Economic policy under new labour--how social democratic is the Blair gov

Economic Policy under New Labour:How Social Democratic is the Blair Government? ANDREW GLYN AND STEWART WOOD

Social democratic parties returned to power across western Europe in the 1990s.However,the rediscovery of elec-toral success has been accompanied by a marked ideological and policy shift away from the traditional terrain of social democracy.Nowhere has this shift been espoused with more enthusiasm,or co-incided with a more spectacular victory at the polls,than in the case of the British Labour party under the leadership of Tony Blair,cloaked in the embryonic ideology of the`third way'.Since taking over the party leadership from John Smith in1994Blair has continually stressed the need to`modernise'tradi-tional social democratic policy platforms, advocating an`adherence to our values but also a willingness to change our old approaches and traditional policy instru-ments'.1To many,the rapid policy move-ment that Blair has initiated seems more like an ideological retreat than modern-isation.For example,Labour's1992elec-tion manifesto contained commitments to raise the top rate of income tax from 40per cent to50per cent,to restore the link between the state pension and aver-age earnings,and to make signi?cant increases in welfare spending.By the time the party returned to power in a landslide electoral victory in May1997 Labour had abandoned these commit-ments,pledging instead to retain the existing top rate of income tax and to abide by Tory spending plans for the?rst two years of government.

To what extent has the New Labour government abandoned social demo-cratic ambitions and policies?Two-thirds through one term in o ce the contours of Labour's economic policy seem clear en-ough.This article examines the main eco-nomic policies of the Blair government, and provides an assessment of their con-tent and likely consequences.It covers macroeconomic and spending policies, where`prudence'rules and where con-trol over interest rates has been delegated to the Bank of England,before proceed-ing to aspects of welfare policy and im-plications for income distribution.The focus then shifts to education and train-ing,which Blair has stressed as central to economic policy,and?nally to broader issues of industrial and industrial rela-tions policy.Preoccupation with the sup-ply side is the most distinctive aspect of Labour policy,combining a wholesale reorientation of the welfare state towards encouraging work with abandonment of both the interventionist policies towards industry and the collaboration with trade unions so characteristic of social demo-cracy in the1960s and1970s.

Macroeconomic policy

Labour's macroeconomic policy places overriding importance on devising a framework for economic stability.This has both political and economic origins. Economic mismanagement was widely blamed for Labour's loss of power in 1979in the aftermath of the collapse of its pay policy in the`winter of discontent'. Thirteen years later the Tory government su ered an irretrievable collapse of support after sterling's ignominious exit from the European Exchange Rate #The Political Quarterly Publishing Co.Ltd.2001

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Mechanism.Avoidance of such macro-economic debacles has accordingly been a political priority.In narrower economic terms,the UK su ered extremely severe recessions in both the early1980s and the early1990s,punctuated by the unsustain-able Lawson boom.The government's 1999Budget statement noted:`Over the past three decades,the UK economy has exhibited high volatility in output and inˉation...The Government has reformed the framework for macroeco-nomic policy to promote economic stabi-lity...Stability is essential for high levels of growth and employment.'Securing steady growth at the long-term sustain-able rate is hardly controversial as an objective.The question is,how to achieve it?

Monetary policy has been placed in the hands of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC),with Bank of England o cials in the majority and the remainder being economists appointed by the govern-ment.The MPC is charged with hitting the government's inˉation target of 2.5per cent per year.The idea is that interest rates would be changed in a timely manner to o set inˉationary or deˉationary pressures.Removing mone-tary policy from short-term political manipulation is supposed to enhance its `credibility'in the eyes of the?nancial markets,and the government claims the reduction in the di erential between Ger-man and UK bond yields(from more than1per cent in the months before the election to around0.25per cent in the autumn of1999)as a signi?cant achieve-ment.The MPC is charged with hitting the inˉation target,not staying beneath it, and this is supposed to prevent over-zealous central bankers focusing solely on minimising inˉation without regard to the consequences for employment. Labour's pursuit of longer-term goals has extended to?scal policy as well.The government has`set two strict?scal rules to deliver sound public?nances'.First, the golden rule decrees that on average over the economic cycle,the government will borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending;second,the govern-ment pledges that its(net)debt`will be held over the economic cycle at a stable and prudent level'(Budget statement 1999).With government(net)investment forecast to average only1.0per cent of GDP per year up to2003/4,the public sector's net debt should gently decline to less than40per cent of GDP.Reaching this trajectory has involved a severe?scal squeeze.The government estimates that between1996/7and1998/9the cyclically adjusted de?cit will have fallen by almost 4per cent of GDP.

This policy framework does not neces-sarily constrain macroeconomic policy from acting to support demand and em-ployment.If unemployment were rising and inˉation were below the target?g-ure,the Bank of England would be ex-pected to cut interest rates,while the government could allow the automatic ?scal stabilisers to work and even engage in some discretionary?scal expansion as well.The real test of the policy will come if unemployment rises and inˉation is above the target;only then would the claim by Treasury spokesman Ed Balls that the Bank of England can`respond where necessary with discretion'and `without paying a high price in terms of lost output'be put to the test.Under such circumstances it would obviously be con-venient for the government to deˉect criticism by blaming the Bank of England for high or rising interest rates. Unemployment declined steadily over the government's?rst two and a half years,but before attributing this to suc-cessful macroeconomic policy it is im-portant to remember that no previous Labour government had inherited such a favourable economic conjuncture. When Labour took o ce unemployment had been falling for four years as the sharp depreciation in1992set in train a strong export recovery;inˉation was about2per cent per year and the world

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economy was delivering steadily grow-ing export markets and stable commodity prices.Even the government de?cit, which had reached an alarming7.9per cent of GDP in1993/4,had been halved. This favourable pattern has been main-tained under Labour,and by the middle of1999unemployment had fallen to 5.8per cent(not much more than half the level in France,Germany and Italy) without serious signs of resurgent inˉa-tion.Thus the government's macro-economic framework consolidated the expansion which was launched by the monetary policy implemented by the Tory Chancellor Kenneth Clarke after 1992.However,this expansion has been more fragile than appeared at?rst sight. The weak point has been the chronic overvaluation of sterling,to which inter-est rates higher than elsewhere in Europe have contributed.Sterling's e ective rate rose24per cent between the middle of 1996and1998.Worse still,this apprecia-tion has occurred while unit wage costs grew faster in the UK than elsewhere. This has led to terri?c pressure on UK industry,with relative unit labour costs rising by41per cent between1993and 1998.As a consequence,cost competitive-ness has been dragged down to the level reached in1981in the depths of Thatch-er's monetary squeeze.The result of the high exchange rate is that the expansion has been severely biased away from manufacturing.Manufacturing output in the middle of1999was only3per cent higher than a decade before.This has contributed to the maintenance of large regional di erentials in joblessness(dis-cussed below).However,the high ex-change rate contributed to holding down inˉation;a fall in sterling to more competitive levels would have pushed up import prices and reduced the competi-tive pressure on UK?rms selling in the domestic market.It is probable that it was the overvalued pound which allowed unemployment to fall so low without compromising the inˉation target.If sterling were to fall sharply to a more realistic long-run level then the MPC would feel obliged to slam on the brakes, and the implication for jobs of privileging the inˉation target would become clear. Maintaining the current level of unem-ployment,let alone allowing a further decline while staying within the inˉation target,is heavily dependent on policies to reduce the unemployment rate at which inˉation would begin to rise(the NAIRU).The more optimistic of the gov-ernment's longer-term projections as-sume that`improved labour market performance leads to a percentage point decline in the sustainable rate of unemployment(or NAIRU)in both1999 and2000and a further percentage point reduction in2001'(Budget state-ment1999).Policies to achieve this `supply-side'improvement are the core of Labour's economic programme.

Employment,welfare to work and the New Deal

Keynesians regard unemployment as being largely`involuntary',in that the unemployed would work for the going level of wages if jobs were available. Expanding aggregate demand allows them to?nd work.However,it is the involuntarily unemployed who consti-tute the reserve army of labour and thus hold in check wage bargaining.So the possibilities of reducing unemployment by a durable macroeconomic expansion are limited to situations where the eco-nomy has`surplus'unemployment(that is,more than the NAIRU).But is it really the case that all types of unemployed worker are equally`e ective'as members of the reserve army?Richard Layard, now economic adviser at the Department for Education and Employment(DfEE), has argued forcefully that the long-term unemployed in particular exert little downward pressure on wage bargaining as they are semi-detached from the

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labour market.They are too demoralised or stigmatised by employers to be ac-tively or realistically seeking work.If they can be enticed or cajoled back into searching for work(or if employers can be persuaded that they are in fact em-ployable),then the extra competition they inject into the labour market will bring downward pressure on wages.This would allow a more expansionary de-mand management policy to generate extra jobs,without the inˉationary pres-sure which would otherwise result.The NAIRU would be reduced and the sus-tainable level of employment increased. If successful,such a policy would lead not only to lower unemployment but also to higher tax receipts(from the incomes of the additional people at work)and reduced social security bene?ts(to those previously unemployed).Even quite ex-pensive policies(in terms of employment subsidies or in-work bene?ts)could pay for themselves if they brought many more earners and thus taxpayers into economic activity.Moreover,this ap-proach can be extended from the long-term unemployed to other groups who are not working.Lone parents with small children,people claiming disability bene?ts,those in early retirement because of lack of work,and partners of unem-ployed people caught in the bene?t sys-tem's`unemployment trap'may all be targets for persuasion,by an appropriate mixture of incentives and sanctions,to re-enter the labour force.The downward pressure on wages which these addi-tional recruits to the reserve army would bring would allow faster growth.Sustain-able employment would rise and non-employment would fall.2

The standard bearer for the New Deal programmes is that relating to the young long-term unemployed(18±24-year-olds unemployed for more than six months). They enter a`gateway'period of inten-sive career counselling.If they do not then move into education or a job they choose one of four`options':a six-month job,with the employer subsidised by￡60 per week(or help with becoming self-employed);work with a voluntary organ-isation or an environmental task force (where they receive a little more than bene?t);or,if their educational level is considered a serious hindrance to their ?nding work,a period of formal educa-tion of up to twelve months.There is no `?fth option'of simply remaining on unemployment bene?t.Similar schemes, on either a pilot or an economy-wide basis,but so far usually voluntary,have been introduced for other groups(the long-term unemployed,lone parents, the partners of unemployed people and the disabled).

In addition to making people on bene-?ts more`employable',the government has reformed the system of in-work ben-e?ts for families with children and dis-abled people,to help`make work pay'. The biggest change has been the Working Families Tax Credit(WFTC),aimed at guaranteeing any family with a full-time worker￡214per week(by spring2001).It was set at a considerably more generous level than the Family Credit programme which it replaced,and was boosted by an additional subsidy to cover child-care expenses for the low-paid.Those on low earnings will also bene?t from adjust-ments to the bottom end of the tax and national insurance schedules.The1999 Budget claimed that the number of those in work who face e ective marginal tax (and withdrawal of bene?t)rates of more than70per cent has fallen from715,000to 230,000.3Single-earner families with two children will be￡30±40per week better o over a large range of weekly earnings (￡120±280per week).4

The Financial Times(23March1999) reported,under the headline`Brown plans tax credit for all in employment', that:

The government wants to give a guaranteed minimum income to all people in work as part of a comprehensive plan to integrate the tax

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and bene?t systems...The absorption of bene?ts in the new employment tax credit,as the Treasury has christened it,would be the culmination of Gordon Brown's ambition to provide subsidised jobs for those?t for work. Only the chronically disabled and lone par-ents with very young children would be expected to live on bene?ts.

The implication is that the element of compulsion in the New Deal,so far most apparent in the`no?fth option'for the young long-term unemployed,will be applied much more generally.This repre-sents a radical rede?nition of the func-tions of the welfare state,and raises a number of questions about the tension between compulsion and individual rights in social democratic thinking. Although welfare rights in Britain since 1945have been predominantly`uncondi-tional',the widely praised`welfare to work'model in Sweden has always relied upon pressures from withdrawal of un-employment bene?ts after a?xed period. Of course,such compulsion to take up an employment or training alternative to bene?ts depends very much on what these alternatives really o er.

In assessing the economic impact of the British version of`welfare to work'three issues are particularly important:

.How big will the e ect be on labour supply,i.e.on the number actively seeking work?

.Will jobs be available?

.What will be the e ect on the pattern of wages?

If the New Deal for the young long-term unemployed really increases their`em-ployability'then substantially more of those who enter the`gateway'should be employed after leaving the New Deal than would otherwise be the case.This would then cumulate into a substantial impact on the stock of people in or actively seeking work.Even if a subsi-dised job had no longer-term e ects on the job prospect of the person concerned, and was simply used by employers as a substitute for another worker,there would be some e ect on wage pressure if those`displaced'by the New Dealers were more`e ective'in their search for jobs.

The numbers who have passed through the New Deal into unsubsidised jobs can provide impressive soundbites for politicians,but convey little informa-tion about the true impact of the pro-gramme since many would have found work anyway.Analysis by the National Institute(reported in the Financial Times, 12July2000)suggests that the New Deal may have increased employment of young people by a very modest13,000 by the spring of2000.Youth unemploy-ment was estimated to be reduced by 41,000,with the di erence accounted for by some of those who would have been unemployed moving into education or one of the other options.

A number of studies have modelled the e ects of the WFTC and agree that those actively seeking work may increase by some30,000(with increased participation by lone mothers and people with non-working partners o setting reduced par-ticipation by people whose partners were already working and who would receive more bene?ts under the proposals). Somewhat similar e ects result from the reductions in national insurance and from the introduction of the new10p income tax rate;and the minimum wage would further tend to increase labour force participation(especially of women). Combined with the impact of other mea-sures to increase job search,it is quite possible that the whole New Deal/Mak-ing Work Pay programme could increase the e ective labour supply by around 100,000.If these estimates are roughly accurate they suggest a distinctly modest e ect(an increase in the labour force of perhaps0.5per cent,or0.75per cent on the Treasury's more optimistic forecast). In simulations the impacts on the labour supply are often reported as`em-ployment e ects'.This begs the very #The Political Quarterly Publishing Co.Ltd.2001

54Andrew Glyn and Stewart Wood

important question of whether Say's Law (that supply creates its own demand) really applies in the labour market.It is important to reiterate that the mechanism proposed is fundamentally macroeco-nomic,with the extra competition in the labour market reducing inˉationary pres-sure.As a result the MPC can take a more relaxed attitude to interest rates and al-low demand to expand.While not all those joining the labour supply would necessarily get jobs themselves,addi-tional jobs would be created by the macroeconomy until the unemployment rate as a whole fell to the new lower NAIRU.The most problematic part of the whole story is whether the posited additions to the labour supply would really bring the expected easing of wage pressure.

The emphasis in the economic analysis underlying the strategy is on the impact of employment status on wage pressure: the short-term unemployed look actively for work and constitute e ective labour market competition;the long-term unem-ployed search less e ectively and on average bring much less downward pres-sure on wages;and those out of the labour force(e.g.lone parents)have no e ect whatever.Transforming the posi-tion of the long-term unemployed,or lone parents,so that they are both in-voluntarily unemployed and employable in the eyes of employers,will swell the reserve army and ease wage pressure. But if the long-term unemployed,lone parents,people taking early retirement and those on sickness bene?t dispropor-tionately have low quali?cations and live in areas of mass unemployment,then will their moving into active job search have much e ect on the overall degree of wage pressure in the economy generally? There is a huge jobs de?cit in the old industrial areas,especially for jobs for the less quali?ed.In Merseyside,for example, a majority of men of working age without quali?cations are not working(though many fewer are categorised as unem-ployed).If the least quali?ed one-quarter of the population were to have as many jobs in the rest of the country as they do in the prosperous south-east then there would have to be an additional850,000 extra jobs for them(calculated from Labour Force Survey for1998).Many of those brought into the labour force by the Welfare to Work measures will have rela-tively poor quali?cations and will live in areas where labour demand is already weak,especially for the unskilled.Increas-ing the reserve army of labour in these areas is unlikely signi?cantly to hold down wages in the economy as a whole and thus allow macroeconomic expan-sion.Conversely,macroeconomic expan-sion,to the extent that it really is facilitated,will de?nitely not create jobs disproportionately in the areas where wel-fare to work has most clients.

For the policy to work,either the less quali?ed would have to be encouraged to move to the high-employment southern parts of the UK or jobs would have to be created deliberately in the areas where labour supply is most expanded,rever-sing the process of job destruction which caused their unemployment and labour force non-participation rates to be so high in the?rst place.However,the govern-ment has fought hard against the idea of a `north±south divide'in employment,em-phasising instead the problem of loca-lised employment black spots.Thus there is a New Deal for Communities aimed at the`intensive regeneration of some of our poorest neighbourhoods' and Employment Zones have been set up.But again most of the focus is on quality of life in the area and on special measures to make individuals there more employable,rather than on deliberate creation of work through public spend-ing,introducing incentives for employers to locate in these areas,and so forth.

If substantial numbers of less-quali?ed people seeking work were to?nd jobs, what would be the implication for their wages?`Making work pay'applies to

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employers as well as employees,and they would o er less quali?ed people more jobs only if the relative cost of less-quali?ed labour declined.There is a real danger that getting a large number of less-quali?ed people in the labour force by one means or another will drive down wages at the bottom of the pay scale.This could lead to conˉict with the minimum wage regulations and would raise the cost of in-work bene?ts for those that have low-paid jobs already.To the extent that the New Deal really does improve skill levels this problem would be re-duced,but it is notoriously di cult sub-stantially to raise the skill levels of many of those targeted by these schemes.

To summarise,the government's macroeconomic strategy puts great weight on increasing labour supply, though existing estimates suggest rela-tively modest e ects.Moreover,the belief that raising labour supply will allow sustainable higher employment without inˉationary pressure ignores the regional concentration of the workless.Ensuring that work is available for such people, without further substantial increases in pay dispersion,requires much more de-liberate action to target increases in de-mand for labour on the areas and skill-groups most a ected by joblessness. One glaring absence in this whole ap-proach is wage bargaining.Blair has re-peatedly made it clear that New Labour's return to power after eighteen years of Conservative government will not usher in the return of`beer and sandwiches'at 10Downing Street.Addressing the TUC Annual Congress in September1999, Blair asserted that`in many ways we have a better,clearer relationship than ever before between trade unions and Labour...You run the unions.We run the government.We will never confuse the two again.'This renunciation by New Labour of Old Labour's corporatism has left the government without any means to encourage the kind of coordination of wage bargaining which appears to have played a signi?cant part in a number of recent`employment miracles',for ex-ample in the Netherlands and Ireland. Confronted with emerging wage in-creases,Gordon Brown has been reduced to urging employers and unions to show restraint in their wage bargaining.How-ever,such appeals from the sidelines will fall on deaf ears unless there is a serious attempt to solve the coordination prob-lem:why should any union in a strong bargaining position,or any employer with a shortage of skilled labour,show restraint while there is no mechanism for ensuring that others will follow suit? Given the weakness of unions in large sections of the private sector and employ-ers'hostility towards constraints on their freedom of manoeuvre,attempting to steer them towards coordinated bargain-ing remains a di cult task.But it seems that political considerationsDfear of ap-pearing to favour union power and cor-poratismDhave dictated a prohibition even on discussion of the issue.In the event that the UK joins the euro,with no possibility of depreciation to o set faster cost increases,the imperative of wage coordination as a way to control inˉation will become if anything more important.

Income distribution

New Labour inherited a Britain with rapidly growing inequality.Between 1978and1990household income inequal-ity in the UK rose much more than in any other OECD state for which data are available,more or less overturning all the reduction in such inequality achieved in the country since1938.Tony Blair said in1996,`I believe in greater equality.If the next Labour Government has not raised the living standards of the poorest by the end of its time in o ce it will have failed.'5Blair has also committed himself to the very bold target of eliminating child poverty over twenty years(cur-rently30per cent of UK children live in households with less than half average

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income,which appears to be the criterion of poverty he is using).Nevertheless his government clearly prefers to talk of so-cial inclusion and equality of opportunity than to espouse the goal of equality of outcome.

The fundamental constraint which New Labour has set for itself is its com-mitment not to raise the tax burden.6It should be emphasised that the UK has a very low level of government expend-iture by EU standards(in1999general government spending was some40.8per cent of UK GDP,compared with the EU average of47.6per cent,47.1per cent per cent in Germany,54.1per cent in France and60.2per cent in Sweden,for ex-ample).A major contribution to the rise in inequality was Margaret Thatcher's decision to index bene?ts to prices rather than earnings.Since the poorest house-holds receive most of their incomes from bene?ts,this inevitably drags down the share of the poorest groups whenever real incomes rise.New Labour steadfastly refused to reverse this general policy, arguing that bene?ts compensate for poverty rather than eliminate its causes.7 The main thrust has been to concentrate support on`work as the best way out of poverty'(Budget statement1999),as dis-cussed in the previous section;it is quite consistent with this approach to refuse to reinstate the link between bene?ts and earnings,especially for the unemployed. Aside from the increases in in-work bene?ts,the introduction of a minimum wage in April1999,albeit at a level well below the proposal of trade unions,re-presents an important policy initiative. Although its impact on the very bottom of the income distribution is limited be-cause most of the poorest households have nobody working,it is still the case that the bottom decile gains most from the minimum wage.Moreover,70per cent of those who bene?t from the mini-mum wage live in the poorest40per cent of working households.

The most comprehensive estimates of the impact of Labour's changes to the tax and bene?t system up to the spring of 2000show the worst-o 20per cent of households gaining by around8.5per cent on average,whereas the best-o 20per cent lost around0.5per cent.8 The worst-o 20per cent of households with children are estimated by the Treas-ury to be destined to bene?t by30per cent,which would make a sizeable inroad into the number of children in povertyDwhich Blair has promised to reduce by 700,000by the next election.

In one respect these?gures underesti-mate the e ect of Labour's measures,for they are based on the present pattern of household behaviour.If large numbers respond to the incentives provided by the WFTC,for example,and take a job, then the extra income they receive will constitute an additional gain for low-income groups over and above the extra bene?ts received by people already work-ing.However,the analyses discussed earlier suggest that these e ects will be relatively small,and so the main e ect on inequality of these measures comes via the boost to incomes of existing low-income workers.Moreover,the estimates quoted earlier of the redistributive impact of Labour's measures give an over-optim-istic impression of what is happening to inequality.The benchmark against which budget changes are measured is the up-rating of bene?ts in line with prices.With earnings tending to grow faster than prices,the incomes of those mainly de-pendent on bene?ts tend to fall system-atically behind average incomes as a whole(the bottom20per cent are de-pendent on bene?ts for more than80per cent of their incomes).If the government does nothing(beyond increasing bene?ts in line with the cost of living)then the bene?t system brings increased inequal-ity.

In the?rst two years of the Labour government the measures implemented were not large enough to o set this `bene?t drag'and household income

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inequality increased.Calculations by the Institute for Fiscal Studies suggest that incomes rose by less than 2per cent for the typical household in the bottom 20per cent while the increase was 7per cent for a typical household in the top 20per cent.In real terms income per head rose about ￡2per week at the bottom and ￡47a week at the top.9Numbers in poverty (less than half average incomes)rose.

Now,it is true that important mea-sures,like the WFTC and the minimum wage,had not come into e ect in the period covered by these calculations.Overall,the measures announced for Labour's ?rst four years should bring some reduction in household income in-equality if nothing else changes.10How-ever,other factors may be pushing in the opposite direction.Over Labour's ?rst two years the pay distribution widened only marginally and interest payments,which bene?t mainly the better-o ,stag-nated.If shortages of skilled labour were to push up wages faster at the top end of the pay distribution,and if interest rates were to rise,then all Labour's measures would be absorbed simply in preventing inequality rising further.So it is quite possible that inequality will be only slightly,if at all,lower at the end of the government's ?rst term in o ce than at the beginning.Of course,this is better than the previous upward trend;but there is no chance of a substantial reversal of the unprecedented rise in inequality since 1979.This would require a major increase in the general level of bene?ts.Although not included in the conven-tional ?gures on income distribution,welfare state spending programmes have an important egalitarian e ect be-cause the bene?ts are spread relatively evenly.The combination of reducing the budget de?cit and holding the share of taxation (roughly)constant has inevit-ably constrained spending programmes.Table 1,based on IFS calculations,shows the real spending increases planned by Labour,compared to both the preceding Major government and the whole eigh-teen years of Tory rule.

The government is delivering distinctly faster increases in health and education spending than its Conservative predeces-sors,and,especially in the case of health,a de?nite rise in the share of GDP.Over-all,however,government expenditure as a percentage of GDP is expected to fall from 41.2per cent in 1996/7to 39.7per cent in 2001/2,essentially stabilising after the cut inherited from the Tories during the ?rst year of government.11Over a ?ve-year period the Blair government would raise total public spending at a slower rate than that achieved by Conserva-tive governments over the previous eighteen years .The big increases in health and

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Table 1:Government spending (average per cent per year increases of real spending)

1997±20021992±19971979±1997(Blair)

(Major)(Thatcher/Major)

Health 4.7 2.6 3.1Education 3.8 1.6 1.5Defence

±1.3±3.1±0.2Social security a 1.5 3.8 3.5Total spending

1.8

2.0

1.6

a

Social security includes tax credits as spending (for comparability);when excluded (as they are in the total ?gure),the growth rate for social security spending is projected at 0.4per cent per year.

Source:L.Chennells,A.Dilnot and C.Emmerson,The IFS Green Budget ,London,Institute for Fiscal Studies,Jan.2000;plus updating and detail kindly supplied by Carl Emmerson (IFS)to include impact of the Comprehensive Spending Review of July 2000.

education are to be achieved by squeez-ing some other parts of public spending, notably defence spending and interest payments.12However,the most import-ant diversion is to come from social security spending,which Labour plans to raise by2per cent per year less than under the Tories(even excluding the reduction in spending resulting from the switch from bene?t s,which do count as spending,to tax credit s,which do not). Even if substantial numbers come o bene?ts,such a target could never be met if bene?ts were generally and con-sistently indexed to wages rather than prices,let alone if their relative value were pushed back towards1979levels. Given the government's reluctance to raise taxation,the only way that substan-tial increases in spending on government services can be?nanced is by squeezing social security.

The pressures emerging from the tight rein on spending of the?rst two years of the Blair government were dramatically revealed by a crisis in the health service at the end of1999.This pushed Tony Blair into appearing to promise to raise UK health spending to the EU average.In-creases of6.2per cent per year in real terms are now planned between1999and 2004.The extent to which these welcome increases are being?nanced by the squeeze on social security is not widely appreciated.

Education and training policy Under the Blair government,education policy has assumed primary importance as a tool of economic policy.In part this is the result of Labour's self-imposed con-straints on conventional macroeconomic policy levers,discussed above.Yet it also arises from a belief in the centrality of educational attainment to improving in-dividuals'labour market https://www.wendangku.net/doc/5e3597107.html,-cation,in other words,is regarded primarily from an economic point of view.The government's?rst policy pro-posal on educational policy,The Learning Age(1998)began:`Learning is the key to prosperity.'

Labour's main initiative in adult edu-cation has been to spread the gospel of `lifelong learning'.The government's aim is to break the exclusive association of learning with schooling,by emphasising the variety of formats in which learning can take place,and by stressing that education continues throughout working lives rather than exclusively prior to them.Though this campaign has so far been largely a rhetorical one,there have been some innovations.In1998the Uni-versity for Industry(UfI)scheme was launchedDin essence,an Internet-based brokering service which will o er infor-mation on a range of education and train-ing courses in di erent regions.The UfI was accompanied by`Learning Direct',a new freephone national advice and infor-mation service about learning and career options.The main?nancial instrument for boosting lifelong learning has been the introduction of Individual Learning Accounts(ILAs).ILAs are intended to enable individuals to invest in up-skilling and re-skilling throughout their careers. The Chancellor announced in his March 1999Budget that a million ILAs were to be created in the forthcoming year,with an initial government contribution of ￡150.Both employers and employees will be able to contribute tax-free to these accounts.In addition,any adult with an Individual Learning Account will be able to claim a discount of20per cent,or an additional grant of up to￡100,on the cost of their training they choose.Adults sign-ing up to improve their basic educationDincluding computer literacyDwill receive a discount of80per cent on course fees. In other respects New Labour's ap-proach to learning in the workplace is a mixture of exhortations to train more, calls for partnership between govern-ment and business,and a continuation of structures and schemes developed under the previous https://www.wendangku.net/doc/5e3597107.html,ern-

#The Political Quarterly Publishing Co.Ltd.2001New Labour's Economic Policy59

ment training programmes,for example, continue to be administered by regional employer-led Training and Enterprise Councils(TECs).In the summer of1999 an umbrella bodyDthe Learning and Skills CouncilDwas created to coordinate the various educational programmes tar-geted at those over sixteen who do not stay in formal education,including in-?rm training o ered through the New Deal employment programme.Neverthe-less,although the emphasis on training has become more prominent under New Labour,the structures responsible for delivering it have not been reformed in any signi?cant way.This contrasts strongly with the proposals developed by the party in the late1980s.By1990 Labour had committed itself to a National Training Fund?nanced by a levy of 0.5per cent on companies'payrolls,and involving the participation of trade union representatives.Prompted by the opposi-tion of business,and under the inˉuence of BlairD?rst as employment spokes-man,later as leaderDthe party gradually abandoned this corporatist approach in favour of one stressing the responsibility of individuals and employers for train-ing,and seeking to involve business in the delivery of training rather than rely-ing on tripartite consultation.In training as in other policy areas,trade unions remain?rmly outside the decision-mak-ing process.

There remains considerable doubt about the impact these educational pol-icies will make on the distribution of opportunities in the UK.The British edu-cational system,like those of other Anglo-Saxon countries,delivers a very inegali-tarian pattern of educational outcomes. Standardised tests reveal a distance be-tween the literacy skills of the least able 5per cent of the labour force and the average that is more than half as big again as in Germany,for example.A major attempt to raise educational standards targeted especially at the bottom end of the distribution would help to reduce earnings inequality.It would also repres-ent an unambiguous increase in eco-nomic e ciency,as there is ample evidence of appalling wastage of talent in a system where educational achieve-ment is so closely tied to the social and economic background of pupils.Some of New Labour'sˉagship educational pol-icies could indeed be interpreted as part of a radical agenda to improve the oppor-tunities available to those at the`bottom end'.Currently in a pilot phase,educa-tional maintenance allowances have been introduced as means-tested?nancial in-centives for sixteen-year-olds to stay in full-time education.Meanwhile,the De-partment for Education and Employment has demonstrated its willingness to inter-vene directly in the management of schoolsDover the heads of local educa-tion authoritiesDin order to improve standards and eliminate poor teaching. This interventionist approach is being combined with an e ort to involve busi-ness more directly in education activities in their localities,mainly through the newly created Education Action Zones in areas of poor educational performance. In one case a private sector company took over direct responsibility for the manage-ment of a school.These and other policies testify to Labour's commitment to use the arm of central government to redress failure of local governments to carry out their educational responsibilities. However,leaving aside the question of whether the educational reforms are well conceived in themselves,a further ques-tion concerns the economic context in which they are https://www.wendangku.net/doc/5e3597107.html,cational achievements are lowest precisely in the areas where poverty and joblessness are most prevalent.There are a number of reasons for this.Children(and parents) are less likely to take hard work at school seriously when there is a widespread perception that learning e ort and job prospects are only weakly related.And learning will be di cult in schools which have high concentrations of children #The Political Quarterly Publishing Co.Ltd.2001

60Andrew Glyn and Stewart Wood

from low-literacy and low-numeracy backgrounds.Sustained improvements in educational outcomes in such areas probably depend on bringing employ-ment to these areas,thereby increasing the`point'of gaining quali?cations and reducing household poverty.The weak-ness of the welfare-to-work policies in the face of joblessness in these areas,noted above,is likely to jeopardise the govern-ment's hopes for a radical extension of equality of opportunity through educa-tional reform.

Labour and the trade unions Between his accession to the Labour party leadership in1994and the general elec-tion three years later Tony Blair spent considerable energy undermining the party's links to the trade union https://www.wendangku.net/doc/5e3597107.html,bour's somewhat surprising electoral defeat in1992was attributed in part to its continuing identi?cation as a party representing the special interests of organised labour.In April1995the party leadership succeeded in ditching Labour's symbolic commitment to nationalisation after party members voted9:1to delete the famous Clause Four from the party's constitution.Union inˉuence within the party was further diminished when the unions'block vote at the annual conference was lowered from70per cent to50per cent.A month later Blair told the TUC conference that the unions would have no more inˉuence than employers over a Labour govern-ment's policy agenda,promising to`gov-ern for the whole nation,not any vested interest within it'.

In two areas,however,Labour did bow to union pressure before coming to power in1997.First,it maintained its pledge to introduce a minimum wage;second,it promised that?rms would be compelled to recognise and negotiate with unions where they are supported by a majority of the workforce.In both cases,however, the government insisted on important caveats that continued to generate tense relations with the unions after the1997 election.Despite continued pressure,the Labour leadership refused to commit itself to a stated minimum wage,arguing instead that a specially convened inde-pendent Low Pay Commission would set the?gure.The Commission's recommen-dations,adopted by the government in late1998,disappointed the union move-ment hugely.First,the government set a minimum wage of￡3.60per hour, whereas the TUC had called for￡4.00, and some unions(such as the public sector workers'union Unison and the Trade and General Workers Union)for ￡5.00.Second,it added a lower minimum of￡3.00per hour for workers aged eigh-teen to twenty-one,a?gure which is likely to remain unchanged until2001 (as does the adult rate).The Labour government also infuriated unions by demanding,once in power,extra condi-tions on the procedure for union recogni-tion in the workplace.After a year of heated tripartite negotiations the TUC conceded to government demands that a majority of those voting and at least40per cent of those eligible to vote would be required before a union would be recog-nised.In addition,?rms with fewer than twenty-one employees are exempted from recognition procedures,and a de-recognition provision has been included for cases where`employee support for recognition arrangements reduces signi-?cantly'.

These bitter rows between Labour and the unions have been tempered some-what by the package of measures con-cerning employee rights contained within the Fairness at Work proposals(now the Employment Relations Act).The manda-tory recognition procedures are accom-panied by a range of increases in statutory minima that the TUC has hailed as the`biggest advance in workers'rights for a generation'.First,the proposals in-clude a raft of family-friendly regulations for employed parents.Maternity leave

#The Political Quarterly Publishing Co.Ltd.2001New Labour's Economic Policy61

will be increased for all employees from fourteen to eighteen weeks,notice ar-rangements for leave will be simpli?ed, and leave entitlement will apply after less than a year of employment.A statutory right of three months'parental leave for all employees is to be introduced.Con-tracts of employment will continue to be in force during parental leave and addi-tional maternity leave unless expressly terminated by dismissal or resignation. Second,the individual employee's rights in the event of dismissal have been strengthened.The period of employment before an employee can qualify for pro-tection against unfair dismissal is to be reduced from two years to one,and max-imum amounts of compensation awards will be raised from￡12,000to￡50,000. Employees will also be given a right to be accompanied by a trade union repres-entative in disciplinary or grievance procedures.Third,trade unions have secured moderate but important gains from the bill.Blacklisting and workplace discrimination against workers because of union membership will no longer be allowed,and public funds are to be pro-vided for training union representatives. These measures may well constitute,as Robert Taylor has remarked in this jour-nal,`the most comprehensive package of legislative proposals to extend employee and trade union rights...for more than a quarter of a century'.That this is the case, however,is more a testament to the neoliberal revolution in industrial rela-tions law under the Conservatives than to the radical content of the proposals themselves.The Employment Relations Act is fundamentally concerned with in-dividual employment rights rather than those of trade unions.Though the bill expands union powers and protection,it is far from clear that their bargaining strength in the workplace will be any greater than before.Even when union recognition has been secured,for ex-ample,there is nothing in the bill that forces the employer to bargain in good faith.Nor will the law prevent individual employees from agreeing di erent terms with their employer from those agreed between the company and the recognised trade union.Second,the signi?cance of the catalogue of employment protections proposed should not be overstated. Workers'rights in Britain continue to lag far behind those of their EU counter-parts in Germany,France and elsewhere. Finally,but most importantly of all,La-bour's most signi?cant decision remains that of not reversing the most important inroads into statutory protection for un-ions and employees introduced by the Conservatives in the1980s,such as re-strictions on strike activity and enforced liabilities for the economic consequences of strikes at?rm level.

Despite this reluctance to restore union rights,individual workers'prospects may improve considerably as a result of Labour's decision to sign the Social Chap-ter of the Maastricht Treaty.In itself,the Social Chapter constitutes little more than priority-setting in broad areas of social policy,such as a rming equal treatment for men and women,the protection of the rights of workers who move within the EU,and the improvement of conditions of employment.Signing up to the Chapter,however,binds Britain to im-plementation of European Commission directives regulating speci?c aspects of working life.In December1997Britain became subject to the terms of the Par-ental Leave Directive,later incorporated into the Employment Relations Act.At the same time the European Works Coun-cil Directive came into force in the UK, requiring companies with at least1,000 employees in total,and at least150work-ers in each of two EU member states,to establish consultative structures with the workforce on issues a ecting them. Most controversial has been the adop-tion of the Working Time Directive, which stipulates that EU workers must not be required to work over48hours per week.The politics surrounding the #The Political Quarterly Publishing Co.Ltd.2001

62Andrew Glyn and Stewart Wood

implementation of this directive capture many of the dilemmas confronting New Labour.Britain's average working hours are considerably longer than those of other nations(in1997average annual hours worked were1,731in the UK, compared to1,656in France,1,574in Germany and1,552in Sweden).13The relative e ect of the directive in the UK's highly deregulated labour market would thus be sizeable.Yet the restriction of working hours by legislative?at is something that the Blair government would almost certainly not have chosen to introduce,anxious as it is to reassure business of its commitment to the neolib-eral conditions for competitiveness.New Labour's response to the inescapability of implementing the undesirable has been to introduce amendments to the legisla-tive version of the directive which would exempt millions of workers from cover-age by the48-hour rule.The government proposes to exempt voluntary work hours above the contractual maximum from the48-hour limit,as well as exempt-ing employers from maintaining detailed records on employees'overtime.Blanket restrictions apply to a number of categor-ies of employment,particularly in the public sector.

In other areas of social and industrial relations policy the Labour government is ?ghting within the European Commis-sion and the Council of Ministers to amend and/or veto additional direc-tivesDfor example,requiring employee consultation within companies operating solely at the national level.The govern-ment's opposition to creeping regulation from Brussels has predictably earned it strong support from employers'organ-isations and hostility from the https://www.wendangku.net/doc/5e3597107.html,-bour is therefore able to claim credit for the social welfare improvements forced upon it by EU membership,while simul-taneously?ghting to dilute their https://www.wendangku.net/doc/5e3597107.html,petitiveness

Labour's competitiveness strategy,as enunciated by Tony Blair in his foreword to Our Competitive Future,is classic third way politics:`Old-fashioned state inter-vention did not and cannot work.But neither does na?ève reliance on markets.' The government's Competitiveness White Paper conceives of a division of labour between companies and govern-ment:the state's job is to establish and police competitive markets to allow en-trepreneurs to innovate,but also to invest in companies'`capabilities'when they cannot do so alone(for example,by in-vestment in a workforce with good basic skills).The government stresses repeat-edly the need for companies to adapt their competitive strategies to the realities of the new`knowledge-driven economy', and to that end has introduced measures designed to promote links between edu-cational and research institutions and industry(Education Action Zones,and an extra investment of￡2billion in science and engineering research,for ex-ample).

Primarily,however,New Labour en-dorses the view that the best approach to improving competitiveness is for govern-ments to keep intervention and regula-tory burdens to a minimum.This approach to state±industry relations re-ˉects one of the most signi?cant policy continuities with the Conservative gov-ernments under Thatcher and Major. New Labour has not only rejected calls for the renationalisation of industries pri-vatised under the Tories(most spectacu-larly after the Paddington rail disaster, when opinion polls suggested huge pub-lic support for renationalising Railtrack); it is also actively pursuing further priva-tisations,most notably of the air tra c control https://www.wendangku.net/doc/5e3597107.html,bour is also initiating a restructuring of the ownership structure of the Post O ce,proposing its conver-sion into a public limited company with all shares owned by the government.In a

#The Political Quarterly Publishing Co.Ltd.2001New Labour's Economic Policy63

similar vein,New Labour has taken up the Tory policy of introducing private sector capital into the public sector through private?nance initiatives (PFIs).By2004the UK government will be paying out￡3.5billion per year under PFI contracts,much of which will involve purchase of current services(like hospital maintenance)as well as interest pay-ments,which,it has been noted,`will always costs more under the PFI than under conventional?nance,since the government is able to borrow more cheaply than the private sector'.14British business is now not only heavily involved in investment in infrastructure in educa-tion,health and other areas of the public sector,but is also extending beachheads into public sector managementDfor ex-ample,in the management of educational authorities,schools,and urban regenera-tion zones.

Conclusion

Although New Labour's policies have little in common with those classically identi?ed with social democracy,it would be wrong to characterise them as devoid of any overall objective or coher-ence.Clearly Labour has prioritised macroeconomic stabilityDpartly in re-sponse to anxieties about a return to the economic tribulations of the1970s.From this perspective,joining the European single currency,thereby ensuring much greater stability for the exchange rate, seems an entirely logical next step (provided it occurred at a reasonable exchange rate for sterling).Gordon Brown's?ve economic tests for judging whether the time is right for entry are pitched at an extraordinary level of gen-erality(for example,`If problems emerge, is there su cientˉexibility to deal with them?')and give ample latitude for justi-fying whatever decision on entry is felt to be politically expedient.

In its quest for economic stability and the political centre ground Labour has imposed upon itself stringent constraints on its tax and spending capacities,and this rules out many of the redistributive policies that parties of the left have tradi-tionally pursued.Yet this is not a source of regret for Blair's New Labour,as the pursuit of greater equality by active re-distribution of income is rejected in prin-ciple,for a mixture of political,economic and moral reasons.Redistribution im-plies a zero-sum trade-o between the interests of rich and poor that New Labour considers misguided.New Labour's egalitarianism lies in its various attempts to construct incentive structures for individuals on low incomes to in-crease their earnings potential through their own e orts.These and other pol-icies reˉect an approach to poverty which focuses solely on the absolute position of the least advantaged,one which would accept greater inequality if this were a necessary by-product of raising stan-dards at the bottom end via supposed `trickle-down'e ects resulting from im-proved incentives for entrepreneurs at the top end.So this concern for improv-ing the position of the most disadvan-taged coexists with policies that reˉect a tolerance for(and even actively encour-age)the further acquisition of wealth by the most advantaged.The result of this combination is one which may well be more inegalitarian,though arguably more meritocratic and with a higherˉoor than before.In this respect New Labour has disentangled the traditional social demo-cratic aims of promoting equality and eliminating poverty in ways that many on the left?nd both unacceptable(in respect of greater inequality in the top half of the distribution)and unconvin-cing(in respect of the near-exclusive emphasis on the labour market).

The central feature in New Labour's strategy for addressing poverty,disad-vantage and social exclusion is the reli-ance on work,and government policies are being tailored to encourage,and in some cases compel,individuals to enter #The Political Quarterly Publishing Co.Ltd.2001

64Andrew Glyn and Stewart Wood

and remain in employment.These have had positive e ects on the distribution of income but fall far short of a comprehen-sive assault on the trend towards greater inequality and increased poverty.A rad-ical improvement in educational per-formance,especially in areas of low educational achievement,would be an important component of a more thorough strategy to tackle these problems.But it needs to be complemented by:

.deliberate policies for job creation in the areas of highest joblessness,cur-rently missing from New Labour's supply-side approach;

.a comprehensive attempt to improve conditions of employment at the bot-tom of the labour market(where the minimum wage stands in contrast to the government's stress onˉexibility); .acceptance of greater redistribution to-wards those at the lower end of the income distribution for whom educa-tion and the labour market does not provide an escape route.

The broader point for comparative social democracy is that the policies introduced by Blair's government so far imply a signi?cant redrawing of the boundaries of state activity.Rather than providing a generous safety net for the unemployed, for example,New Labour sees the state's role as stimulating their re-entry into the labour market.As the welfare state evolves from a generous and comprehen-sive support system for multiple cate-gories of individuals into a series of employment programmes with lower levels of long-term`dependency',the rationale for increasing the state's share of GNP will diminish further.In macro-economic policy the?scal ambition of social democracy is rejected,and control of interest rate policy is seen as better exercised by an(almost)independent central bank(whether in London or Frankfurt)than by the government. Responsibility for training and re-training,meanwhile,must rest with indi-viduals and employers,not with the state. Nor should the state involve itself in private sector industrial relations or wage bargaining.And with regard to ownership and investment in industry and servicesDeven those in the public sectorDthe private solution is instinc-tively preferred to one relying on the state.The di culties with a strategy of combining an improvement in the posi-tion of the worst o with a diminishing role for the state has been the theme of this article.If New Labour could square this particular circle they would be the envy of many a social democrat abroad.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Perry Ander-son,Wendy Carlin,Esra Erdem,Desmond King,Bob Rowthorn,Dave Stasavage and Stuart White for comments,and Carl Emmerson,Holly Sutherland and Jayne Taylor for valuable information.A version of this paper is to be published in Social Demo-cracy and Economic Policy,edited by Andrew Glyn and published by Oxford University Press(2000).

Notes

1Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroèder,Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte June1999, located at.

2Labour force participation by people not previously counted as unemployed would not reduce the NAIRU but would raise the sustainable level of employment.The prin-ciples behind the New Deal are sum-marised in paras 4.9and 4.10of the Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report,Bud-get1999.

3However,the inevitable e ect of greater generosity and slower withdrawal of ben-e?ts is that many more people receive(and lose)them,so that numbers on marginal rates of more than60per cent rise from 730,000to915,000.

4By transforming a range of bene?ts into tax credits the government also contrived

#The Political Quarterly Publishing Co.Ltd.2001New Labour's Economic Policy65

to reduce components of the social secur-ity bill(with tax credits not included)and the average burden of taxation(tax credits counting as negative taxation).By2001/2, tax credits will be cutting the tax bill by0.6 per cent of GDPDshades of Margaret Thatcher's massaging of the public sector de?cit by subtracting receipts from priva-tisation!

5Guardian,16December1998.

6Controversy abounds over precisely what measurement is relevant here.The1999 Budget shows the share of taxes in GDP (the broadest and most sensible measure) rising from35.4per cent in1996/76to36.7 per cent in2000/1,which will give plenty of scope for arguments about how much of the tax increases in New Labour's?rst year were`Tory taxes'that Labour inher-ited.

7The1999Budget represented some retreat on this with its commitment to uprate the Minimum Income Guarantee for pen-sioners(in e ect,a renamed and slightly more generous version of Income Support) by earnings in April2000.

8Calculations by the Institute of Fiscal Stud-ies,available at.

The?gures would be a little larger if the impact of the minimum wage were in-cluded.

9Information kindly supplied by Jayne Taylor of IFS.

10Calculations carried out by Holly Suther-land with the Cambridge microsimulation model suggest that about one-half of the `redistribution'from Labour's measures would be absorbed in preventing inequal-ity from rising as a result of bene?t drag. 11These data refer to the fairly comprehen-sive de?nition of total managed expend-iture as a percentage of GDP.

12The?gures for the increases in`real spend-ing'have to be handled with care.They overstate the real volume of inputs be-cause low productivity growth in the sectors providing these labour-intensive services pushes up their costs faster than in the economy as a whole(around0.5per cent per year between1990and1996,for example).

13OECD Employment Outlook1998,Table F, p.207.

14L.Chennells,A.Dilnot and C.Emmerson, The IFS Green Budget,London,Institute for Fiscal Studies,Jan.2000.

#The Political Quarterly Publishing Co.Ltd.2001

66Andrew Glyn and Stewart Wood

鞋子尺码对照表大全

★鞋子尺码对照表大全(标准通用)★美国码★日本码★国际码★英国码★鞋子尺码对照表 标准通用尺码对照表 男鞋尺码对照表（标准通用） 尺码39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 脚长(mm) 23."6-24 24."1-245 24."6-250 25."1-255 25."6-260 26."1- 26526."6-270 27."1-275 27."6-280 美国码 6."5 7 7."5 8 8."5 9 9."5 10 10."5

24."5 25."0 25."5 26."0 26."5 27."0 27."5 28."0 28."5 国际码245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 女鞋尺码对照表（标准通用） 尺码35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 脚长（mm） 22."1-225 22."6-230 23."1-235 23."6-240 24."1-245 24."6- 25025."1-255

美国码5 5."5 6 6."5 7 7."5 8 8."5 日本码 22."5 23."0 23."5 24."0 24."5 25."0 25."5 26."0 国际码225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 Adidas尺码对照表 Adidas男鞋尺码对照表 中国码38 2/3 39 1/3 40 40 2/3 41 1/3 42 42 2/3 43 1/3 44 44 2/3 451/3 46 美国码6 6."5 7

8."5 9 9."5 10 10."5 11 11."5 英国码 5."5 6 6."5 7 7."5 8 8."5 9 9."5 10 10."5 11 标准尺码（mm）240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295Nike尺码对照表 Nike男鞋尺码对照表 中国码 38."5 39 40 40."5 41 42 42."5 43 44 44."5 45 美国码6 6."5 7

海淘鞋子尺码对照表

Women's Size Conversions US Sizes Euro Sizes UK Sizes Inches CM 4 3 5 2 8.1875" 20.8 4.5 35 2.5 8.375" 21.3 5 35-3 6 3 8.5" 21.6 5.5 36 3.5 8.75" 22.2 6 36-3 7 4 8.875" 22.5 6.5 37 4.5 9.0625" 23 7 37-38 5 9.25" 23.5 7.5 38 5.5 9.375" 23.8 8 38-39 6 9.5" 24.1 8.5 39 6.5 9.6875" 24.6 9 39-40 7 9.875" 25.1

9.5 40 7.5 10" 25.4 10 40-41 8 10.1875" 25.9 10.5 41 8.5 10.3125" 26.2 11 41-42 9 10.5" 26.7 11.5 42 9.5 10.6875" 27.1 12 42-43 10 10.875" 27.6 Men's Size Conversions US Sizes Euro Sizes UK Sizes Inches CM 6 39 5.5 9.25" 23.5 6.5 39 6 9.5" 24.1 7 40 6.5 9.625" 24.4 7.5 40-41 7 9.75" 24.8 8 41 7.5 9.9375" 25.4

8.5 41-42 8 10.125" 25.7 9 42 8.5 10.25" 26 9.5 42-43 9 10.4375" 26.7 10 43 9.5 10.5625" 27 10.5 43-44 10 10.75" 27.3 11 44 10.5 10.9375" 27.9 11.5 44-45 11 11.125" 28.3 12 45 11.5 11.25" 28.6 13 46 12.5 11.5625" 29.4 14 47 13.5 11.875" 30.2 15 48 14.5 12.1875" 31 16 49 15.5 12.5" 31.8 Youth Size Conversions (6 – 10 years)

鞋类中英文对照

鞋 类 英 文 包装用字汇…………………………………………………………………4 (四)颜色

字汇..............................................................................4 (五)材料字汇..............................................................................5 二、鞋子构造名称(一)鞋子各部位名称及图解............................................................12 (二)鞋类各种鞋型名称及图解.........................................................22 三、制鞋工具及机械设备..............................................................29 四、制鞋过程之术语应用(一)制鞋过程暨品管检验应用术语...................................................33 (二)鞋类制作流程........................................................................38 五、鞋类一般缺点........................................................................43 六、规格表之应用........................................................................44 七、订单之应用...........................................................................46 八、简易英语会话........................................................................47 九、一般贸易常识 (51) 十、国际贸易暨交易上用语 (52)

国际的鞋尺码对照表

鞋舌上标注说明：CM即厘米，为鞋的内部长度;EUR即欧洲码，为中国人平时购鞋时所说的鞋码;US即美国码，UK即英国码也都是选购运动鞋时的一个参照。脚板窄者选鞋不会有太大影响，脚板宽或厚者需穿大一号甚至大二号的鞋! 鞋子尺码对照表 标准通用尺码对照表 男鞋尺码对照表(标准通用) 女鞋尺码对照表(标准通用)

Adidas 尺码对照表Adidas 男鞋尺码对照表 欧洲码/EUR 3 9 40 40. 5 41 4 2 42. 5 43 44 44. 5 45 4 6 46. 5 4 7 厘米/CM 2 4 24. 5 25 25. 5 2 6 26. 5 26. 5 27 27. 5 27. 5 2 8 28. 5 2 9 英国码/UK 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9. 5 10 10. 5 1 1 11. 5 1 2 标准尺码(mm) 240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 女式 欧洲码 /EUR 36 36. 5 37 38 38. 5 3 9 40 40. 5 41 4 2 42. 5 厘米/CM 22 22. 5 23 23. 5 23. 5 2 4 24. 5 24. 5 25 2 6 26. 5

英国码/UK 3. 5 4 4. 5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7. 5 8 8.5 中性欧洲码 /EUR 36 36. 5 37 38 38. 5 3 9 40 40. 5 41 4 2 42. 5 43 44 44. 5 45 4 6 厘米/CM 22 22. 5 23 23. 5 23. 5 2 4 24. 5 24. 5 25. 5 2 6 26. 5 26. 5 27 27. 5 27. 5 2 8 英国码/UK 3. 5 4 4. 5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9. 5 10 10. 5 1 1 Nike 尺码对照表Nike 男鞋尺码对照表 欧洲码/EUR 38. 5 39 4 40. 5 4 1 42 42. 5 43 4 4 44. 5 4 5 45. 5 4 6 47 47. 5 厘米/CM 24. 5 24. 5 2 5 25. 5 2 6 26. 5 27 27. 5 2 8 28. 5 2 9 29. 5 3 30. 5 31 美国码/US 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 1 0 10. 5 1 1 11. 5 1 2 12. 5 13 标准尺码(mm) 240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 Nike 女鞋尺码对照表 欧洲码 /EUR 35 35. 5 36 36. 5 37. 5 3 8 38. 5 3 9 40 40. 5 41 4 2 43

鞋子各部位中英文对照

鞋子各部位中英文对照 帮面-UPPER 后帮-BACK COUNTER 内里-LINING 大底-OUTSOLE 中底-INSOLE 中底标-INSOLE LABEL 鞋眼-EYELET 鞋眼片-EYELET STAY 鞋带-LACE 魔术扣-VELCRO 鞋舌-TONGUE 鞋跟-HEEL 靴帮-CUT 高帮-HIGHT CUT 低帮-LOW CUT 边墙-SIDE SHOE 沿条-WELT 刺绣-EMBROIDERY 扣子-BUCKLE 拉练-ZIPPER 松紧带-ELASTIC LACE（GROE） 饰片-ORNAMENT 铁心-SHANK 加强带-REINFORCE TAPE 泡棉-FOAM 飞机板-INSERTER 跟皮-HEEL COVER 鞋鞍-SADDLE 满帮-WHOLE VAMP 鞋垫（中底垫皮）-SOCK LINING 鞋面前端-VAMP 鞋头-TOE CAP 套头-TOE BOX 鞋领-COLLAR 鞋腰QUARTER 滴塑片-PLASTIC PIECE 鞋统-SHAFT 滚边-BINDING 鞋后开口-OPEN BACK 2、品名（ITEM） 运动鞋-SPORT SHOES 反绒皮-SWEDE SHOES 休闲鞋-CASUAL SHOES 皮鞋-LEATHER SHOES 注塑鞋-INJECTION SHOES 时装鞋-FASHION SHOES 靴子-BOOT 拖鞋-SLIPPER 毛绒鞋-ANIMAL SHOES（PLUSH） 沙滩鞋-BEACH SANDAL 室内鞋-INDOOR SHOES 布鞋-CANVAS SHOES 凉鞋-SANDAL 3、颜色（COLOUR） 深色-DARK/D. 浅色-LIGHT/L. 银色-SILVER

鞋类专业术语中英文对照

鞋类专业术语中英文对照 目录： 鞋子种类 (2) 部位名称 (3) 材料名称 (4) 问题点描述 (6)

Sports shoes运动鞋 Casual shoes便鞋 Hiking shoes/Traveling shoes旅游鞋Slipper拖鞋 Sandals凉鞋 Boots马靴 Work shoes工作鞋 Beach Shoes沙滩鞋 Canvas shoes帆布鞋 Pumps单鞋/跟鞋 Climbing shoes登山鞋 Football shoes足球鞋 Jogging shoes慢跑鞋 Basketball shoes篮球鞋 Leisure shoes休闲鞋 Tennis shoes网球鞋 Baseball shoes棒球鞋 Aerobic shoes舞蹈鞋 Leather shoes皮鞋 Sandal凉鞋 flip-flops 夹脚/人字拖 Slippers拖鞋 Sneakers平板鞋/旅游鞋 ballet shoes芭蕾舞鞋 Moccasin 鹿皮鞋 Patent leather shoes 漆皮皮鞋 Boot 靴子 Bootie短靴 Clog 木拖鞋 galosh, overshoe 套鞋 Walking Shoes步行鞋 Artificial leather/PU人造皮革 healthy shoes, healthcare shoes保键鞋，健康鞋 Safety shoes 安全鞋 High heel高跟鞋 Skateboard滑板鞋 Skating shoes滑冰鞋 Grass-sliding shoes 滑草鞋 Skiing shoes 滑雪鞋 Orthopedic shoe矫正鞋 Cotton shoes棉鞋Racing shoes 跑鞋 dress shoes 时装鞋 fashion shoes 精致鞋（装饰鞋，盛装鞋）plastic shoes塑料，塑胶鞋 children shoes童鞋 Cement shoes冷粘鞋 Injection shoes注塑鞋 Vulcanized shoes硫化鞋 Snow boots 雪地靴 Cork slipper 软木拖 Croco shoes 花园鞋 鞋子种类(shoes variety)

鞋子尺寸测量方法及尺码对照表

鞋子尺寸测量方法及尺码对照表 鞋子尺寸测量 为购买到最适合自己的尺码，建议您先认真参考非常重要的有关尺码测量的介绍内容: 注： 1、"抬脚测量是大家最容易犯的错误!如果抬脚测量，由于脚没有受力的缘故，测量出来的数据会偏小而不准确。所以测量时要求身体直立，体重均分于双脚，这样才能测出准确的尺码。 2、人由于行走习惯和用力不一的原因，基本上每个人的两只脚都不一样大小，购买鞋子的时候应按照最大那只脚来选择尺码。(差之毫厘，失之千里哦) 3、你平时都穿多大尺码的鞋?请勿提供球鞋尺码。 4、脚板是肉肉的?还是瘦而没肉? 5、请您按前面介绍的测量方法核准尺码，该方法是中华人民共和国国家质量监督局对我国制鞋行业的规范标准。注意测量出来的数据一定要和平时自己穿的码数基本协调才对噢。 鞋子尺码对照表 我们常用的两种鞋码一种是英美制的，就是一般比较大的那个，一种是我国制定的，就是较小的。 换算公式： 中国制/2-10=英美制 写的尺码大概分四种： 美国、英国、欧洲和毫米数。比如说： US UK EUR MIM

9 8 42 270 我们中国一般用欧洲号。 女鞋 脚长(cm) 22."5 23 23."5 24 24."5 25 25."5 26 中国35 36 37 38 39 39 40 40 美国5 5."5 6 6."5 7 7."5 8 8."5 英国4 4."5 5 5."5 6 6."5 7 7."5 欧洲35 36 37 38 39 39 40 40 .男鞋

脚长(cm) 24." 525." 526."5 27 27."5 28 中国43 44 45 46 美国 77." 588."59 9."5 10 10."5 英国 66." 577."58 8."5 9 9."5 欧洲43 44 45 46 希望以上信息对网购族们有一定的帮助作用。

海淘鞋类尺码对照表

海淘鞋类尺码对照表 + 经验分享 一、长度 中国尺码和欧码一致，计算公式为：脚长值（mm）/5-10。例如225/5-10=35码。 美码和英码每0.5为一档，同一尺寸英码比美码小1-2号。 美码没有完美的计算公式，大致可以用0.75*欧码-23来计算。 附男女鞋、童鞋国际尺码对照表： 童鞋（婴儿、学步儿、小童、大童） 注意：不同品牌的尺码差异可能较大，购买前最好上品牌官网查询其尺码说明（对 照表）。 二、宽度 一般在美国网站买鞋子，同一个鞋子尺码下，有五种不同的女鞋宽度、四种不同的男鞋和童鞋宽度： 1、特窄（X-Narrow）：女鞋S号或AA号 2、窄（Narrow）：男鞋N号或C号，女鞋N号或A号，童鞋N号 3、正常中等宽度（Medium）：男鞋M号或D号，女鞋M号或B号，童鞋M 号 4、宽（Wide）：男鞋W号或EE（2E）号，女鞋W号或C/D号，童鞋W号 5、特宽（X-Wide）：男鞋XW号或EEEE（4E）号，女鞋XW号或EE（2E）号，童鞋XW号 Medium（中等）表示脚宽=脚长的3/8，相邻的鞋宽等级表示的脚宽相差3/16英寸（0.476厘米）； 即Narrow比Medium窄0.476厘米，Wide比Medium宽0.476厘米，X-Wide 比Wide宽0.476厘米…… 以脚长25厘米为例，此脚长对应的中等宽度（Medium）为25*3/8=9.375厘米； 如果此人的脚宽很接近9.375厘米，那么就应该选择Medium这档； 如果他的脚宽是9.8厘米，很接近9.375+0.476，那么就应该选择Wide这档。 亚洲人的脚一般比欧美人要宽，脚背宽或者高的朋友可以适当考虑买加宽甚至特宽。 （这是一般建议，不同品牌请具体斟酌，当然最好是去专柜试穿了）。 三、测量方法 （一）量脚的原则 1、请人协助：不能自己量，因为自然站立让脚来承担重力，量出的尺寸才准确； 2、双脚都要测量：按照较大的那只脚的脚长进行鞋码选择； 3、最佳测量时机：下午或您适当运动后，这时脚比较大，同时穿上您打算要穿的袜子，结果会更准确。 （二）量脚的执行要点 1、脚形线：被测量者正常站立在白纸上，测量者用笔绕其脚形粗略的绘制一条边缘线；

鞋子尺码对照表大全

★鞋子尺码对照表大全(标准通用)★美国码★日本 码★国际码★英国码★ 鞋子尺码对照表 标准通用尺码对照表 男鞋尺码对照表（标准通用） 尺码 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 脚长(mm)23.6-24 24.1-245 24.6-250 25.1-255 25.6-260 26.1-265 26.6-270 27.1-275 27.6-280 美国码 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 日本码 24.5 25.0 25.5 26.0 26.5 27.0 27.5 28.0 28.5 国际码 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 女鞋尺码对照表（标准通用） 尺码 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 脚长（mm） 22.1-225 22.6-230 23.1-235 23.6-240 24.1-245 24.6-250 25.1-255 25.6-260 美国码 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 日本码 22.5 23.0 23.5 24.0 24.5 25.0 25.5 26.0 国际码 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 Adidas 尺码对照表 Adidas 男鞋尺码对照表 中国码 38 2/3 39 1/3 40 40 2/3 41 1/3 42 42 2/3 43 1/3 44 44 2/3 45 1/3 46 美国码 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 英国码 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 标准尺码（mm） 240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 Nike 尺码对照表 Nike 男鞋尺码对照表 中国码 38.5 39 40 40.5 41 42 42.5 43 44 44.5 45 美国码 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 英国码 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 标准尺码（mm） 240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 Nike 女鞋尺码对照表 中国码 35 35.5 36 36.5 37.5 38 38.5 39 40 40.5 41 美国码 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 英国码 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 标准尺码（mm） 220 220 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 265

鞋类术语英文对照

1、结构(construction) 帮面、鞋帮-UPPER 鞋身面/鞋腰- Quarter后帮-BACK COUNTER 内里-LINING 大底-OUTSOLE 中底-INSOLE 中底标-INSOLE LABEL 鞋眼-EYELET 鞋眼片-EYELET STAY 鞋带-LACE 圆带 ROUND半圆带 SEMI-CIRCLE扁带 FLAT 单色双色多色 魔术扣-VELCRO 鞋舌-TONGUE 鞋跟-HEEL 鞋帮-CUT 高帮-HIGHT CUT 低帮-LOW CUT 边墙、大底沿条-SIDE SHOE 沿条-WELT 鞋口- top line 刺绣-EMBROIDERY 扣子-BUCKLE 拉练-ZIPPER 松紧带-ELASTIC LACE（gore）魔术扣-VELCRO 魔术扣毛-VELCRO LOOP 魔术扣丁-VELCRO HOOK 饰片-ORNAMENT 铁心-SHANK 加强带/补强带-REINFORCE TAPE 泡棉-FOAM 海绵-SPONGE飞机板-INSERTER 跟皮-HEEL COVER 鞋鞍-SADDLE 满帮-WHOLE VAMP 鞋垫（中底垫皮）-SOCK LINING 鞋头面-VAMP 鞋头-TOE CAP 前港宝- toe box 后港宝- heel/counter box 鞋领、领口-COLLAR 鞋腰QUARTER 滴塑片-PLASTIC PIECE 靴统-SHAFT 滚边-BINDING 鞋后开口-OPEN BACK 鞋头开口-OPEN TOE 2、品名（ITEM） 运动鞋-SPORT SHOES 反绒皮-SUEDE SHOES 休闲鞋-CASUAL SHOES 皮鞋-LEATHER SHOES 注塑鞋-INJECTION SHOES 时装鞋-FASHION SHOES 靴子-BOOTS 拖鞋-SLIPPERS 毛绒鞋-ANIMAL SHOES（PLUSH） 沙滩鞋-BEACH SANDALS 室内鞋-INDOOR SHOES 布鞋-CANVAS SHOES/VULCANIZED SHOES 凉鞋-SANDALS 3、颜色（COLOUR） 深色-DARK/D. 浅色-LIGHT/L. 银色-SILVER 灰色-GREY 黑色-BLACK水晶色-CRYSTALLINE 白色-WHITE 米白色 OFF-WHITE 嫩绿色-SPRING MINT深绿色-AUGUST GREEN 浅绿色-CITRUS GREEN 草绿色GREEN 05（LIT GREEN）鲜绿色-DESERT WEED 青绿色-SUBLE MOSS

美国-中国-国际鞋码对照表

鞋码，通常也称鞋号，是用来衡量人类脚的形状以便配鞋的标准单位系统。目前世界各国采用的鞋码并不一致，但一般都包含长、宽两个测量。长度是指穿者脚的长度，也可以是制造者的鞋楦长。即使在同一个国家/地区，不同人群和不同用途的鞋，例如儿童、运动鞋，也有不同的鞋码定义。下面是尺码对照表，可以帮你解决如何挑选正确的码数；经过量度脚长与脚宽，让你能够挑选到合适的鞋子。 国际标准鞋号表示的是脚长的毫米数。 中国标准采用毫米数或厘米数。如：245是毫米数，24 1/2是厘米数，表示一样的尺码。 换算公式： 厘米数×2－10=欧制（欧制+10）÷2=厘米数 厘米数－18+0.5=美制美制+18－0.5=厘米数 厘米数－18－0.5=英制英制+18+0.5=厘米数 （欧码+10）×5=中国鞋号，如欧码35的鞋，对应的中国鞋号为225；欧码37对应的中国鞋号为235。 鞋号换算表（单位：毫米）34号——22035号——22536号——23037号——23538号——24039号——24540号——25041号——25542号——26043号——26544号——27045号——275。 男人鞋尺码对照表： 厘米24.5 24.5 25 25.5 26 26.5 27 27.5 28 28.5 29 29.5 30 30.5 31 中国码38.5 39 40 40.5 41 42 42.5 43 44 44.5 45 45.5 46 47 47.5 英国码 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12 美国码 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12 12.5 13 女人鞋尺码对照表： 厘米22 22 22.5 23 23.5 24 24.5 25 25.5 26 26.5 27 27.5 28 28.5 29 30 30.5 中国码35 35.5 36 36.5 37.5 38 38.5 39 40 40.5 41 42 42.5 43 44 44.5 45.5 46 英国码 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10.5 11 美国码 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12 13 13.5

美国鞋码对照表

美国鞋码对照表 Nike,Adidas,Puma,Converse,Kappa,Reebok,New balance尺码查询对照表 NIKE 耐克运动鞋尺码对照表 男鞋尺码对照表 美国码/US6 6.577.588.599.51010.51111.512131415US 欧码/EUR38.5394040.5414242.5434444.54545.54647.548.549.5EUR 厘米/CM24.024.525.025.526.026.527.027.528.028.529.029.530.031.032.033CM 阿迪39 1/34040 2/341 1/34242 2/343 1/34444 2/345 1/34646 2/347 1/34849 1/350 2/3中国码260 265 270 李宁新41 2/3 42 1/3 43 李宁旧42 43

女鞋尺码对照表 美国码/US5 5.56 6.577.588.599.51010.51111.512欧码/EUR35.53636.537.53838.5394040.5414242.5434444.5厘米/CM22.022.523.023.524.024.525.025.526.026.527.027.528.028.529.5 NIKE 耐克服装尺码对照表 男子服装（单位CM） 尺码XS S M L XL XXL 身高160165170175180185胸围（上装）8084889296100腰围（下装）687276808488裤子282930313233 数字165/72A170/74A170/76A175/78A175/78A180/84A 女子服装（单位CM） 尺码XS S M L XL 身高150155160165170

海外购常见尺码对照表

海外购常见尺码对照表 海外购经常会遇到尺码问题，海外购不像国内的B2C商城可以货到付款，无理由退货，买错尺码的话基本上只能送人了。本文整理了相关资料，以帮助网友们下单时尽量正确的选择自己的尺码。需要注意：1、同国内情况类似，国外的尺码也比较混乱，各个品牌的尺码换算不尽相同，本文选取的是互联网上较为流行的版本。2、无论是参与国内的抢购还是参与海外购，熟知自己的身高（衣码）、腰围（裤码）、脚长（鞋码）是必须的。 1、牛仔裤尺码 牛仔裤尺码通常会标识W**L**字样，前者表示腰围，后者表示裤长，例如W29L30，通常可以按腰围选购。有一个简单的计算方法：女性的腰围两字+6，例如1尺9，即19+7=26码。男性的腰围两字+7~9，例如2尺6，即26+8=34码，腰围越大加的数字越大。注：还有个精确的算法，用你的腰围*13.1再四舍五入即可得到准确的尺码。例如2尺2的腰，2.2*13.1=28.8=29码。具体的换算见下表： 2、衣服尺码 美版的衣服尺码使用了和国内相同的S（Small）、M（Medium）、L（Large）+X（eXtreme）的标识方法，但其代表的衣服大小与国内的惯例不同，通常会大一个甚至几个号。不同类型的服装尺码会有所不同，不同品牌的尺码也有较大差异，下面是较为通用的尺码表，网友们可以根据自己的胸围或者腰围选取最接近的尺码： 3、鞋子尺码 鞋子尺码是最为混乱的。中国尺码和欧码是一致的，可以使用公式计算出来，具体为脚长值（mm）/5-10。例如230/5-10=36码。美码没有一个完美的公式可以计算，各个品牌均有自己的转换表，不同品牌的差异可能非常大。基本的规律是，美码和英码每0.5为一档，同一尺寸英码比美码小1-2号，美码大致上可以用0.75*欧码-23来计算。 名鞋库网站上有部分品牌的尺码转换表，可以对号入座试试看。但此表不完全与其他鞋类B2C网站提供的尺码表完全一致，因此还是仅供参考。表格较大，点击后可在新页面查看大图。 男款

海淘鞋类尺码对照表

海淘鞋类尺码对照表?+?经验分享 一、长度 中国尺码和欧码一致，计算公式为：脚长值（mm）/5-10。例如225/5-10=35码。 美码和英码每0.5为一档，同一尺寸英码比美码小1-2号。 美码没有完美的计算公式，大致可以用0.75*欧码-23来计算。 附男女鞋、童鞋国际尺码对照表： 童鞋（婴儿、学步儿、小童、大童） 注意：不同品牌的尺码差异可能较大，购买前最好上品牌官网查询其尺码说明（对 照表）。 二、宽度 一般在美国网站买鞋子，同一个鞋子尺码下，有五种不同的女鞋宽度、四种不同的男鞋和童鞋宽度： 1、特窄（X-Narrow）：女鞋S号或AA号 2、窄（Narrow）：男鞋N号或C号，女鞋N号或A号，童鞋N号 3、正常中等宽度（Medium）：男鞋M号或D号，女鞋M号或B号，童鞋M 号 4、宽（Wide）：男鞋W号或EE（2E）号，女鞋W号或C/D号，童鞋W号 5、特宽（X-Wide）：男鞋XW号或EEEE（4E）号，女鞋XW号或EE（2E）号，童鞋XW号 Medium（中等）表示脚宽=脚长的3/8，相邻的鞋宽等级表示的脚宽相差3/16英寸（0.476厘米）； 即Narrow比Medium窄0.476厘米，Wide比Medium宽0.476厘米，X-Wide 比Wide宽0.476厘米…… 以脚长25厘米为例，此脚长对应的中等宽度（Medium）为25*3/8=9.375厘米； 如果此人的脚宽很接近9.375厘米，那么就应该选择Medium这档； 如果他的脚宽是9.8厘米，很接近9.375+0.476，那么就应该选择Wide这档。 亚洲人的脚一般比欧美人要宽，脚背宽或者高的朋友可以适当考虑买加宽甚至特宽。 （这是一般建议，不同品牌请具体斟酌，当然最好是去专柜试穿了）。 三、测量方法 （一）量脚的原则? 1、请人协助：不能自己量，因为自然站立让脚来承担重力，量出的尺寸才准确； 2、双脚都要测量：按照较大的那只脚的脚长进行鞋码选择；? 3、最佳测量时机：下午或您适当运动后，这时脚比较大，同时穿上您打算要穿的袜子，结果会更准确。 （二）量脚的执行要点 1、脚形线：被测量者正常站立在白纸上，测量者用笔绕其脚形粗略的绘制一条边缘线；

各国服装鞋裤尺码详细对照表1

各国服装鞋裤尺码详细对照表。 更新时间：2010-01-04 尺寸：均码！手工平量: 女装尺码对照表(单位:cm) 码0小12（S）小4（M）中6（L）大8（XL）加大24(XXL)加加 大 围77-80cm79-82cm83-86cm87-90cm90-94cm94-98cm 2尺8寸2-2 尺9寸4 围60-63cm63-66cm66-71cm73-76cm76-79cm76-80cm 2尺2寸8-2 尺4寸 围84-87cm87-92cm93-95cm96-99cm100-103cm100-104cm 3尺-3尺1寸2 长100cm102cm104cm106cm108cm110cm 3尺3寸 ※此对照表仅供参考。 国家Size 日本579111315171921 SS,XS S M L LL,XL LL,XXL,3L4L5L6L 36384042 XS S M L XL XXL 160-165 /84-86165-170 /88-90 167-172 /92-96 168-173 /98-102 170-176 /106-110 A8101214161820 B24-68-1012-1416-18 32343638404244德国 36384042444648

女装尺码对照（仅供参考） 常见的服装尺码和身材的对应关系作参考 S=160/68A M=165/72A L=170/76A XL=175/80A 均码一般在中号和大号之间 一般155-160/80-84之间都算小码，160-165/84-88之间为中码，165-170/88-92之间为大码。 女裤尺码对照表（仅供参考）上衣(一): 尺码S M L XL 2XL(XXL)3XL 4XL 胸围(英寸）34-3636-3839-4142-4445-4849-5253-56腰围(英寸）25-2727-2930-3233-3536-3940-4344-47内长(英寸）29-1/23030-1/231313131袖长(英寸）3132333434-1/23535-1/2 下围(英寸）35-3737-4040-4343-4646-5050-5454-58裤子: A ：英寸表 尺码身长腰围臀围大腿前档后档28号38in 29in 40in 20in 9.5in 14in 29号38.5in 30in 41in 21in 10in 14.5in 30号39in 31in 42in 22in 10.5in 15in 32号39.5in 32in 43in 23in 11in 15.5in 瑞士西班牙 30323436384040424446485012 14 16 18 20 22 身高尺码 胸围臀围美码英码小号)16072－8080－88483626中号)16581－8785－936103828大号)17088－9490－988124030加大号) 175 95－101 95－103 10 14 42 32 女裤尺码2 4 6 8 10 对应腰围63（cm ）67（cm ）71（cm ）74（cm ）78（cm ）女裤标注2627282930对应腰围 1尺9 2尺 2尺1 2尺2 2尺3

鞋子尺码对照表

Widths X-Narrow Narrow Medium Wide X-Wide N M W XW Sizes Age Group U.S E.U. U.K. Inches cm Infant 0.5 M 16 0 3 1/4 8.3 Infant 1 M 16 0.5 3 1/2 8.9 Infant 1.5 M 17 1 3 5/8 9.2 Infant 2 M 17 1 3 3/4 9.5 Infant 2.5 M 18 1.5 4 10.2 Infant 3 M 18 2 4 1/8 10.5 Toddler 3.5 M 19 2.5 4 1/4 10.8 Toddler 4 M 19 3 4 1/2 11.4 Toddler 4.5 M 20 3.5 4 5/8 11.7 Toddler 5 M 20 4 4 3/4 12.1 Toddler 5.5 M 21 4.5 5 12.7 Toddler 6 M 22 5.5 5 1/8 13 Toddler 6.5 M 22 5.5 5 1/4 13.3 Toddler 7 M 23 6 5 1/2 14 Toddler 7.5 M 23 6.5 5 5/8 14.3 Toddler 8 M 24 7 5 3/4 14.6

Toddler 8.5 M 25 7.5 6 15.2 Toddler 9 M 25 8 6 1/8 15.6 Toddler 9.5 M 26 8.5 6 1/4 15.9 Toddler 10 M 27 9 6 1/2 16.5 Little Kid 10.5 M 27 9.5 6 5/8 16.8 Little Kid 11 M 28 10 6 3/4 17.1 Little Kid 11.5 M 29 10.5 7 17.8 Little Kid 12 M 30 11 7 1/8 18.1 Little Kid 12.5 M 30 11.5 7 1/4 18.4 Little Kid 13 M 31 12 7 1/2 19.1 Little Kid 13.5 M 31 12.5 7 5/8 19.4 Little Kid 1 M 32 13 7 3/4 19.7 Little Kid 1.5 M 33 14 8 20.3 Little Kid 2 M 33 1 8 1/8 20.6 Little Kid 2.5 M 34 1.5 8 1/4 21 Little Kid 3 M 34 2 8 1/2 21.6 Big Kid 3.5 M 35 2.5 8 5/8 21.9 Big Kid 4 M 36 3 8 3/4 22.2 Big Kid 4.5 M 36 3.5 9 22.9 Big Kid 5 M 37 4 9 1/8 23.2

鞋子尺码对照表

鞋子尺码对照表 1、标准通用尺码对照表 男鞋尺码对照表（标准通用） 尺码39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 美国尺码 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 日本尺码24.5 25 25.5 26 26.5 27 27.5 28 28.5 国际码245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 脚长（mm）23.6 24.1 24.6 25.1 25.6 26.1 26.6 27.1 27.6 女鞋尺码对照表（标准通用） 尺码35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 美国尺码 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 日本尺码22.5 23 23.5 24 24.5 25 25.5 26 国际码225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 脚长（mm）22.1 22.6 23.1 23.6 24.1 24.6 25.1 25.6

2、常见品牌鞋尺码 Adidas 尺码对照表 Adidas 男鞋尺码对照表 中国码38 2/3 39 1/3 40 40 2/3 41 1/3 42 42 2/3 43 1/3 44 44 2/3 45 1/3 46 美国码 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 英国码 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 标准尺码（mm）240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 Nike 尺码对照表 Nike 男鞋尺码对照表 中国码38.5 39 40 40.5 41 42 42.5 43 44 44.5 45 美国码 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 英国码 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 标准尺码（mm）240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 Nike 女鞋尺码对照表 中国码35 35.5 36 36.5 37.5 38 38.5 39 40 40.5 41 美国码 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 英国码 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 标准尺码（mm）220 220 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 265 Reebok 尺码对照表 Reebok 男鞋尺码对照表 中国码38.5 39 40 40.5 41 42 42.5 43 44 44.5 45 美国码 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 英国码 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 标准尺码（mm）245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 Reebok 女鞋尺码对照表 中国码35 35.5 36 36.5 37.5 38 38.5 39 40 40.5 41 美国码 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 英国码 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 标准尺码（mm）220 225 230 235 240 245 250 255 260 265 270 converse 尺码对照表 converse 男鞋尺码对照表 中国码38.5 39 40 40.5 41 42 42.5 43 44 44.5 45 46 46.5 47 47.5 48 49 50 51.5 美国码 6.5 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12 12.5 13 13.5 14 15 16 标准尺码（mm）240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275 280 285 290 295 300 305 310 315 320 330 340

鞋类专业英语大全

鞋类专业英语大全 鞋子各部位中英文对照 帮面-UPPER 后帮-BACK COUNTER 内里-LINING 大底-OUTSOLE 中底-INSOLE 中底标-INSOLE LABEL 鞋眼-EYELET 鞋眼片-EYELET STAY 鞋带-LACE 魔术扣-VELCRO 鞋舌-TONGUE 鞋跟-HEEL 靴帮-CUT 高帮-HIGHT CUT 低帮-LOW CUT 边墙-SIDE SHOE 沿条-WELT 刺绣-EMBROIDERY 扣子-BUCKLE 拉练-ZIPPER 松紧带-ELASTIC LACE（GROE） 饰片-ORNAMENT 铁心-SHANK 加强带-REINFORCE TAPE 泡棉-FOAM 飞机板-INSERTER 跟皮-HEEL COVER 鞋鞍-SADDLE 满帮-WHOLE VAMP 鞋垫（中底垫皮）-SOCK LINING 鞋面前端-VAMP 鞋头-TOE CAP 套头-TOE BOX 鞋领-COLLAR 鞋腰QUARTER 滴塑片-PLASTIC PIECE 鞋统-SHAFT 滚边-BINDING 鞋后开口-OPEN BACK 2、品名（ITEM） 运动鞋-SPORT SHOES 反绒皮-SWEDE SHOES 休闲鞋-CASUAL SHOES 皮鞋-LEATHER SHOES 注塑鞋-INJECTION SHOES 时装鞋-FASHION SHOES 靴子-BOOT 拖鞋-SLIPPER 毛绒鞋-ANIMAL SHOES（PLUSH） 沙滩鞋-BEACH SANDAL 室内鞋-INDOOR SHOES 布鞋-CANVAS SHOES 凉鞋-SANDAL 3、颜色（COLOUR）