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Bank Loans with Chinese Characteristics

Bank Loans with Chinese Characteristics:

Some Evidence on Inside Debt in a State-

Controlled Banking System

Warren Bailey, Wei Huang, and Zhishu Yang *

Cornell University, University of Hawaii, and Tsinghua University

16th May 2010

Abstract

We study a transitional economy where state-controlled banks make loan decisions based on noisy inside information on prospective borrowers, and may lend to avert unemployment and social instability. In China, poor financial performance and high managerial expenses increase the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan, and bank loan approval predicts poor subsequent borrower performance. Negative event-study responses occur at bank loan announcements, particularly for borrowers measuring poorly on quality and creditworthiness, or for lenders or borrowers involved in litigation regarding loans. Our results highlight dilemmas in a state-led financial system and the local stock market’s sophistication in interpreting news.

Keywords: bank loans, state ownership, China

JEL classification codes: G21, G28, G14

* Address for Correspondence: Warren Bailey, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Sage Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853-6201, U.S.A., wbb1@https://www.wendangku.net/doc/8b14399075.html,; Wei Huang, Shidler College of Business, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2404 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822, U.S.A., weih@https://www.wendangku.net/doc/8b14399075.html,; Zhishu Yang, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China, yangzhsh@https://www.wendangku.net/doc/8b14399075.html,. We thank David Tang and Jun Wang for their research assistance. We thank conference participants at the May 2007 International Finance Conference at Queen’s University, 2007 China International Finance Conference at Chengdu, 2007 Chinese University of Hong Kong and Tsinghua Workshop on Finance and Accounting at Beijing, 2008 Eastern Finance Association Annual Meeting at Tampa, 2008 China Summer Institute at Dalian, 2008 CKGSB Finance Research Summer Camp at Hangzhou, 2008 Financial Management Annual meeting at Dallas, 2009 Third CAF-FIC-SIFR Emerging Market Conference, ISB Campus, Hyderabad, and seminar participants at Xiamen University, Jun-koo Kang, Mark Leary, Nicholas Lardy, Inessa Love, Paul Malatesta, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Jun “QJ” Qian, Rick Smith, Per Str?mberg, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments or other assistance. Yang acknowledges financial support from NSFC (Project Number: 70671060) and HSBC-Tsinghua China Rural Finance Research Grant.

? 2008, 2009, 2010 Warren Bailey, Wei Huang, and Zhishu Yang.

Bank Loans with Chinese Characteristics:

Some Evidence on Inside Debt in a State-

Controlled Banking System

Abstract

Bank Loans with Chinese Characteristics:

Some Evidence on Inside Debt in a State-Controlled Banking System

I. Introduction

In supplying capital to firms, financial markets feature institutions and practices intended to mitigate problems such as transactions costs, information asymmetries, and agency conflicts, and to adapt to the regulatory environment. Much research focuses on the purposes that banks serve. Banks can intermediate the maturity preferences of lenders and borrowers (Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Rajan 1996). As a form of “inside” debt, bank loans may solve information and agency problems that public bond issues or other “outside” debt cannot (Fama 1985, Rajan 1992). If, for example, managers cannot perfectly communicate their information to capital market participants (Myers and Majluf 1984), banks may serve a very important intermediating role between savers and borrowers.

What happens if these institutions and practices do not fully extend to less-developed economies? While basic notions of what banks do and how they contribute to the economy are expected to hold for the U.S. and other highly developed environments, it is unclear what happens when per-capita income is low, legal and financial systems are weak, and government influence on banking and the economy in general is greater.

One feature that becomes more prominent as we move away from developed Anglo-Saxon capital markets is partial or total government ownership of banks. Some recent studies have examined the impact of government ownership of banks across a variety of countries and in emerging markets in some cases. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) find a great degree of government ownership of banks, particularly in less-developed environments. This ownership appears to hinder financial development. Dinc (2005) finds that, in countries with

free elections, heightened lending by government banks in election years appears to support political goals. In Italy, elections appear to affect the lending behavior of state-owned banks and, in particular, the allocation of low-interest loans (Sapienza, 2004) while in Pakistan borrowing and default may be higher for firms with political connections (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Under such circumstances, do banks contribute to economic efficiency as basic theories suggest? Beyond the less-developed economies, state-led banking is now of even greater interest as the recent failures in U.S. and European banking systems have led to substantial state ownership and control of banks in even the most developed economies.

The notion that banks produce information about borrowers has motivated some interesting empirical research on developed capital markets. If firms can choose between bank debt and public debt, and if banks can mitigate information problems, raising money with a bank loan, instead of a public issue of bonds or other securities, should be a positive signal, particularly for newer, smaller, or otherwise information-poor borrowers. Consistent with the information role of bank debt, stock market responses to announcements of a bond issue are typically zero or slightly negative (Eckbo 1986) but announcements of bank loans typically yield significantly positive abnormal returns for the borrower’s stock (Mikkelson and Partch 1986, James 1987). Furthermore, this effect appears stronger for high quality lenders (Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel 1995), loan renewals (Lummer and McConnell 1989, Best and Zhang 1993), smaller borrowers (Sloven, Johnson, and Glascock 1992), borrowers with high dispersion in expected earnings or negative earnings realizations (Best and Zhang 1993), and loans with particularly demanding covenants (Demiroglu and James, 2007). Recent U.S. evidence (Fields, Fraser, Berry, and Byers, 2006) suggests that the positive announcement effect has attenuated but may still appear for smaller, weaker borrowers and during times of high credit risk premiums.

Aintablian and Roberts (2000) validate the positive bank loan announcement effect using data from Canadian capital markets. Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004) find positive abnormal returns for emerging-market borrowers who obtain internationally-syndicated term loans, with most prominent effects for subsequent, rather than first, loans and for firms with certain governance characteristics.1These results suggest that, when banks and prospective borrowers are independent and profit-maximizing, banks do indeed serve to generate information as suggested by “inside debt” theories of banking and bank loans. Banks give loans only to creditworthy firms, and approval of a bank loan is perceived by the stock market as a good signal, particularly for information-poor borrowers. Renewals or subsequent loan approvals may compound this effect.2 What happens to this certification role of banks when, as previous authors have found, government-controlled lenders serve political goals? In this paper, we study whether the notion of inside debt holds up in the context of China’s banking system, a unique laboratory with which to study bank loans in an underdeveloped environment.

The poor state of law, regulation, and disclosure in China’s capital market is a severe constraint on the efficiency of banks and borrowers.3Recent research has shown that Chinese listed companies are subject to mismanagement and outright theft in the form of “tunneling” by

1 They also report positive abnormal returns for international bond issues, echoing Kim and Stulz (1988).

2However, the notion of inside debt does not explain everything. Negative abnormal stock returns and poor operating performance are often observed for a few years after the announcement of a bank loan (Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel 2006), though this may depend on the frequency rather than the form of capital-raising (Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel 2008).

3 See Anderson (1999) for a case study of how Brazil’s bond market has adapted to an underdeveloped environment.

controlling shareholders.4 Furthermore, the limitations of the markets for public securities makes it difficult for firms to raise money with equity or public debt (Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005) as the stock market is relatively small and corporate bond issues are almost unheard of.5 Thus, a Chinese firm largely relies on retained earnings and bank loans for finance, regardless of whether the firm is healthy or distressed. At the same time, the Chinese economy offers the researcher a rich cross-section of heavily-traded listed firms and a predictable source of bank loan news as mandated by disclosure regulations.

Our paper exploits China’s unique setting to develop further evidence on how banks function and, in particular, how they carry out their hypothesized certification role in an environment that combines rapid economic growth, very underdeveloped capital markets, and state-controlled banks that serve political goals. Our findings are of interest to a variety of academics, policy-makers, and practitioners, and contribute to problems ranging from improving banking law and regulation to pricing bank stock issues such as the recent large bank IPOs from China.

Our paper proceeds as follows. First, we present a simple model in which state-owned banks make lending decisions based on useful but noisy inside information on prospective borrowers. Both “good” and “bad” borrowers may obtain bank loans driven by purely commercial considerations or for political reasons. The prior probabilities that “good” and “bad” borrowers get bank loans depend on the probability that a firm receives a politically-motivated loan versus a commercially-determined loan, and if the latter, on the process by which the bank 4 See, for example, Jian and Wong (2010), Jiang, Lee, and Yue (2010), and Cheung, Jing, Rau, and Stouraitis (2006) on the use of “tunneling”, loans, and other related-party transactions to extract value from Chinese listed companies.

5 Listed companies can make a seasoned offering if three-year average ROE is above 6%, but issuance procedures are typically complicated for companies seeking immediate external finance.

decides to invest resources in investigating a potential borrower. Given a loan approval event, investors update their posterior probabilities for various publicly-observed outcomes conditional on whether the expected payoff of a loan is greater than the cost of investigation. As in Akerloff (1970), informationally-disadvantaged stock market investors cannot distinguish between good and bad borrowers. A pooling equilibrium reflecting the average quality of borrowing firms results, and, in particular, the stock price of a firm may react negatively to the announcement that the firm has received a bank loan. Second, we empirically investigate the factors affecting the likelihood of receiving a bank loan and the impact of receiving a loan on the long-term performance of borrowers. We test several hypotheses about bank loan announcements with event-study reactions and cross-sectional differences in borrower, lender, and loan characteristics. We also examine the stock price reaction for the lender, for those cases when the lending bank is listed.

A brief summary of our findings is as follows. We find that poorer financial performance and higher managerial expenses increase the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan. Furthermore, approval of a bank loan predicts poor subsequent accounting performance. Supplemental data for companies that display increased long-term debt on the balance sheet but no explicit loan announcements confirm this finding. We further examine market responses to loan announcements. Using bank loan announcements for all listed companies in China from 1999 to 2004, we find significant declines in stock prices of Chinese borrowers at times of such announcements. This is consistent with our theoretical prediction. The negative effect is typical for borrowers with frequent related-party transactions, poor subsequent performance, high state ownership, no foreign class shares, loans from the four state banks, loans from local bank branches, or loans intended to repay existing debt. Finally, for the small number of loans

originating from listed banks, we find no evidence that the lender’s stock price drops at the time a loan is announced. Our evidence suggests that, under an enriched notion of inside debt, a bank loan announcement no longer sends a clear-cut positive signal about the borrower’s prospects. Instead, investors must condition their assessment of the borrower’s value on other firm, loan, and lender characteristics.

This paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly describes China’s banking system. Section III presents a model and testable hypotheses that embrace both the existing literature and the peculiarities of China’s banking system. Section IV describes the data we have gathered and the sample selection criteria employed. Section V presents empirical results, while Section VI is a summary and agenda for future research.

II. An Overview of China’s Banking System

Economists, policy-makers, business managers, and investors continue to follow with great interest the rapid evolution of China’s economic and financial system starting with the ascension of Deng Xiaoping as the country’s leader in 1978. Under “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, demand for banking services has skyrocketed, but the banking system is troubled. Chinese banking is dominated by state-owned banks, operates in an uncompetitive environment, and faces much pressure to contribute to political and social stability.6 Perhaps as a consequence, Chinese banks continue to be plagued with substantial amounts of non-performing loans.7 The web page of the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission8 reports a

6 See Dinc (2005), and Brown and Dinc (2005), for studies of political influences on banks in developing countries.

7 Podpiera (2006) reports that the ratios of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans for the four major state banks are 25.6%, 20.1%, and 15.6% in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively.

8 https://www.wendangku.net/doc/8b14399075.html,/english/home/jsp/index.jsp.

total of 1.268 trillion yuan (about 174 billion U.S. dollars, or 6.17% of total loans) of non-performing loans on the books of commercial banks at the end of 2007. Other estimates of the problem are even larger. Asset management companies formed by the Chinese government have liquidated substantial volumes of bank assets at heavy discounts. Poorly-performing state-owned enterprises are the heaviest borrowers.9

China’s banking sector has been the primary source of financing for China’s growing economy, with the banking and credit industry accounting for over 80 percent of China’s financial assets. The outstanding amount of bank loans is significantly greater than that of equity or corporate bonds. At the end of 2004, for example, total bank loans comprised 138.1% of GDP while the combined market value of China’s two stock exchanges was only 27.1% of GDP.10 Raising money with corporate bonds, rather than bank loans, is almost unheard of.11 With bank loans accounting for 87% of total funds raised by China’s non-financial sector as of June 2006, bank lending remains the dominant source of financing in China’s economy.

Under its traditional communist system, China’s government collected revenues from state-owned enterprises and provided financing to those firms according to the state budget. Eventually, the allocation of financing to firms was organized as bank loans from the People’s

9 Podpiera (2006) finds that state-owned commercial banks lend significantly more in provinces with lower enterprise profitability. This suggests that the lending decisions of these banks have been policy-driven.

10 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas report, issue 4, July/August 2005.

11Corporate bond issuance began in 1984 and, by 1986, 10 billion yuan ($1.2 billion) in face value was outstanding. However, many companies defaulted, leading to social unrest and subsequent government limitations on bond issuance to a small number of large state-owned enterprises. Currently only about a dozen such bonds trade on securities exchanges. Other barriers to issuing corporate bonds include high issuer qualifications, illiquidity, poor creditor protection in bankruptcy, and cheaper equity financing.

Bank of China (PBOC) and, starting in the late 1970s, from the four newly-established state-owned specialty banks, as well as joint-equity banks, city commercial banks, policy banks, and rural credit co-operatives.12 Though their share of bank loan activity is declining, the Big Four state-owned banks still hold over 50% of the banking sector’s assets as of June 2006. Joint-equity banks and city commercial banks account for nearly 16% and 6% of the sector’s assets, respectively, while other financial institutions such as policy banks and rural credit co-operatives hold the remaining assets.13

As a result of politically-oriented lending practices and the lack of repayment guarantees, the Big Four state-owned banks have historically been plagued by large ratios of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans. Under the current tax regime, both lenders and borrowers receive favorable tax treatment. Banks can, in general, deduct losses from bad loans and contributions to a bad loan reserve account from pre-tax income. Actual bad loan losses are written off against the reserve and any excess can be subtracted from pre-tax income.14 Borrowers can fully deduct

12Four state-owned commercial banks (China Industrial and Commercial Bank, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural Bank of China) were formed to replace the mono-bank system and separate commercial lending from central banking functions. Joint-equity banks are incorporated as limited companies and typically feature a state-dominated shareholding structure. City commercial banks evolved from urban credit co-operatives with business mainly in the city of location. Given strong ties to local governments, they typically obtain their deposits from local governments and corporations, and suffer high loan concentration and related party transactions. Other types of banks include policy banks, rural credit co-operatives, postal savings, and branches of foreign banks.

13 Deutsche Bank Research, China Special, December 7, 2006.

14 “Policy Details for Pre-tax Deduction of Bad Loan Losses in Financial Companies,” State Tax Bureau of China, Policy No. 4, 2002.

interest on bank loans from pre-tax income.15In recent years, the government has been implementing a series of reforms to improve the efficiency and profitability of the state banks, particularly given the impending opening of the domestic financial sector to foreigners under the WTO. First, a large percentage of bad loans have been transferred from the state banks to wholly state-owned asset management corporations (AMCs) in return for bonds guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance. 16 Second, three of the Big Four state banks have changed from wholly state-owned to corporations owned by shareholders, though the state remains the largest shareholder. Shareholder meetings, boards of directors, board of supervisors, and other western-style governance measures have been adopted. Perhaps most significantly, the government has allowed foreign investors (typically global financial services firms) to take minority ownership stakes in the state banks, loosening foreign ownership ceilings in the hope that foreigners will provide additional capital, technology, and management skill.17Lastly, three of the Big Four have recently gone public in Hong Kong, with China Construction Bank listed in Hong Kong in 2005, and Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China listed in Hong Kong and Shanghai in 2006. Public listing is intended to improve management, governance, transparency and, ultimately, profitability. Beyond the state banks, reforms have also extended to joint-equity

15 People’s Republic of China Corporate Income Tax, Provisional Code, December 13, 1993.

16Given the poor cash recovery rate (less than 25%) on these bad loans, the government is effectively transferring large amount of funds to the state banks. In some cases, there were direct cash injections. In 2003, for example, Bank of China and China Construction Bank each received US$22.5 billion from China’s foreign reserves.

17In 2005, for example, Bank of America Corporation and Temasek invested $3.0 billion and $2.5 billion for approximately 9 and 6 percent ownership in China Construction Bank. The deal included one seat on the board of directors and transfer of some staff.

banks and city commercial banks, a number of which have obtained foreign partners or listing on mainland or Hong Kong stock exchanges.

In spite of these efforts, many problems remain in China’s banking system. The ownership shares of foreign strategic investors are relatively small and their involvement in governance is still minimal. The banking system is still dominated by state-owned enterprises, and bank lending continues to be driven by the availability of funds, not borrower profitability.18 China’s banks remain largely constrained by government intervention at different levels and subject to substantial political influence, and continue to lack sound credit-risk analysis and effective monitoring of borrowers. Dobson and Kashyap (2006) provide anecdotal evidence that government influence on bank loan decisions is still widespread despite the substantial progress of reform. As they suggest, banks in China are forced to meet contradictory goals of supporting employment and changing themselves into modern commercial banks. An anonymously-quoted banker recently went so far as to say that “The Chinese banks are pure utilities…The State Council tells them to lend, and they lend.”19

A symptom of the continuing problems in China’s financial system are the highly publicized cases of embezzlement of corporate funds from listed companies through “related party transactions” (also known as “connected transactions”) with controlling shareholders. Controlling shareholders extract assets or cash from a listed company to another private company mostly through self-dealing transactions. Existing studies have found a negative impact of related party transaction on listed companies’ share value. For example, Cheung, Jing, Rau, and Stouraitis (2005) find that Chinese firms with higher state ownership experience more

18 See Podpiera (2006) for details.

19 “Red mist”, 4th February 2010, https://www.wendangku.net/doc/8b14399075.html,.

negative excess returns at the announcement of related party transactions. A variation on this “tunneling” directly involves the banking system: a listed company uses bank loans to obtain funds that are subsequently transferred, via related party transactions, to its parent company or other related privately-held company. In some particularly notorious cases, the controlling shareholder subsequently sold off the heavily-indebted listed company.

III. Theory and Testable Hypotheses

A. The Announcement Effect of Bank Loans Under Different Ownership Regimes

Unlike directly placed debt whose terms depend only on public information, the bank loan decision and loan covenants are based on both public information and the information from costly monitoring. Banks have incentives to expend resources to investigate and monitor borrowers to produce valuable information and alleviate moral hazard. For example, Diamond (1984) suggests that banks exist because they can evaluate and monitor borrowers efficiently, addressing the “free rider” problem and thereby reducing information asymmetry. Since banks enjoy information advantages relative to outside investors, bank loans are viewed as inside debt that may enhance a borrowing firm’s value by reducing information asymmetries and monitoring firm performance. Thus, previous studies have explained positive bank loan announcement effects with the notion of inside debt.

However, this logic implicitly assumes that banks are independent corporations governed by shareholders with the objective of value maximization. In a transitional economy like China’s, banks have historically been state-owned, and may pursue goals beyond value maximization. State-owned banks have been obliged to provide loans to keep firms afloat in order to maintain employment and, ultimately, social stability given China’s lack of a well-functioning social

“safety net”.20 Furthermore, Chinese banks may be pressured to issue loans to serve the political goals of local governments.

In financial markets with transparent and exclusive ownership structures, Diamond (1991) shows that borrowers with credit ratings toward the middle of the spectrum have an incentive to seek monitoring and hence rely on bank loans. Borrowers with very high or low credit ratings typically do not need bank monitoring. In China, however, state ownership of banks and lack of alternative financing vehicles compel state-controlled firms regardless of quality to seek bank loans as the primary form of external financing. Healthy firms with growth opportunities easily obtain bank loans as value maximization is one objective of the banks, and distressed firms may also receive bank loans given the political mandate of the state-owned banks. Given state ownership of both banks and borrowers coupled with the lack of enforcement of bankruptcy procedures, bank loans are frequently not serviced or repaid. In effect, the government insures deposits and, thus, the risk of a run on a state bank is minimal. Furthermore, interest rates on bank loans are regulated by the government and are not effectively linked to borrower credit ratings, giving weak firms further incentives to seek bank loans. Firms may also obtain bank loans due to contacts with, or pressure from, various levels of government. Under these circumstances, the signaling value of bank loans is no longer obvious.

A bank receives useful but noisy inside information from a prospective borrower as part of the loan application process. Thus, there are two levels of uncertainty in the process. At the first stage, both a bank and stock market participants do not know whether a particular firm is good or bad. At the second stage, the bank learns whether the firm should be judged

20 See Bai, Li, Tao, and Wang (2000) for a theory of state enterprise reform that captures the production versus social stability trade-off.

commercially or granted a loan on political grounds. If this information, which is not observed by the market, indicates "commercial, not political," the bank then decides whether or not to invest resources to observe further private but noisy information. If, in contrast, the loan should be granted on political grounds, the bank forgoes the cost of generating further private information about the prospective borrower.

When a loan is announced, stock market participants must use public information to sort

through several related uncertainties. These include whether the borrower is low or high quality whether the loan was granted on political or commercial grounds, and, if granted on commercial grounds, how to update the borrower’s creditworthiness. Next, we present a model of the valuation effect of bank loan announcements in a pooling equilibrium that reflects the average quality of the borrowers financed by bank loans. An intriguing and intuitive consequence of our model is that the stock market’s assessment of a borrower’s value can result in a negative response to a loan announcement.

B. A Pooling Equilibrium for the Bank Loan Announcement Effect

We begin by assuming that there are two types of firms seeking external finance. High

quality firms have a good credit rating and positive NPV projects,21 while low quality firms do not have positive NPV projects and are unlikely to be able to service their debt. Low quality firms have a value, V , which is distributed as ~()V G Ω with mean L μand variance 2L

σ. Similarly, high quality firms have a higher market value, V , with distribution 2~(,)H H

V G μσ. 21 Note that “high quality” may include troubled firms that, with a loan, can implement positive NPV projects and

return to health.

Independently-governed profit-maximizing banks would not lend to a low quality firm.

However, when both banks and borrowing firms have mutually inclusive or connected state ownership, banks may lend not only on the worthiness of the borrower’s investment projects but also for political reasons. Both high and low quality firms may obtain bank loans. From the point-of-view of stock market traders, who are informationally disadvantaged, high and low quality firms cannot be distinguished and a pooling equilibrium that reflects the probabilities that high or low quality firms can obtain bank loans prevails in the stock market.

Because stock traders cannot distinguish whether firms that obtain loans are high or low

quality, they do not know the exact value of a firm. We assume that the market value of a firm, V , is a random variable that follows a mixture distribution with probability β that the firm is low quality (V ) and probability 1- β that the firm is high quality (V ). Therefore, V from the point-of-view of stock market traders can be expressed as:

V V V )1(ββ?+= , where 10<<β (1) The ex ante mean and variance of firm value from the market’s point-of-view are:

H L V E V E EV μββμββ)1()1(?+=?+=

(2a) ()2222[]1L H Var V βσβσ=+?

(2b) Assume that a bank loan announcement is a random event from the point-of-view of

stock market participants. Let “loan” equal 1 if a bank loan is issued or 0 otherwise. We assume that the prior probabilities that high and low quality firms get bank loans are as follows:

H V V loan P Pr )|1(===, H V V loan P Pr 1)|0(?=== (3)

L V V loan P Pr )|1(===, L V V loan P Pr 1)|0(?===

The priors, Pr H and Pr L , depend on the probability that a firm receives a politically-motivated loan versus a commercially-determined loan, and, if the latter, on the process by which the bank decides whether or not to invest resources in evaluating a loan’s commercial viability.

The expected payoff to making a loan (prior to determining whether or not to incur the information cost) versus merely buying a government bond is:

*(1)rf k EV EV R ββ=+?? (4)

where rf R is the risk free payoff from a government security.

A (risk neutral) bank chooses to investigate a specific firm’s creditworthiness if the cost of the investigation, k , is less than the expected payoff, *k . We assume that k is publicly known. A loan will be made under two circumstances: (1) if a firm is investigated and found to be high quality after investing k or (2) if a bad firm is to be propped up for non-economic reasons, without being investigated. The bank does not make a loan if an investigated firm is of low quality or if it chooses not to invest k in information production when there are no political considerations.

The bank does not publish the result of an investigation of a prospective borrower, nor does it even indicate whether or not an investigation was conducted. Thus, from the perspective of stock traders, only two kinds of events are observable for a potential borrowers, (1) whether the payoff, *k , exceeds the investigation cost, k , and (2) whether the loan is made. We will analyze how stock traders evaluate a potential borrower with the following matrix of publicly-observed outcomes:

Loan = 0

Loan =1 *

k k >Scenario I Scenario II *

k k ≤Scenario III Scenario IV

Let 'β denote the posterior probability that a firm is of low quality computed by stock traders based on the four possible outcomes in the matrix.

In Scenario I, it is sensible that a loan is not granted because *k k > and stock traders know that no investigation will take place and that no loan is issued. Thus, no additional information is revealed to stock traders, and they set 'ββ= and do not change their evaluation of the firm. In Scenario II, a loan is made even though *k k >, clearly indicating to stock traders that the borrower is a low quality firm being supported for political reasons:

'*(low quality firm| loan=1,)1P k k β=>= (5a)

'*1(high quality firm| loan=1,)0P k k β?=>= (5b)

In Scenario III, the expected payoff is greater than the cost of investigation but no loan is granted. In Scenario IV, the expected payoff is greater than the cost of investigation and a loan is issued. Under the fourth Scenario, the posterior probability, 'β, is updated using the method of Bayes. The loan event causes stock traders to update their beliefs about firm value, though they cannot resolve perfectly whether the successful borrower is a good firm receiving a loan on a commercial basis or a bad firm being supported for political reasons. Hence, the conditional probabilities that a firm is low quality or high quality given the firm gets a bank loan are:

'*Pr )1(Pr Pr ),1|(ββββ=?+=≤==H

L L

k k loan V V P (6a)

'*1Pr )1(Pr Pr )1(),1|(ββββ?=?+?=≤==H L H k k loan V V P (6b) Thus, the posterior expected firm value is:

V E k k loan V E H H H H L ==?+

))(Pr (Pr Pr )1(Pr )(),1|(2

*H L H L H

L H L EV k k Loan V E EV μμββθμμβ???+=?Δ=?≤==Δ

(8) In equation (8), )1(2ββθ?=, and 02>θ given 10<<β. By construction,H L μμ<, so

()0L H μμ?<. Thus, if H L Pr Pr < , then 0>ΔEV . Put another way, the expected market value

of a firm announcing approval of a bank loan increases if the probability that a loan is issued to a high quality firm is higher than the probability that a loan is issued to a low quality firm, as would be the case in a “normal” environment where the loan decision is based purely on value maximization. In contrast, if H L Pr Pr >, then 0E Δ<. The expected market value of a firm

announcing a bank loan declines if a low quality firm is more likely to obtain a bank loan.

Thus, we may observe the seemingly perverse outcome of negative market responses to bank loan announcements if bank lending is not purely dependent on borrower quality and information asymmetry is severe. A positive stock market reaction would only encourage low quality firms to borrow more, yielding an increasing supply of low quality borrowers and ever-declining average quality. Thus, negative average price reactions must prevail. This echoes the used car market of Akerlof (1970): the average quality tends to decline, and only “lemons” are offered for sale.

C. Testable Hypotheses

Given the ideas outlined above, we organize our empirical tests around several testable hypotheses. We begin with basic notions of who gets a bank loan and what that forecasts about the future, contrasting conventional inside debt notions with state-led bailouts as motivations for loans:

H1a: Approval of a bank loan indicates a high-quality, creditworthy borrower.

H1b: Approval of a bank loan indicates a poor-performing firm which cannot obtain sufficient funds from operations and receives support from the state-led banking system.

Under H1a or H1b, receipt of a bank loan has implications for how the borrower is likely to fare in the future:

H2a: Approval of a bank loan predicts good borrower performance in the future.

H2b: Approval of a bank loan predicts poor borrower performance in the future.

Next, we state some hypotheses about stock market reactions to bank loan announcements. Such reactions are potentially complex: stock traders should react positively to bank loans in a banking environment driven purely by commercial considerations, but may react negatively to loans granted in an environment of bail-outs or other non-commercial motivations for lending. In our pooling equilibrium model, both high and low quality firms might get bank loans. Thus, a bank loan announcement does not send a precise signal that eliminates the information asymmetry between the stock market and the borrower, but stock market participants have some ability to estimate borrower quality:

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2016年银行安全保卫工作计划

2016年银行安全保卫工作计划 1、2016年银行安全保卫工作计划 20XX年安全保卫工作按照上级行的总体要求，深入学习贯彻党的十七大精神，紧紧围绕建设社会主义和-谐社会目标，认真落实科学发展观，按照《中国人民银行“十一五”期间安全保卫工作规划》要求，加强保卫队伍建设，加快安全防范设施建设，积极探索安全保卫工作的改革，促进我支行安全保卫工作水平的提高。一、提高认识，加强领导支行领导要高度重视安全保卫工作，始终把安全保卫工作纳入党组工作的重要议事日程，把安全工作始终放在首位，把防范各类案件和事故的发生当作头等大事来抓。压滤机滤布要以国家财产和职工生命安全高度负责的精神，认真履行职责，建立健全奖惩机制，把安全保卫工作纳入考核与管理，真正实行“一票否决”制，真正把安全保卫工作落到实处。行长是安全工作的第一责任人，办公室主任、保卫人员是安全保卫工作的直接责任人，要以高度的政治责任心和事业责任感对保卫工作负责，认真抓落实。要把安全保卫工作纳入总体规划和年度工作计划，做到年初有计划，半年有小结，年终有总结，做到制度健全，人员落实，管理到位。支行要侧重抓好内部安全管理，防范和化解风险隐患，杜绝治安刑事案件和责任事故的发生。要加强对职工的安全教育力度，提高职工遵纪守法和自觉防范风险的意识，做到“管好自己的人、看好自己的门、办好自己的事”，确保一方平安。二、加强保卫队伍建设，不断提高保卫人员的综合素质保卫队伍是人民银行工作中的一支重要力量，安全工作的好坏事关人民银行整体工作的开展和安全，是做好各项基础工作的根本保障。日常要加强对保卫人员的思想教育

和职业道德教育，引导他们树立正确的人生观、价值观和无私奉献精神，使他们能积极主动克服困难，自觉做到识大体、顾大局、讲奉献、讲团结，甘于吃苦、安心本职，努力完成工作任务。保卫人员要克服自卑情绪和思想，要自尊、自重、自爱、自醒、自强，从根本上树立热爱保卫工作思想。保卫人员要加强学习，努力掌握现代科学知识和管理手段，要加强事业心和责任感不断提高自身素质。部门负责人是保卫工作的“领头羊”，安全工作的好坏关键是带头和以身作责。今年的安全保卫工作要始终遵循“超前防范”和“警惕出安全”的总要求，按照“规范、守纪、创新”工作思路，力增20XX年有新的起色和亮点。为提高保卫人员的综合业务素质，支行要积极派人参加上级行举办的“新知识、新业务、新技能”的培训和岗位技能练兵比武活动，不断提高保卫业务知识、监控设备操作、突发事件处置等方面的能力。三、加强制度建设，严格落实各项规章，加强应急准备和演练工作。为使各项规章制度更加标准化、规范化，支行将结合“制度落实年”活动，进一步修订《防盗窃应急预案》。保卫人员要严格按照上级行的要求填报各种账、卡、薄，滤布严禁违章操作。继续做好对安全保卫工作应急预案的修改、补充和完善。加强应急预案的演练工作，按照总行精神，演练要注重效果，可以进行实战型、推演型演练。我支行将在年内组织一次消防安全应急演练活动，并上报相关资料和图片。四、认真落实党风廉政建设、案件事故防范责任制，大力推动反腐倡廉建设。一是要加强党风廉政建设、案件事故防范教育，每半年至少进行一次党风廉政建设、案件事故防范教育和思想动态综合分析。完善反腐倡廉“大宣教”工作格局，坚持监督联席会议制度，拓展教育内容，丰富教育形式，强化宣传教育效果，深入开展廉洁从政教育和警示教育。要认真学习贯彻党的十七大精神和中央纪委十七届二次全会精神，认真

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