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伯克希尔股东手册(最新翻译)

伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东手册

作者：沃伦·巴菲特

译者：李茂平

翻译时间：2013/4/27~2013/6/12

资料来源：伯克希尔哈撒韦公司2012年年报97页

资料网址：https://www.wendangku.net/doc/e84741383.html,/reports.html

In June1996,Berkshire’s Chairman,Warren E.Buffett,issued a booklet entitled “An Owner’s Manual*”to Berkshire’s Class A and Class B shareholders. The purpose of the manual was to explain Berkshire’s broad economic principles of operation.An updated version is reproduced on this and the following pages.

一九九六年六月，伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的董事长，沃伦-巴菲特，发表了名为“股东手册”的小册子给伯克希尔哈撒韦A类和B类股的股东。本手册的目的是为了说明伯克希尔重要的经营原则。以下是最新版本：

OWNER-RELATED BUSINESS PRINCIPLES

“股东一家亲”企业原则

At the time of the Blue Chip merger in1983,I set down13owner-related business principles that I thought would help new shareholders understand our managerial approach.As is appropriate for“principles,”all13remain alive and well today,and they are stated here in italics.

1983年并购蓝齿公司时，我写下了13条“股东一家亲”企业原则。我想，这有助于新股东理解我们的管理方法。今天，这13条原则仍然适用。以斜体陈述如下：

1.Although our form is corporate,our attitude is partnership.Charlie Munger and I think of our shareholders as owner-partners,and of ourselves as managing partners.(Because of the size of our shareholdings we are also,for better or worse,controlling partners.)We do not view the company itself as the

ultimate owner of our business assets but instead view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the assets.

1.尽管我们的组织形式是公司制，但在我们看来是合伙制。查理芒格和我认为股东是“所有者合伙人”，而我们是“管理者合伙人”。（因为持股比例不同，我们是控股合伙人）。我们对公司的看法是,它不是众多商业资产的超级所有者，而是我们和股东共同拥有这些资产的一个管道。

Charlie and I hope that you do not think of yourself as merely owning a piece of paper whose price wiggles around daily and that is a candidate for sale when some economic or political event makes you nervous.We hope you instead visualize yourself as a part owner of a business that you expect to stay with indefinitely,much as you might if you owned a farm or apartment house in partnership with members of your family.For our part,we do not view Berkshire shareholders as faceless members of an ever-shifting crowd,but rather as co-venturers who have entrusted their funds to us for what may well turn out to be the remainder of their lives.

查理和我希望你不要把自己当作价格每日不断波动的证券的拥有者，当出现使你紧张的经济或政治事件时也不要总想着卖出。我们希望你设想自己是无期限的公司合伙人，就像你和家庭成员共同拥有一个农场或公寓。我们不把股东视作反复变动且很少露面的大众，而是视作把资金交给我们并期待良好的回报的合营者。

The evidence suggests that most Berkshire shareholders have indeed embraced this long-term partnership concept.The annual percentage turn over in Berkshire’s shares is a fraction of that occurring in the stocks of other major American corporations,even when the shares I own are excluded from the calculation.

有证据表明，大多数伯克希尔的股东已经接受了这种长期合伙人的概念。相对于其他美国大公司，我们公司股票的换手率很低，即使减去我持有的股份来计算的话。

In effect,our shareholders behave in respect to their Berkshire stock much as Berkshire itself behaves in respect to companies in which it has an investment. As owners of,say,Coca-Cola or American Express shares,we think of Berkshire as being a non-managing partner in two extraordinary businesses,in which we

measure our success by the long-term progress of the companies rather than by the month-to-month movements of their stocks.In fact,we would not care in the least if several years went by in which there was no trading,or quotation of prices,in the stocks of those companies.If we have good long-term expectations,short-term price changes are meaningless for us except to the extent they offer us an opportunity to increase our ownership at an attractive price.

实际上，我们的股东对待伯克希尔公司股票的做法和伯克希尔对待他投资的公司的做法一样。比如，作为可口可乐和美国运通公司的股东，我们把伯克希尔当做两家杰出企业的“非管理合伙人”，我们根据他们的长期进步评估我们成功与否，而不是他们股票的月度变动率。事实上，我们不在乎它在几年内是否有交易或报价。如果我们预期公司长期向好，那么短期的价格波动对我们是无意义的；除非这些波动为我们提供了在有吸引力的价格增加股份的机会。

2.In line with Berkshire’s owner-orientation,most of our directors have a major portion of their net worth invested in the company.We eat our own cooking. 2.与伯克希尔的股东取向一致，大多数董事们把主要财产投资在本公司。我们自食其力。

Charlie’s family has80%or more of its net worth in Berkshire shares;I have more than98%.In addition,many of my relatives–my sisters and cousins,for example–keep a huge portion of their net worth in Berkshire stock.

查理家族80%多的财产买了伯克希尔的股票，而我则是98%。另外，我的很多亲戚-如我的姐妹和兄弟-的大量财产都买了伯克希尔的股票。

Charlie and I feel totally comfortable with this eggs-in-one-basket situation because Berkshire itself owns a wide variety of truly extraordinary businesses. Indeed,we believe that Berkshire is close to being unique in the quality and diversity of the businesses in which it owns either a controlling interest or a minority interest of significance.

查理和我对于鸡蛋放在一个篮子里感到很舒服，因为伯克希尔拥有各种各样真正非凡的企业。的确，通过控股或做为少数股东，伯克希尔集高品质的多样化公司于一身。

Charlie and I cannot promise you results.But we can guarantee that your financial fortunes will move in lockstep with ours for whatever period of time you elect to be our partner.We have no interest in large salaries or options or other means of gaining an“edge”over you.We want to make money only when our partners do and in exactly the same proportion.Moreover,when I do something dumb,I want you to be able to derive some solace from the fact that my financial suffering is proportional to yours.

查理和我无法向你承诺投资成果。但我们可以保证，只要你是我们的合伙人，无论何时，你的金融资产和我们自己的资产将完全保持一致。我们对高薪，期权，或者其他什么从你们身上挣钱的事毫无兴趣。我们只希望和我们的合伙人一起，以相同的比例挣钱。甚至，当我做了一些错误事的时候，你能有一丝安慰，因为我和你同样遭受到了损失。

3.Our long-term economic goal(subject to some qualifications mentioned later)is to maximize Berkshire’s average annual rate of gain in intrinsic business value on a per-share basis.We do not measure the economic significance or performance of Berkshire by its size;we measure by per-share progress.We are certain that the rate of per-share progress will diminish in the future–a greatly enlarged capital base will see to that.But we will be disappointed if our rate does not exceed that of the average large American corporation.

3.我们的长期目标是使伯克希尔的每股内在价值保持最大的年平均增速。我们以每股增速而不以公司规模衡量伯克希尔的成就和表现。未来，随着股东权益的大幅增加，每股增速会下降；但只有当我们的增速低于美国大公司的平均增速时，我们才会失望。

4.Our preference would be to reach our goal by directly owning a diversified group of businesses that generate cash and consistently earn above-average returns on capital.Our second choice is to own parts of similar businesses, attained primarily through purchases of marketable common stocks by our insurance subsidiaries.The price and availability of businesses and the need for insurance capital determine any given year’s capital allocation.

4.为实现目标，我们偏爱完全持有那些能产生充足现金且资本回报率一贯超过平均数的公司。我们第二选择是够买该类公司的一部分上市股票，这主要由保险分部来投资。投资与否由目标公司的价格，发展潜力和保险公司资本的数量来决定。

In recent years we have made a number of acquisitions.Though there will be dry years,we expect to make many more in the decades to come,and our hope is that they will be large.If these purchases approach the quality of those we have made in the past,Berkshire will be well served.

近年来，我们已进行了大量并购，未来，我们想更多的并购。最好是并购大公司，如果并购公司的的质量和过去我们收购的一样，那就更好了。

The challenge for us is to generate ideas as rapidly as we generate cash.In this respect,a depressed stock market is likely to present us with significant advantages.For one thing,it tends to reduce the prices at which entire companies become available for purchase.Second,a depressed market makes it easier for our insurance companies to buy small pieces of wonderful businesses–including additional pieces of businesses we already own–at attractive prices.And third,some of those same wonderful businesses,such as Coca-Cola,are consistent buyers of their own shares,which means that they, and we,gain from the cheaper prices at which they can buy.

我们的挑战是产生想法的速度能否像我们产生现金一样快。从某种意义上说，一个下跌的市场是赠送给我们的礼物。

首先，下跌市场降低了股票价格，使并购整个公司成为可能。

第二，下跌市场使我们的保险公司有机会以迷人的价格购买或增持完美公司的一部分。第三，一些完美公司如可口可乐会回购股票，这意味着他们和我们在更便宜的价格获得了更多的收益。

Overall,Berkshire and its long-term shareholders benefit from a sinking stock market much as a regular purchaser of food benefits from declining food prices. So when the market plummets–as it will from time to time–neither panic nor mourn.It’s good news for Berkshire.

总的来说，伯克希尔及其长期股东受益于下跌的股票市场；就像一个定期的食品购买者受益于食品价格下落一样。所以当市场未来发生断崖式下跌时，既不要恐慌也不要难过，对伯克希尔来说这真是好消息。

5.Because of our two-pronged approach to business ownership and because of the limitations of conventional accounting,consolidated reported earnings

may reveal relatively little about our true economic performance.Charlie and I, both as owners and managers,virtually ignore such consolidated numbers. However,we will also report to you the earnings of each major business we control,numbers we consider of great importance.These figures,along with other information we will supply about the individual businesses,should generally aid you in making judgments about them.

5.因为我们对公司股权的两种持有方式（完全持有或部分持有）以及传统会计的局限，合并报表无法展示我们的经营业绩。查理和我，既是所有者也是管理者，总是忽略合并的会计数字。因此，我们也报告给你每一个主要业务的业绩数据，这些数据更重要些。这些数字，连同其他信息，会对你评价这些业务有帮助。

To state things simply,we try to give you in the annual report the numbers and other information that really matter.Charlie and I pay a great deal of attention to how well our businesses are doing,and we also work to understand the environment in which each business is operating.For example,is one of our businesses enjoying an industry tailwind or is it facing a headwind?

为了把事情说明白，我们想在年报里披露那些重要的数据和信息。查理和我主要注意公司业务的运行和公司运行所处的环境。例如，某个企业所在行业是否处于上升或下降通道。

Charlie and I need to know exactly which situation prevails and to adjust our expectations accordingly.We will also pass along our conclusions to you.Over time,the large majority of our businesses have exceeded our expectations.But sometimes we have disappointments,and we will try to be as candid in informing you about those as we are in describing the happier experiences.

查理和我设法了解真实情况并调整我们预期。我也会把这些预期告诉你们。随着时间的推移，绝大多数的公司超过了我们的预期。但有的公司也令我们失望，我们会坦率真诚的通知你们，就像披露好的业绩时一样。

When we use unconventional measures to chart our progress–for instance, you will be reading in our annual reports about insurance“float”–we will try to explain these concepts and why we regard them as important.In other words, we believe in telling you how we think so that you can evaluate not only

Berkshire’s businesses but also assess our approach to management and capital allocation.

当我们用非常规方法评价我们的成绩--例如，年报中披露的保险“浮存金”--我们试图解释这些概念以及为什么重视这些概念。我们相信，告诉你们我们的思考方式，你们就不光可以评估伯克希尔的业务，也可以了解我们管理和投资的方法。

6.Accounting consequences do not influence our operating or capital-allocation decisions.When acquisition costs are similar,we much prefer to purchase$2of earnings that is not reportable by us under standard accounting principles than to purchase$1of earnings that is reportable.This is precisely the choice that often faces us since entire businesses(whose earnings will be fully reportable)frequently sell for double the pro-rata price of small portions(whose earnings will be largely unreportable).In aggregate and over time,we expect the unreported earnings to be fully reflected in our intrinsic business value through capital gains.

6.会计计算结果不影响我们的投资决定。当购买成本相差不大时，我们宁愿投资能产生2美元收入的项目也不投资1美元收入的项目。尽管按照标准会计准则，这2美元在利润表中不予披露，而1美元可以披露。我们经常面临这种选择，因为整个公司的售价经常是小部分售价合计的两倍。（而整个公司利润是在利润表中披露的，一小部分的利润一般不在利润表披露）最后，随着时间推移，我们相信，未披露利润通过增加股东权益，从而展示其内在价值。

We have found over time that the undistributed earnings of our investees,in aggregate,have been fully as beneficial to Berkshire as if they had been distributed to us(and therefore had been included in the earnings we officially report).This pleasant result has occurred because most of our investees are engaged in truly outstanding businesses that can often employ incremental capital to great advantage,either by putting it to work in their businesses or by repurchasing their shares.Obviously,every capital decision that our investees have made has not benefitted us as shareholders,but overall we have garnered far more than a dollar of value for each dollar they have retained.We

consequently regard look-through earnings as realistically portraying our yearly gain from operations.

我们发现，随着时间的推移，我们投资的公司的未分配利润对伯克希尔很有利，就像这些利润已经分配给我们并在利润表中完整披露一样。造成这样令人愉快的结果，主要因为大多数公司拥有杰出的业务，能经常用新增资本创造更多利润，不管是投入到主业中还是用于回购股票。显然，我们投资的公司做的每一个资本决策没有直接给我们这些股东创造利润，但他们留存的每一个美元都为我们创造了远超过1美元的价值。因此我们关注综合收益（又译为透视收益），这才是每年我们的真实收益。

7.We use debt sparingly and,when we do borrow,we attempt to structure our loans on a long-term fixed-rate basis.We will reject interesting opportunities rather than over-leverage our balance sheet.This conservatism has penalized our results but it is the only behavior that leaves us comfortable,considering our fiduciary obligations to policyholders,lenders and the many equity holders who have committed unusually large portions of their net worth to our care.(As one of the Indianapolis“500”winners said:“To finish first,you must first finish.”)

7.我们很少借款；当需要借款时，我们设法让贷款基于长期国定利率。我们宁肯拒绝一些机会也不愿意增加资产负债表的杠杆。这一保守做法使我们的投资结果处于不利地位，但也使我们感到舒服，因为我们对那些把大部分财产交给我们管理的投保人、出借人、股东有诚信义务。（印第安纳波利斯州500强之一说过：要想做到第一，必须第一个做到）

The financial calculus that Charlie and I employ would never permit our trading a good night’s sleep for a shot at a few extra percentage points of return.I’ve never believed in risking what my family and friends have and need in order to pursue what they don’t have and don’t need.

查理和我的金融学知识不允许我们为了几个百分点额外的收益而牺牲美好的睡眠。我们相信我的家族和朋友们，无需为获取一些他们不曾拥有也不必要的财富，而把他们拥有且需要的财富置于风险中。

Besides,Berkshire has access to two low-cost,non-perilous sources of leverage that allow us to safely own far more assets than our equity capital alone would permit:deferred taxes and“float,”the funds of others that our insurance business holds because it receives premiums before needing to pay out losses. Both of these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about$117 billion.

此外，伯克希尔有两个低成本无风险的杠杆资源使我们可以安全拥有超过权益资本的更多资产，他们是递延税和浮存金。这些他人的钱存放于我们的保险公司，因为只有他们损失时才会得到支付的保险金。这两样资金迅速增加，现在已有1170亿美元。

Better yet,this funding to date has often been cost-free.Deferred tax liabilities bear no interest.And as long as we can break even in our insurance underwriting the cost of the float developed from that operation is zero. Neither item,of course,is equity;these are real liabilities.But they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them.In effect,they give us the benefit of debt–an ability to have more assets working for us–but saddle us with none of its drawbacks.

更好的是，这些资金一直是无成本的。递延所得税负债不产生利息，并且只要我们能在保险业务上保持盈利，使用浮存金的成本也是零。当然，这两项都不是权益，他们是真实的负债，但是无借据也无到期日。事实上，这些债务给了我们债务到好处——使我们有能力买更多资产——却没有给我们债务的坏处（译者注：债务的坏处指到期还款和利息）。

Of course,there is no guarantee that we can obtain our float in the future at no cost.But we feel our chances of attaining that goal are as good as those of anyone in the insurance business.Not only have we reached the goal in the past (despite a number of important mistakes by your Chairman),our1996 acquisition of GEICO,materially improved our prospects for getting there in the future.

当然，无法保证未来我们仍能获得无成本的浮存金。但我们想，我们和保险行业的其他公司一样，有机会做的到。这不仅是因为我们过去做到了（尽管你们董事长犯过严重错误），1996年并够GEICO公司后，增强了我们在未来做到的预期。

In our present configuration(2012)we expect additional borrowings to be concentrated in our utilities and railroad businesses,loans that are non-recourse to Berkshire.Here,we will favor long-term,fixed-rate loans.

我们期望新增借款压缩在当前投资组合中的公用事业和铁路公司，借款也不由伯克希尔担保。我期望这些借款是长期的且利率是固定的。

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8.A managerial“wish list”will not be filled at shareholder expense.We will not diversify by purchasing entire businesses at control prices that ignore long-term economic consequences to our shareholders.We will only do with your money what we would do with our own,weighing fully the values you can obtain by diversifying your own portfolios through direct purchases in the stock market.

8.我们不会用股东的钱实现管理“愿景”，也不会忽视股东的长期利益而进行多样化的并购。我们对待你们的钱就像对待自己的钱一样，权衡你获得的价值，就像你自己在股票市场配置投资组合一样。

Charlie and I are interested only in acquisitions that we believe will raise the per-share intrinsic value of Berkshire’s stock.The size of our paychecks or our offices will never be related to the size of Berkshire’s balance sheet.

查理和我只对那些能增加伯克希尔每股内在价值的投资感兴趣。我们的工资和办公室永远不会和伯克希尔的资产负债表扯上关系。

9.We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results.We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention,over time, delivers shareholders at least$1of market value for each$1retained.To date, this test has been met.We will continue to apply it on a five-year rolling basis. As our net worth grows,it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely.

9.我们的高尚动机需要定期用结果进行检查。我们通过检查1美元留存收益是否随时间推移创造出了1美元的市场价值来评估留存收益是否明智。到今天为止，这个检查是通过的。我们会持续在每个滚动的5年期实施这个检查。随着我们的净值的增加，聪明的运用留存利润的难度增加。

I should have written the“five-year rolling basis”sentence differently,an error I didn’t realize until I received a question about this subject at the2009annual meeting.When the stock market has declined sharply over a five-year stretch, our market-price premium to book value has sometimes shrunk.And when that happens,we fail the test as I improperly formulated it.In fact,we fell far short as early as1971-75,well before I wrote this principle in1983.

关于5年滚动检查，我也许表述过不同的意思。直到2009年的年会上我收到一个提问，我才意识到有个错误。当股票市场深幅下跌超过5年，我们的市场价格某些时候会低于净资产。如果这种情况发生，那么我们的测试会失败，我的规划也是不当的。事实上，1971~1975年间，这个测试失败了。但这发生在1983年我写本条原则之前。

The five-year test should be:(1)during the period did our book-value gain exceed the performance of the S&P;and(2)did our stock consistently sell at a premium to book,meaning that every$1of retained earnings was always worth more than$1?If these tests are met,retaining earnings has made sense.

5年测试应该在如下时间进行：

1）我们账面价值增速超过标普指数增速的时间段内。

2）股票售价高于账面值时间段，这表示留存的一美元总是值市价1美元。

如果这些测试通过了，留存收益才有意义。

10.We will issue common stock only when we receive as much in business value as we give.This rule applies to all forms of issuance–not only mergers or public stock offerings,but stock-for-debt swaps,stock options,and convertible securities as well.We will not sell small portions of your company–and that is what the issuance of shares amounts to–on a basis inconsistent with the value of the entire enterprise.

10.只有当收到的价值与付出的价值一样多时，我们才会发行普通股。这条规则适用任何形式的发行——不管是公司合并、公开发行股票，或者股票债券互换，股票期权，或可转换证券等。出售你们公司的一部分（这也是发行股票的意义）不会在不合理的价值基础上进行。

When we sold the Class B shares in1996,we stated that Berkshire stock was not

undervalued–and some people found that shocking.That reaction was not well-founded.Shock should have registered instead had we issued shares when our stock was undervalued.Managements that say or imply during a public offering that their stock is undervalued are usually being economical with the truth or uneconomical with their existing shareholders’money:Owners unfairly lose if their managers deliberately sell assets for80￠that in fact are worth$1.We didn’t commit that kind of crime in our offering of Class B shares and we never will.(We did not,however,say at the time of the sale that our stock was overvalued,though many media have reported that we did.)

当我们在1996年出售B类股票的时候，我们说过这些伯克希尔的股票并没有售价过低，但有些人对此感到不满。这种反应是没有根据的。当我们的股票售价过低，我们不会发行股票而会表达不满。管理学曾提到或暗示，公开发行低估的股票事实上节约了资金但浪费了其股东的钱：当管理层故意的以80美分卖出了价值1美元的资产时，股东们损失了财富。发行B类股票的时候我们没有做这样的坏事，未来也不会。（我们没有做的意思是说发行的时候股票是高估的，当时很多媒体这样说）

11.You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance:Regardless of price,we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns.We are also very reluctant to sell sub-par businesses as long as we expect them to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations.We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses.And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures.(The projections will be dazzling and the advocates sincere,but, in the end,major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.)Nevertheless,gin rummy managerial behavior(discard your least promising business at each turn)is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in that kind of behavior.

11.你们应该注意查理和我的一个做法，该做法会损害我们的财务表现：不管价格怎样，我们也不会出售伯克希尔拥有的任何好公司。而且，我们也不愿意卖出较差的公司，只要：1）公司能产生一些现金；2）他们的管理层和工会的关系是和谐的。我们希望不要再犯购买较差的公司的错误。并且我们会非常谨慎对待这些建议：投入巨额资本后我们的差公司就能恢复满意盈利能力。（这一预测通常前途光明且被真诚的提出。但最后，向劣质行业投入资金就像在沙子上盖楼）。拉米纸牌游戏式的管理方式（在每一轮中丢掉你少量有前途的公司）不是我们的管理类型。我们宁肯有点不利的财务表现结果也不会从事这种管理方式。

We continue to avoid gin rummy behavior.True,we closed our textile business in the mid-1980’s after20years of struggling with it,but only because we felt it was doomed to run never-ending operating losses.We have not,however, given thought to selling operations that would command very fancy prices nor have we dumped our laggards,though we focus hard on curing the problems that cause them to lag.

我们一直在规避拉米纸牌游戏式的管理方式。的确，经过20年代努力后我们在1980年代的中期停止了纺织业务。这因为经过无止境的损失之后该业务难逃一死。尽管我们设法整治造成它们落后的问题，然而，我们从未想过高价卖出，也没想过废止这个落后的业务。

12.We will be candid in our reporting to you,emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value.Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed.We owe you no less.Moreover,as a company with a major communications business,it would be inexcusable for us to apply lesser standards of accuracy, balance and incisiveness when reporting on ourselves than we would expect our news people to apply when reporting on others.We also believe candor benefits us as managers:The CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private.

12.我们将坦诚公正的向你们汇报，特别是令公司价值的增加和减少的重要事情。我们的指导原则是，告诉你们实情——就像如果我们的位置对调，我们想知道实情一样。我们不会亏欠你。此外，作为一家拥有主要新闻媒体的公司，对自己报告时采用比对新闻

人物报告时更低的精确、客观标准，是不可原谅的。我们也认为公平公正对我们有益：首席执行官在公众场合误导他人，最终会在私下里误导自己。

At Berkshire you will find no“big bath”accounting maneuvers or restructurings nor any“smoothing”of quarterly or annual results.We will always tell you how many strokes we have taken on each hole and never play around with the scorecard.When the numbers are a very rough“guesstimate,”as they necessarily must be in insurance reserving,we will try to be both consistent and conservative in our approach.

在伯克希尔公司，既不存在“巨额冲销”的会计花招，也不存在季度或年度结果的“平滑”数字。我们总是会告诉你我们进了几个球洞而不是积分卡的得数。如果保险准备金中必须申报的某个财务数字很难确认，我们会采用一致性和保守性原则处理。

We will be communicating with you in several ways.Through the annual report, I try to give all shareholders as much value-defining information as can be conveyed in a document kept to reasonable length.We also try to convey a liberal quantity of condensed but important information in the quarterly reports we post on the internet,though I don’t write those(one recital a year is enough).Still another important occasion for communication is our Annual Meeting,at which Charlie and I are delighted to spend five hours or more answering questions about Berkshire.But there is one way we can’t communicate:on a one-on-one basis.That isn’t feasible given Berkshire’s many thousands of owners.

我们会采用几种方法与您交流。

1）通过年报，在文档允许的合理长度里，我们会给股东提供足够有价值的信息。我也曾想在互联网上发布的季报中简述一些重要的事情；但最终我没有动笔。（一年一次演唱会就够了）。

2）另一个交流机会是我们的年度会议。查理和我会很高兴花5个或更多个小时，回答关于伯克希尔的问题。不过我们不能一对一的交流。对拥有成千上万股东的伯克希尔来说，这是不可能的。

In all of our communications,we try to make sure that no single shareholder gets an edge:We do not follow the usual practice of giving earnings

“guidance”or other information of value to analysts or large shareholders. Our goal is to have all of our owners updated at the same time.

在我们的交流中，我们会防止某个股东获得如下好处：我们不会向大的股东或分析师提供盈利指导或其他有价值的信息。我们的目标是让所有的股东在同一时间获得最新的信息。

13.Despite our policy of candor,we will discuss our activities in marketable securities only to the extent legally required.Good investment ideas are rare, valuable and subject to competitive appropriation just as good product or business acquisition ideas are.Therefore we normally will not talk about our investment ideas.This ban extends even to securities we have sold(because we may purchase them again)and to stocks we are incorrectly rumored to be buying.If we deny those reports but say“no comment”on other occasions, the no-comments become confirmation.

13.尽管我们的政策是公平公正，但我们只在法律要求的范围内讨论有价证券的活动。好的投资想法是罕见的宝贵的，并会被竞争对手盗用；就像并购好产品和好生意的想法一样。所以我们一般不会谈论投资想法，包括那些卖出的证券（因为我们可能会再次买入）和传言我们会买入的证券。如果我们用“无可奉告”回应这些传言，也是一种确认。

Though we continue to be unwilling to talk about specific stocks,we freely discuss our business and investment philosophy.I benefitted enormously from the intellectual generosity of Ben Graham,the greatest teacher in the history of finance,and I believe it appropriate to pass along what I learned from him,even if that creates new and able investment competitors for Berkshire just as Ben’s teachings did for him.

尽管我们不愿谈论具体的股票，但我自由的谈论我们的公司和投资理念。我极大的受益于本·格雷厄姆的慷慨智慧，他是金融史上最伟大的老师，我会传达从他那里学到的知识，即使这样会产生新的竞争对手就像本·格雷厄姆当年碰到的情况一样。

TWO ADDED PRINCIPLES

新增的两条原则

14.To the extent possible,we would like each Berkshire shareholder to record a gain or loss in market value during his period of ownership that is proportional to the gain or loss in per-share intrinsic value recorded by the company during that holding period.

For this to come about,the relationship between the intrinsic value and the market price of a Berkshire share would need to remain constant,and by our preferences at1-to-1.As that implies,we would rather see Berkshire’s stock price at a fair level than a high level.Obviously,Charlie and I can’t control Berkshire’s price.But by our policies and communications,we can encourage informed,rational behavior by owners that,in turn,will tend to produce a stock price that is also rational.Our it’s-as-bad-to-be-overvalued-as-to-be-undervalued approach may disappoint some shareholders.We believe,however,that it affords Berkshire the best prospect of attracting long-term investors who seek to profit from the progress of the company rather than from the investment mistakes of their partners. 14.有可能的话，我们希望每个伯克希尔的股东在做股东期间记录一下市值的增减；这与他持有期间的每股内在价值的增减相似。这是因为伯克希尔的内在价值与市场价格的比值将会保持不变，我们希望是1:1。这意味着，我们希望看到伯克希尔的股票价格公平合理而不是超高。很明显，查理和我无法控制伯克希尔的股价。但通过我们的策略以及与诸位的交流，我们可以促使股东们增长见识和更理性，从而会产生理性的价格。我们的“高估和低估一样坏”的理念会让一些股东失望，我们相信，这一理念会带给伯克希尔最好的前景，吸引长期投资者从公司增长中获利而不是其他股东的投资失误中获利。

15.We regularly compare the gain in Berkshire’s per-share book value to the performance of the S&P500.Over time,we hope to outpace this yardstick. Otherwise,why do our investors need us?The measurement,however,has

certain shortcomings that are described in the next section.Moreover,it now is less meaningful on a year-to-year basis than was formerly the case.That is because our equity holdings,whose value tends to move with the S&P500,are a far smaller portion of our net worth than they were in earlier years. Additionally,gains in the S&P stocks are counted in full in calculating that index, whereas gains in Berkshire’s equity holdings are counted at65%because of the federal tax we incur.We,therefore,expect to outperform the S&P in lackluster years for the stock market and underperform when the market has a strong year.

15.我们也把伯克希尔的每股账面价值增长率与标准普尔500指数的表现相比较。随着时间推移，我们希望超过这一参照标尺。否则的话，投资者们要我们有啥用？这一比较方法有下述的某些缺陷。另外，这种以年为基础的比较不如以前有意义了。这是因为，我们的股票持有量（它们的价格随标普500指数波动）占净资产的比例比以前减少了许多。此外，标准普尔股票的增长会完全计入指数，而伯克希尔的股票只计算65%因为我们要交联邦税。我们预计，在股市不好时会超过标普指数，在市场高涨时会低于标普指数。

INTRINSIC VALUE

内在价值

Now let’s focus on a term that I mentioned earlier and that you will encounter in future annual reports.Intrinsic value is an all-important concept that offers the only logical approach to evaluating the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses.Intrinsic value can be defined simply:It is the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life.

现在，让我们来聚焦一个术语，该术语我早前提到过，你也会在未来的年报中碰到。在对投资项目和生意的吸引力进行评估和比较时，内在价值是非常重要的概念并给出了唯一合乎逻辑的做法。内在价值的简单定义是：一个企业余下寿命中可取出的现金的折现值。（译者注：这个现金指：可以安全地拿出来分配，且不会影响到公司的正常经营、长期成长和维持竞争地位的钱。）

The calculation of intrinsic value,though,is not so simple.As our definition suggests,intrinsic value is an estimate rather than a precise figure,and it is additionally an estimate that must be changed if interest rates move or forecasts of future cash flows are revised.Two people looking at the same set of facts,moreover–and this would apply even to Charlie and me–will almost inevitably come up with at least slightly different intrinsic value figures.That is one reason we never give you our estimates of intrinsic value.

然而，计算内在价值并不简单。根据我们的定义，内在价值是一个概数而不是精确数；此外，当利率变化或预计未来现金流改变时，该概数必须也改变。两个人看相同的一组事实，包括查理和我在内，也会不可避免的得出不同的内在价值数字。这就是为什么我们不告诉你们公司内在价值估计值的原因。

What our annual reports do supply,though,are the facts that we ourselves use to calculate this value.Meanwhile,we regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number,though one of limited use.The limitations do not arise from our holdings of marketable securities,which are carried on our books at their current prices.Rather the inadequacies of book value have to do with the companies we control,whose values as stated on our books may be far different from their intrinsic values.

然而，我们在年报中提供我们用于计算内在价值的具体事实。同时，我们也报告我们的每股账面价值，尽管这个数字容易计算但用处有限。它的局限性并非源自我们持有的上市的证券，它们以现价记录账面价值；而是来自我们控股的公司，它们的账面价值虽然记录在账簿上但与内在价值却相去甚远。

The disparity can go in either direction.For example,in1964we could state with certitude that Berkshire’s per-share book value was$19.46.However,that figure considerably overstated the company’s intrinsic value,since all of the company’s resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business.Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values.

这种差异可以体现在两个方面。例如,在1964年我们确信的记载伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的每股账面价值是19.46美元。然而，这个数字远高于公司的内在价值，因为当时公司所有的资源都来自利润很差的纺织业务，这些纺织资产的持续经营价值或清算价值低于其账面价值。

Today,however,Berkshire’s situation is reversed:Now,our book value far understates Berkshire’s intrinsic value,a point true because many of the businesses we control are worth much more than their carrying value.

但是，今天伯克希尔的情况完全不同了：现在我们的账面价值远在伯克希尔的内在价值之下，一个原因是许多我们控股的企业比它们的账面价值值钱的多。

Inadequate though they are in telling the story,we give you Berkshire’s book-value figures because they today serve as a rough,albeit significantly understated,tracking measure for Berkshire’s intrinsic value.In other words, the percentage change in book value in any given year is likely to be reasonably close to that year’s change in intrinsic value.

虽然存在不足，但我们给出的账面价值可以粗略的估算伯克希尔的内在价值（尽管存在显著的低估）。换句话说，某年账面价值变动的百分比与该年内在价值变动的百分比非常接近。

You can gain some insight into the differences between book value and intrinsic value by looking at one form of investment,a college education.Think of the education’s cost as its“book value.”If this cost is to be accurate,it should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.

你可以通过分析大学教育这种投资形式来洞悉账面价值与内在价值的差异。把大学的教育成本想象为“账面价值”。如果要精确计算成本，就应该加上这些学生们因选择上大学而不是做工作而放弃的收入。

For this exercise,we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value.First,we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that

figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure,which must then be discounted,at an appropriate interest rate,back to graduation day.The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.

对于这个练习题,我们将忽略大学教育的重要的非经济利益而完全专注于其经济价值。首先,我们必须估计毕业生一生中赚到的收入并减去假如他不接受大学教育赚到的收入。之后，这一收入差额需要使用合适的利率折现，折现到毕业日。计算结果等于大学教育的内在经济价值。

Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value,which means that whoever paid for the education didn’t get his money’s worth.In other cases,the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value,a result that proves capital was wisely deployed.In all cases,what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.

一些学生会发现，他们的教育成本的“账面价值”超过了内在价值。这意味着，这个人为大学教育支付的钱是不值得的。另一种情况是，大学教育的内在价值远超过了其账面价值，这证明了资本被明智的运用了。在两种情况中，这个非常精确的账面价值并不是内在价值的指示器。

THE MANAGING OF BERKSHIRE

伯克希尔的管理

I think it’s appropriate that I conclude with a discussion of Berkshire’s management,today and in the future.As our first owner-related principle tells you,Charlie and I are the managing partners of Berkshire.But we subcontract all of the heavy lifting in this business to the managers of our subsidiaries.In fact,we delegate almost to the point of abdication:Though Berkshire has about 288,000employees,only24of these are at headquarters.

我想，以讨论伯克希尔现在和将来的管理作为结束语是适当的。正如“股东一家亲”原则的第一条说的一样，查理和我是伯克希尔的管理合伙人。但我们把企业管理的所有重担分包给子公司的经理们。事实上，我们几乎已经退位：尽管伯克希尔大约有288,000

bachmann操作手册翻译

与M1的控制系统，简单到复杂的控制系统可以放在一起。此外，终端可以集成在系统和多个控制器可以通过一个控制中心联网。下图示意性地示出的M1控制系统各部件之间的连接。图2：M1控制系统原理图工具 M1控制器一个M1控制器自主工作。如果多个M1控制器在同一网络中，他们可以互相交流。开发的PC 开发计算机用于控制器的配置和调试开发上位机与控制器通过网络进行通信。. 终点站终端和巴赫曼电子有限公司工业电脑用于呈现信息和应用和操作机器。该连接是由一个控制器或通过在网络中的集成。进一步的信息：硬件（产品说明）> 15章“操作和观察装置（可视化）”

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巴菲特致股东的信-2001年

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HRPWM用户手册(工具软件翻译)

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这个文档是结合使用特定于设备的增强脉宽调制器(ePWM)模块参考指南。这个HRPWM模块扩展了时间分辨能力的传统派生数字脉冲宽度调制器(PWM)。HRPWM通常用在当PWM分辨率低于~ 9 - 10位。这发生在PWM频率大于~ 200千赫当使用一个CPU /系统时钟的100 MHz。关键HRPWM的特点是: ?长时间分辨能力 ?用于工作周期和移相控制方法细粒度控制或 ?时间边缘定位使用扩展比较和阶段寄存器使用一个信号 ?实现PWM的道路,也就是说,在EPWMxA输出。EPWMxB产量传统PWM功能 ?自检诊断软件模式来检查微边缘定位器(MEP)逻辑是跑步最佳介绍 ePWM的外围是用来执行一个函数,它在数学上是等价的,一个数模转换转换器(DAC)。如图1所示,TSYSCLKOUT = 10纳秒(即100 MHz时钟),有效分辨率为常规生成PWM是一个函数的PWM频率(或时间)和系统时钟频率。设SYSCLKOUT=100MHZ TPWM=100KHZ 100K/100M*100%=0.1% 如果所需的PWM操作频率不提供足够的决议在PWM方式,您可能想要考虑HRPWM。作为一个例子,HRPWM提供改进的性能,表1显示了决议在比特数各种PWM频率。这些值假设一个100 MHz SYSCLK频率和一个MEP步骤大小为180 ps。看到特定于设备的数据表为典型的和最大的性能规范为MEP。

产品说明书翻译(共1篇)

篇一：产品说明书的翻译产品说明书的翻译说明书主要是用来说明产品的性能、特点、用途、配方及使用方法等，服务对象是普通消费者，所以语言浅显确切，简单明了，讲究科学性和逻辑性。它的作用旨在指导使用，所以翻译时要一丝不苟，不能有少出入。由于商品中种类、性质不同，说明的方法。内容也就不同。所以在翻译时要针对不同的具体要求，努力使译文所选用词准确明了，行文简洁流畅。一般来说，日用品说明书在说明产品性能、特点、用途等方面时，往往追求生动活泼，充满溢美之词，旨在激发人们购买、使用产品的欲望。而药品说明书通常包含成分、主治、用法说明、注意事项、禁忌以及副作用等部分。翻译时要读懂原文中的专用名词，然后才能准确用词，避免出错。机械设备说明书通常包括商品特点、用途、规格、性能、结构、操作程序以及注意事项等，语言简单明了。【例1】娃哈哈儿童营养液娃哈哈儿童营养液是由我厂和浙江医科大学医学营养系共同开发的，含有人体所需的氨基酸、维生素、微量元素等多种营养成分，尤其是对儿童生长发育所缺的钙、铁、锌作了补充，通过国家级新产品鉴定，在国内同类产品中处于领先地位。配料：蜂蜜、山楂、红枣、枸杞、莲子、米仁、桂圆、核桃等。成分：每100毫升含量，蛋白质1.5%以上，钙250-300毫克，铁12.5-20毫克，锌12.5-20 毫克。净含量：每支10毫克，每盒10只，计100毫升。储藏：本品宜存于阴凉处。保质期一年，保存期一年半。食用方法：早晚食用，每次1-2支。批准文号：浙卫食准字（89）第0004-35号标准代号：q/wjb0201-89 杭州娃哈哈营养食品厂出品，浙江医科大学医学营养系监制。【译文】 wahaha, a children’s nourishing liquid is co-developed by hangzhou wahaha nutritious food product factory and the dept. of medical nutrition of zhejiang medical university. the liquid contains rich amino acids, vitamins and particularly supplies children with ca and trace elements such as fe and zn essential to healthy growth. it occupies the leading position in the development of nourishing products and has passed the nation-level evaluation of newly-developed products. ingredients: honey, hawthorn, jujube, lycium, chinese lotus seed, barley, longan, walnut, etc. nutrients: per 100ml: protein over 1.5%, ca 250-300 mg, fe 12.5-20 mg, zn 12.5-20 mg. contents: 10 ampoules per case, 10 ml per ample, total 100 ml. storage: to be kept in a cool place. quality guarantee for one year and storage period one and a half year. dosage: 1-2 ampoules a day in the morning and evening. sanction no.: zhejiang food hygiene permit (89)0004-35 standard code: q/wjb 0201-89 manufactured by: hangzhou wahaha nutritious food product factory

新版汽车涂装SE指导手册(翻译)

涂装同步工程 4—1 概述涂装同步工程工作是在整车开发过程中，以白车身为对象进行涂装工艺可行性、车身结构防腐性、密封性等进行工艺分析。涂装同步工程分析，要紧密地结合现场生产线实际情况，如前处理及电泳方式(步进式、连续式）、电泳槽泳透力、各工位节拍及工装、设备等内容一并考虑. 在汽车产品研发中，涂装同步工程包括以下四个阶段:工艺策划阶段、模型阶段、工程化设计阶段和样车试制阶段，各阶段开展的具体工作内容、各阶段输入输出物以及责任分工见表4—1《涂装同步工程工作细则》. 除了《涂装同步工程工作细则》,在涂装同步工程的相应阶段还输出部分关联文件。 4-2 涂装工艺可行性分析方法为了完成涂装同步工程工艺策划阶段的分析工作，使该阶段的工作做得更深入、规范,特编写涂装工艺可行性分析方法,此分析方法适用于同步工程工艺策划阶段的工艺可行性分析,为今后此项工作提供方法指导和操作规范。 1 工作内容 1。1 生产能力分析。 1.2 制造工艺可行性分析。

1。3 生产工艺设备、工装适用性分析. 2 工作方法 2。1 工作步骤第一步：搜集资料：《××项目预研项目书》、《项目设计任务书》及××车型量产选定生产线的现场工艺资料。由搜集到的资料分析得出以下信息: a）××车型的生产纲领及白车身外形尺寸（长×宽×高）及白车身重量； b) ××车型质量定义; c）选定生产线的通过性尺寸(长×宽×高）及承重； d）选定生产线的工艺流程； e) 选定生产线的主要生产设备、工装明细。第二步：根据以上资料对选定生产线的生产能力、制造工艺;生产工艺设备、工装的可行性进行分析. 第三步：根据以上分析结果得出××车型工艺可行性的结论。 2.2 工作内容分析方法 2.2.1生产能力分析通过××车型选定生产线的生产节拍及班次，计算出生产线的最大产能，与××车型的生产纲领对比分析，确定产品在该生产线生产时是否满足生产纲领的要求，如不满足，是否有改进措施，并对改进措施实施后是否可行得出结论. 2。2。2制造工艺可行性分析 a）工艺流程分析：由选定生产线的现场工艺资料得出××车型

巴菲特致股东的信-1997年

Buffett’s Letters To Berkshire Shareholders 1997 巴菲特致股东的信1997年 Our gain in net worth during 1997 was $8.0 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class Bstock by 34.1%. Over the last 33 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $25,488, a rate of 24.1% compounded annually.(1)1997年本公司的净值增加了80亿美元，每股帐面净值不管是A级股或B 级股皆成长了34.1%，总计过去33年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的25,488美元，年复合成长率约为24.1%*。 1. All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares,the successor to the only stock that the company had outstandingbefore 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30ththat of the A. *1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在1996年以前流通在外唯一的一种股份，B级普通股拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利。 Given our gain of 34.1%, it is tempting to declare victory and move on. But last year's performance was no great triumph: Any investor can chalk up large returns when stocks soar, as they did in 1997. In a bull market, one must avoid the error of the preening duck that quacks boastfully after a torrential rainstorm, thinking that its paddling skills have caused it to rise in the world. A right-thinking duck would instead compare its position after the downpour to that of the other ducks on the pond. 看到我们高达34.1%的超高报酬率，大家可能忍不住要高呼胜利口号，并勇往前进，不过若是考量去年股市的状况，任何一个投资人都能靠着股票的飙涨而大赚一票，面对多头的行情，大家一定要避免成为一只呱呱大叫的骄傲鸭子，以为是自己高超的泳技让他冲上了天，殊不知面对狂风巨浪，小心的鸭子反而会谨慎地看看大浪过后，其它池塘里的鸭子都到哪里去了。 So what's our duck rating for 1997? The table on the facing page shows that though we paddled furiously last year, passive ducks that simply invested in the S&P Index rose almost as fast as we did. Our appraisal of 1997's performance, then: Quack. 那么我们这只鸭子在1997年的表现又如何呢? 报表显示虽然去年我们拼命的向前划，不过到最后我们发现其它被动投资S&P 500指数的鸭子的表现一点也不比我们差，所以总结我们在1997年的表现是︰呱呱! When the market booms, we tend to suffer in comparison with the S&P Index. The Index bears no tax costs, nor do mutual funds, since they pass through all tax liabilities to their owners. Last year, on the other hand, Berkshire paid or accrued $4.2 billion for federal incometax, or about 18% of our beginning net worth. 当股市正热时，相较于S&P 500指数，我们比较吃亏，因为指数或共同基金不必负担租税成本，他们可以直接将税负转嫁到投资人的身上，相对地在另一方面伯克希尔光是去年就必须认为高达42亿美元的联邦所得税，这相当于我们年初净值的18%。 Berkshire will always have corporate taxes to pay, which means it needs to overcome their drag in order to justify its existence. Obviously, Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I won't be able to lick that handicap 由于伯克希尔必须要负担企业所得税，所以为了要证明其存在的意义，它就一定要能够克服这先天的障碍，不过很显然的伯克希尔的主要合伙人查理曼格跟我很难每年都打败这样的

翻译写作指南- 欧洲委员会翻译写作手册Fight the Fog

Directorate-General for Translation European Commission

HOW TO WRITE CLEARLY This booklet is intended for all writers of English at the European Commission. Whether your job is drafting or translating, here are some hints – not rules – that will help you to write clearly and make sure your message ends up in your readers’ brains, not in their bins. Put the reader first page 2 Use verbs, not nouns page 3 page 4 abstract not Concrete, passive 5 page not Active, Whodunnit? Name the agent page 6 Making sense – managing stress page 7 KISS: Keep It Short…. page 8 page Simple 9 … and False friends … page 10 pitfalls page 11 other and … References page 12

Put the reader first There are three groups of people likely to read Commission documents: 1. EU insiders (colleagues in the Commission or other institutions) 2. outside specialists 3. the general public. The third group is by far the largest and most important. As more Commission documents are made accessible to the general public, criticism of FOG will increase. Always bear in mind the people you're writing for: not your committee, your boss, or the reviser of your translations, but the end users. They are in a hurry. Don't overestimate their knowledge, interest or patience. Whatever the type of document - legislation, a technical report, minutes, a press release or speech - you can enhance its impact by writing clearly. Try to see your subject matter from your readers' point of view; try to involve them ("you" is an under-used word in Commission documents); and try not to bore them. You can avoid irritating half your readers by replacing gender-specific words (replace "layman" by "lay person"; "salesgirl" by "sales assistant"; "workman" by "worker"). Avoid "he, she/ his, her" by using "they/ their" instead.

灵格斯翻译家使用手册

灵格斯翻译家使用手册安装灵格斯 1、从灵格斯翻译家网站下载软件的安装程序到本机硬盘. 2、双击安装程序, 进行安装. 3、安装过程中, 如果没有特别的需求, 可以一路按“下一步” 直至安装完成. 注意: ?请从官方网站或官方指定的下载网站获取灵格斯的安装程序, 切勿下载来源不明或所谓的绿色版, 以免造成不必要的损失和使用上的种种故障. ?安装前, 请确认已经关闭了其他程序, 特别是防病毒软件和防火墙软件, 以便正常顺利安装. 设置主程序灵格斯翻译家的主程序已经安装到操作系统中了, 为了更好地使用灵格斯翻译家带来的便利, 我们需要在使用前对主程序进行设置. 首先, 启动灵格斯翻译家, 点击程序界面左侧选项中的“设置”, 激活设置面板.

屏幕取词点击“翻译” 选项标签, 对鼠标屏幕取词进行设置. ?鼠标取词: 用鼠标将光标移到词上面时, 再加上组合键就可翻译该词. ?鼠标左键取词: 用鼠标将光标移到词上面时, 按下〔鼠标左键+组合键〕就可翻译该词. ?鼠标右键取词: 用鼠标将光标移到词上面时, 按下〔鼠标右键+组合键〕就可翻译该词. ?鼠标中键取词: 用鼠标将光标移到词上面时, 按下〔鼠标中键+组合键〕就可翻译该词. ?延迟: 做以上动作时延迟几毫秒才做翻译动作. ?支持本地语言映射: 选中后, 在简体中文用户界面下, 会自动转换词典中的繁体中文内容为简体; 在繁体中文用户界面下, 则会自动转换词典中的简体中文内容为繁体. (注: 本功能需要配合支持映射功能的词典使用) 常规接着, 点击“常规” 标签, 对软件的常规项目进行设置.

?选择用于Web 搜索的搜索引擎: 当我们在右上角搜索框内输入文字, 并按下Enter 键时, 会连到互联网搜索引擎. ?保存的查询历史个数: 查询的词语的历史纪录. ?登录至Windows 时, 运行Lingoes: 打勾此项, 则会在开机时启动此程式. ?启动后最小化: 开启此程式的, 会缩到工具列上. 热键