing on the cogni-tive processes that mediate the relation between social comparison and its attendant outcomes—a V ective, cog-nitive, and behavioral—a central issue that nevertheless has received relatively little attention from early compar-ison researchers. It seems likely that in the coming years

A.P. Buunk, F.X. Gibbons / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 102 (2007) 3–2117

our insight into social comparison processes will be enhanced further by employing techniques and models developed in the social cognition and social judgment lit-erature. One approach, suggested by Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris (1995) two-step model, which may prove very fruitful in the future, is to take a dual-process perspective (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) on comparison. That is, to what extent do social comparisons involve more heuris-tic (image-based, a V ective) processing vs more analytic or systematic (i.e., reasoned, thoughtful) processing? Are there circumstances that promote one type over another, and, if so, what are their consequences in terms of self-evaluation and or behavior?

We also believe that both the extent to which and the way in which social comparisons may function automat-ically and subconsciously constitute major issues for future research. Thus, we would expect more research in the future that examines priming e V ects, with similar or dissimilar upward and downward targets, or perhaps priming of loved ones instead of the self. The same goes for research that looks at reaction times in response to di V erent types of comparisons. These techniques may also reduce some of the problems associated with a gen-eral reluctance to acknowledge engaging in social com-parison. A particularly promising development in the future concerns the links that may be made between social comparison and neuroscienti W c and evolutionary approaches. With respect to the former, we anticipate work in the future that will examine brain activity dur-ing di V erent types of comparison processes and opportu-nities (cf. Fadiga, Craighero, & Olivier, 2005); e.g., can reactions to upward vs downward comparison be detected at a neural level? Are di V erent parts of the brain activated depending on who the comparison target is or what s/he is doing? With regard to the evolutionary per-spective, it has been suggested, for example, that social comparisons assist individuals in determining their rank in the group, which has adaptive value (Gilbert, 1990; Gilbert et al., 1995; Buunk & Brenninkmeijer, 2000), and that the desire to be better on dimensions that are important to oneself and the desire to have friends who are better than oneself on dimensions that are unimpor-tant to oneself developed in the course of evolution as elaborated mechanisms to prevent potentially harmful competition in groups (Beach & Tesser, 2000). It is a challenge for future research to develop experimental paradigms to examine such issues, including their neuro-scienti W c underpinnings. More generally, the question of the utility of social comparison as a means to e V ect posi-tive changes in behavior is worthy of more attention in the future. Speci W cally, there is a need for research that looks at the motivational e V ects of induced or (judi-ciously) encouraged comparison with certain targets—good students, for example, or other role models. The same applies to work that examines the intervention util-ity of induced, but “controlled,” comparisons (e.g., with former smokers or people undergoing successful postin-jury rehabilitation). Overall, we remain optimistic that more light will be shed on many unresolved issues in the coming years, and we see an active, and most likely con-tinued controversial, future ahead for the theory and its adherents.

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