我国上市银行高管薪酬与银行绩效的实证分析

摘要

银行业是我国经济健康运转的重要基础，银行业发展的好坏对社会经济有着举足轻重的影响，而银行高管对其所在银行的经营业绩又起着至关重要的作用。自从我国商业银行改制以来，上市商业银行高管的天价薪酬越来越引起社会的广泛关注和质疑。同时，随着改革开放的不断推进，拥有完善的产业结构和先进的高管薪酬激励机制的外资银行全面地融入到我国金融行业的竞争中来，而我国商业银行的薪酬激励制度并不完善，其对银行高管的激励作用没有外资银行显著，这导致我国很多高层管理人才的流失。上市银行高管的薪酬是否过高？高管人员的天价薪酬是否能对银行的综合绩效产生显著影响？怎样使高管薪酬与商业银行的业绩达到内在的一致性？采取怎样的措施来吸引管理人才为银行创造价值？面对这些问题，我国商业银行应该如何制定合理的薪酬管理制度，使上市商业银行的利益达到最大化。

本文在参考国内外相关文献的基础上，以我国沪深两市的14家商业银行作为研究样本，搜集这些样本2009年至2013年共五年的相关财务数据并整理成面板数据，建立回归模型对我国上市商业银行高管薪酬与其业绩之间的关系进行实证研究。实证结果表明：我国上市商业银行高管薪酬基本上与银行经营绩效存在一定相关性，但薪酬的激励作用比较有限。这是由于银行高管的薪酬激励更多考虑的是其对银行盈利增加的激励，而对提升银行资本使用效率的激励却考虑的较少。从高管薪酬激励的有效性来看，虽然我国商业银行高管薪酬的增加与每股收益指标保持高度同步的关系，但银行的资产收益率却反而下降，这反映出高薪并没有带来实际的高效，说明我国商业银行对高管提供的薪酬所起到的激励作用并不十分理想，成本控制能力不强，整体经营的资源配置不合理。

根据实证的结论，本文针对银行高管薪酬激励制度存在的问题，认为进一步完善我国银行业高管薪酬制度还需要：建立健全业绩考核评价机制；健全完善上市银行高管薪酬信息披露制度；重视长期激励，完善组合激励；加强内部监督，完善银行治理机制等。

关键词：上市银行高管薪酬薪酬激励经营绩效

ABSTRACT

The banking industry is an important basic to our healthy operation of the economy. The development of the banking industry plays a decisive role on the social economy, and the bank's executives are playing a vital role on their operating performance. Since China's commercial banks reformed, doubts and concerns about the sky-high cost of the bank's executives are raising widespreadly. At the same time, with the continuous advance of the reform and opening-up, foreign-funded banks which own the improved industrial structure and the advanced senior managers' compensation mechanism fully integrated into our financial industry competition. However China's commercial banks compensation incentive system is not very perfect, the incentive effect to the senior executives is less far from than the foreign banks do, which cause the big loss of senior managers. Is the listed bank executives' payment too high? Whether the sky-high cost of the bank's executives have a great significance on the performance of the bank? How to make senior executives' payment and the bank performance achieve consistency? How to take measures to attract senior executives to create more value to our commercial banks? Faced with these problems, China's commercial banks should make reasonable salary management system to maximize their benefits.

Based on the related literature at home and abroad, this paper select 14 listed commercial banks as study samples.Collect the relevant financial data from 2009 to 2013 and sort out into panel data, then establish regression model to do the research on the relationship between senior executives' payment and banks' performance.The empirical results show that: the senior executives' payment of the China's listed commercial bank has a certain relationship with the bank performance, but the incentive function of compensation is limited. This is because our senior managers' compensation mechanism pay more attention to the banks' increased profitability, not the capital efficiency. Although the increase of the senior managers' compensation and the per-share earnings index maintain a highly synchronous relationship, but the bank's return on assets index falls. It reflects that the high salary didn’t bring actual efficiency. It shows that the senior managers' compensation which China's commercial banks provide didn’t make an

ideal result, the cost control ability is weak and the overall allocation of resources is irrational.

Therefore, in this paper, aiming at solving the problems existing in Chinese executive compensation system, banks should take the following suggestions：reform Chinese banking executive compensation incentive system; improve the disclosure system of the listed bank executive compensation; highlight the long-term incentive, improve the incentive combination; strengthen internal supervision and improve internal governance mechanism continuously etc.

Key Words：Listed banks Senior Managers' Compensation Compensation Incentive Performance of Listed Banks

目录

摘要.............................................................. I ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................................... I I 绪论 (7)

0.1研究背景和意义 (7)

0.1.1研究背景 (7)

0.1.2研究意义 (8)

0.2文献综述 (9)

0.2.1国外文献综述 (9)

0.2.2国内文献综述 (11)

0.3研究思路和内容 (15)

0.3.1研究思路 (15)

0.3.2研究内容 (24)

0.4研究方法 (25)

0.5创新点与不足 (25)

0.5.1本文创新点 (25)

0.5.2不足之处 (26)

1 上市银行高管薪酬与银行绩效的理论分析 (27)

1.1相关概念厘定 (27)

1.1.1高级管理人员 (27)

1.1.2高管薪酬 (27)

1.1.3公司绩效 (28)

1.2高管薪酬与银行绩效的理论基础 (29)

1.2.1委托—代理理论 (29)

1.2.2公司治理理论 (30)

1.2.3人力资本理论 (31)

1.2.4激励理论 (32)

2我国上市银行高管薪酬现状分析....................... 错误！未定义书签。

2.1基本建立起绩效薪酬激励制度 (35)

2.2高管薪酬以短期激励为主 (36)

2.3银行高管薪酬水平总体较高 (36)

2.4不同性质银行高管薪酬差异显著 (37)

2.5高管薪酬信息披露不足 (38)

3我国上市银行高管薪酬与银行绩效的实证分析 (39)

3.1样本选择与数据来源 (39)

3.1.1样本选择 (39)

3.1.2数据来源 (40)

3.2变量选择 (40)

3.2.1薪酬变量 (39)

3.2.2经营业绩指标 (40)

3.3研究假设 (43)

3.4实证分析 (44)

3.4.1描述性统计分析 (44)

3.4.2相关性分析 (45)

3.4.3回归分析 (48)

3.4.4实证结论分析 (16)

4 完善我国银行高管薪酬激励制度的建议 (18)

4.1建立健全业绩考核评价机制 (18)

4.2健全完善上市银行高管薪酬信息披露制度 (39)

4.3重视长期激励，完善组合激励 (39)

4.4加强内部监督，完善银行治理机制 (21)

5研究局限与研究展望 (21)

5.1研究局限 (21)

5.2研究展望 (22)

参考文献............................................. 错误！未定义书签。致谢................................................. 错误！未定义书签。

图表目录

图目录

图0-1研究技术路线图 (9)

图2-1 银行高管薪酬平均水平图 (23)

图2-2不同上市银行高管薪酬对比图 (24)

图3-1car与ccar,roa与roe的散点图 (33)

表目录

表3-1选取变量的描述性统计结果 (30)

表3-2 各变量相关系数表 (31)

表3-3模型汇总 (34)

表3-4回归方差分析 (34)

表3-5回归系数表 (34)

表3-6模型回归结果 (35)